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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic methodology is concerned, in a very important 
sense, with providing a philosophical legitimation for the 
claims of economic inquiry. If an economist is asked "Why 
should one believe your theories?" or, "Why should one sup-
port public policy that is based on your theories?", the 
answer given can be considered to be a methodological state-
ment. Mark Blaug notes in the preface to his influential 
book Ih~ tl~lhQ~Q!QBY Qf ~~QRQmi~§, "I have added the 
subtitle, tlQ~ ~~QRQmi§l§ ~~El~irr, suggesting that 'the 
methodology of economics' is to be understood simply as 
philosophy of science applied to economics" <Blaug, 1980, 
p. Xi). 
Philosophy of science has traditionally been concerned 
with providing a philosophical legitimation for the claims 
of scientific inquiry in general. Blaug notes that 11 Anyone 
consulting some current textbooks in the philosophy of sci-
ence will soon discover that the philosophy of science ... 
appears to consist largely of a purely logical analysis of 
the formal structure of scientific theories, which seem to 
be more concerned with prescribing good scientific practice 
than with describing what it is that has actually passed as 
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science ... " CBlaug, 1980, p. 1). 
The notion of philosophy of science as prescriptive, 
however, has been undergoing a drastic change in the last 
two decades. Philosophy of science, which had been built 
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largely upon positivist foundations, or at least shaped by 
positivist ideals, has been dominated by a raging debate 
about whether it should be prescriptive (in the traditional 
sense), or whether it should give up prescriptive preten-
sions and settle for a descriptive role of the sort 
popularized by Thomas Kuhn in Ih~ ~iL~£i~L~ £f ~£i~rriifi£ 
R~Y£l~ii£rr~. This debate, moreover, has filtered down to 
economics. A review of recent literature in this area <pro-
vided in Chapter II) reveals an overwhelming concern of 
economic methodologists in coming to grips with the ideas of 
Thomas Kuhn, the late Imre Lakatos, and other contemporary 
philosophers of science. 
Some economic methodologists -- most notably, Bruce 
Caldwell -- have concluded that the ideal of a single, pre-
scriptive methodology for economics should be given up. 
They advocate methodological pluralism. Caldwell specifi-
cally has lined out a program for methodological appraisal 
from a pluralistic perspective. He suggests that, in 
addition to an assessment of the internal logical consisten-
cy of a research programme, a critical assessment of its 
strengths and limitations, etc., should be preceded by a 
"rational reconstruction" of its methodological content. 
Furthermore, Caldwell emphasizes, "Every such reconstruction 
should be from a particular point of view that should be 
explicitly stated" (Caldwell, pp. 245-246). Within this 
program, then, a methodological appraisal would be both 
descriptive and evaluative. 
This dissertation is a methodological appraisal of 
certain key aspects of neoclassical economics, carried out 
in the spirit of Caldwell's program of methodological plu-
ralism. Neoclassical economics has, of course, been the 
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subject of several methodological appraisals. The uniqueness 
of the present appraisal is its "point of view" -- its 
hermeneutical perspective. Neoclassical economics was cho-
sen for this project not only because it is the dominant 
research programme in economics, but also because the fact 
that it has been appraised (methodologically) from other 
perspectives facilitates a comparison of the hermeneutical 
perspective with those other perspectives. 
Philosophical hermeneutics is concerned primarily with 
the development of a theory of human understanding. It is 
rooted in a concern with ontological issues, as opposed to 
positivist philosophy of science which is rooted in a con-
cern with epistemological issues. It should, therefore, 
provide an interesting and fruitful contrast with other 
perspectives on economic methodology. It is also an appro-
priate perspective to introduce to methodological appraisal 
in economics because it is having a significant impact on 
methodological issues in other social sciences (Outhwaite, 
p 37). 
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The key figure in contemporary philosophical hermeneu-
tics is the German philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics (discussed more fully 
in Chapter III) is the specific perspective that informs the 
appraisal of neoclassical economics in Chapt~rs IV thru IX. 
This appraisal begins with a so-called "rational reconstruc-
tion" of neoclassical economics (Chapter IV). This is a 
standard procedure for methodological appraisal under 
Caldwell's suggested program, and it also serves to clarify 
the sense in which "neoclassical economics" is used in this 
appraisal. Next, in Chapter V, an exploration is presented 
of the adequacy of neoclassical economic inquiry. This 
exploration is guided by Gadamer's model of conversation in 
which he emphasizes the importance of asking the "right" 
questions. This is followed by three chapters which evalu-
ate several methodological issues which have been evaluated 
from several perspectives --methodological individualism is 
considered in Chapter VI, the rationality postulate and the 
theory of consumer behavior in Chapter VII, and the 
normative/positive distinction is taken up in Chapter VIII. 
And finally, in Chapter IX, Milton Friedman's "Essay on 
Positive Economics" and the debate over explanation versus 
prediction is reviewed from a hermeneutical perspective. 
Friedman's essay is deemed worthy of explicit attention 
because it is, according to Blaug, "the centerpiece of 
postwar economic methodology, the one essay on methodologi-
cal questions that virtually every modern economist has read 
at some stage in his or her career .•. " <Blaug, 1980, 
p. 103). 
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Throughout this appraisal the views of other economic 
methodologists have been incorporated in ways deemed useful 
for purposes of clarification, contrast and comparison. The 
final chapter (Chapter Xl summarizes the findings of this 
appraisal regarding the strengths and weaknesses of neoclas-
sical economics from a hermeneutical perspective. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON POST-KUHNIAN 
ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 
Economic methodology in this century has, for the most 
part, reflected the strong influence of the positivist heri-
tage in the philosophy of science. In the past 25 years or 
so, however, the philosophy of science has been in a state 
of turmoil. The 1962 publication of Thomas Kuhn's popular 
and influential Ih~ ~1~~£1~~~ Qf ~£i~rr1ifi£ R~YQl~!iQrr~ 
posed a challenge to Popperian falsificationism and kicked 
off what has come to be known as the "growth of knowledge" 
movement in philosophy of science. Kuhn's work seemed to 
"pull the rug out from under" the claim that science is a 
rational enterprise. Imre Lakatos, in an effort to shore up 
science's claim to rationality while maintaining Kuhn's de-
scriptive accuracy regarding actual scientific practice, 
developed the methodology of scientific research programmes 
( MSRP) . 
The literature on economic methodology has increasingly 
reflected an attempt to come to grips with the work of Kuhn 
and Lakatos. But a review of the literature leaves one with 
the distinct impression that economic inquiry is methodolog-
ically ungrounded. Douglas Hands recently examined the 
6 
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applicability of Lakatos' MSRP to economics and concluded 
that it "must be negatively appraised" ( 1985, p. 13). Bruce 
Caldwell claims, "The most significant contribution of the 
'growth of knowledge' philosophers was the demonstration 
that the quest for a single, universal prescriptive scien 
tific methodology is quixotic" (p. 244). Caldwell advocates 
methodological pluralism. Still another economist, Donald 
McCloskey, argues that all the concern about scientific 
methodology is a misplaced concern, that instead economics 
would benefit from a heightened awareness of the rhetoric of 
economics <McCloskey, p. 509). 
Turmoil in the Philosophy of Science 
~£QnQIDi£~ C1980), Hands points out that philosophy of sci-
ence "has undergone a major upheaval during the last twenty 
years" (1984, p. 116). And although a new consensus philos-
ophy of science does not appear to be imminent, it has 
become widely accepted that, "The so-ca 11 ed 'received view' 
of the preceding epoch is dead" (Hands, 1984, p. 116). What 
has happened is that a new growth of knowledge movement has 
apparently pulled off a successful revolution against what 
Caldwell states as 
... the long-held views that scientific activity is 
best distinguished by the rigor and objectivity of 
its methods and that science progresses by the 
gradual accumulation of true knowledge, either in 
the form of brute, atomic facts or in the form of 
theories whose structural characteristics mimic an 
objectively discernable phenomenal reality. The 
growth of knowledge tradition emphasizes that 
science is a dynamic, growing enterprise, that its 
impressive successes are not due to its having 
followed immutable and objective procedures 
( p. 244) • 
In a nutshell, the growth of knowledge movement has raised 
severe doubts about any legitimate prescriptive role for 
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philosophy of science and about the epistemological validity 
of scientific knowledge itself. 
The following is a summary of the contemporary debate 
in philosophy of science. The philosophy of science has 
gone through several phases in attempting to provide a basis 
for the superiority of scientific knowledge, each phase 
being weaker than the previous phase. The verificationists 
laid down criteria (verifiability) for a theory being con-
sidered "scientific" as well as rules for determining 
(verifying) the truth of a theory. The falsificationists, 
emphasizing that there is no amount of empirical observation 
that will provide conclusive proof that a theory is true, 
proposed changing the criterion for scientific status from 
verifiability to falsifiability and provided their own 
rules -- very complex and sophisticated ones in Popper's 
philosophy -- for determining when a theory must be consid-
ered false. The falsificationists admitted that scientific 
knowledge could not be claimed to be conclusively true, but 
they claimed that science is still rational and that it 
generates knowledge that at least grows ever closer to the 
truth. Both the verificationists and the falsificationists 
advocated a prescriptive approach to philosophy of science. 
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Then Kuhn, with the publication of Ih~ ~!r~g!~r~ Qf 
~gi~n1ifi£ E~YQ1~1iQll~ in 1962, shifted the debate from one 
over alternative prescriptions to one of prescription versus 
description. Kuhn's descriptive study of the history of 
scientific practice pointed out major stages (revolutions) 
in the scientific process that necessarily rely on non-
rational decisions by scientists. Kuhn's study became the 
focus of the contemporary debate in philosophy of science, 
apparently because it created a large opening for critics of 
science bent on challenging the notion of the inherent 
superiority of scientific knowledge. Laka~os attempted to 
formulate a methodology, described in a later section, that 
was descriptively accurate while still providing assurance 
that science is rational. 
Paul Feyerabend, however, claimed that Lakatos' method-
ology actually did not rule out anything, and thus was 
equivalent to no scientific method, that is, equivalent to 
Feyerabend's own proposal that ''anything goes~. Feyerabend 
made explicit what the philosophy of science debate is 
ultimately about (i.e., whether there is any unique sort of 
knowledge that is classifiable as "scientific knowledge" and 
whether such knowledge has any legitimate claim to superior-
ity over any other sort of knowledge such as myth, 
metaphysical, religious, etc.). 
Revolutions in Economic Thought 
Positivist philosophy of science -- used in the broadest 
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sense to include Sir Karl Popper's falsificationism -- has 
been the dominant influence on mainstream economic methodol-
ogy in this century. The mainstream writers have engaged in 
disputes about "direct versus indirect" testing of hypothe-
ses, the importance or irrelevance of assumptions being 
realistic, and about whether predictive accuracy, explanato-
ry power, or descriptive accuracy should be the goal of 
economic theory. But they have overwhelmingly accepted the 
notion that the validity of economic theory must, at some 
point, be judged on the basis of empirical evidence. 
With hindsight, however, it may become apparent that 
Kuhn's I~~ ~~L~~~~L~ Qf ~~i~rr~ifi~ R~YQl~~iQrr~ in 1962 
signalled the end of the positivist era in economic method-
ology. Kuhn's work generated very little attention from 
economists during the 1960's. It wasn't until 1965 that an 
economics article suggested that his work was applicable to 
economics, and it wasn't until 1969 that an economics arti-
cle was exclusively concerned with the application of 
Kuhnian thought to economics. But since 1970, the attention 
of economic methodologists has focused increasingly on 
placing economic methodology in the "growth of knowledge" 
perspective. 
According to Kuhn, most scientific activity is carried 
out within an accepted theoretical framework which has been 
built upon past scientific achievements. The accepted 
theoretical framework reflects certain beliefs about the 
world, and it serves as a foundatiqn for the articulation of 
1 1 
problems that must be solved if the range of explanatory 
power is to be extended. Furthermore, even the methods of 
research that were used in the foundational achievements 
tend to be accepted as the legitimate methods, and thus 
perpetuated. All of this adds up to what Kuhn characterizes 
as paradigm-based research. The term "paradigm," in the 
broad sense, "stands for the entire conste 11 at ion of be-
liefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members 
of a given community" (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 175). Paradigm-based 
research is what Kuhn refers to as "normal science." It is 
research aimed at the fleshing out and extension of the 
already accepted theoretical framework, and contradictory 
theories and viewpoints tend to be suppressed by the estab-
lished scientific community. Kuhn claims that the research 
problems pursued tend to be those which are seen as holding 
the most promise for such fleshing out and extension, and 
has likened the process to puzzle-solving. 
Normal science can be seen, according to Kuhn, as an 
attempt to improve the perceived fit between the theoretical 
structure and nature. In this process, there will always be 
discrepancies in the fit which can be characterized as 
anomaly -- data which contradict the theoretical predic-
tions. Some discrepancies may become the subject of new 
normal science puzzle-solving activity, others may be set 
aside indefinitely to be dealt with later, but some discrep-
ancies may evoke a crisis that threatens the paradigm 
itself. Such crises result in what Kuhn characterizes as 
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''extraordinary research." Extraordinary science may involve 
deliberate attempts to find other areas where the paradigm 
seems to break down and it may involve new types of experi-
ments based on new and speculative theories. Such times of 
crisis may also be characterized by resort to philosophical 
analysis, methodological debate, and explicit questioning of 
underlying assumptions. Extraordinary science may spawn 
competing paradigms while the old paradigm is being weak-
ened. 
Kuhn's explanation of such crises and their resolution 
probably represents the most controversial aspect of his 
description of the scientific process. He maintains that 
scientists who switch from one paradigm to another during 
such crises, are strongly influenced by non-rational 
factors. He deliberately uses the term ''revolution" to 
characterize periods of widespread switching from one para-
digm to another, because of parallels he sees between 
political and scientific change. 
Kuhn discusses several things that tend to keep 
participants in a debate over paradigms from making complete 
logical contact with each other. A new paradigm is likely 
to assign somewhat different meanings to some of the vocabu-
lary of the old paradigm. A new paradigm is likely to 
employ a somewhat different set of criteria in determining 
what will be considered legitimate problems and solutions. 
A new paradigm will also be built around a new theoretical 
structure which purports to be a better fit with nature than 
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was the theoretical structure of the old paradigm. Thus, 
the new theories may be logically incompatible with the old 
ones to the extent that they generate a different set of 
predictions. And finally, Kuhn claims that scientists 
working within the new paradigm can be said to "see" a 
different world than their counterparts in the old paradigm. 
They "adopt new instruments and look in new places ... [and 
theyJ •.. see new and different things when looking with 
familiar instruments in places they have looked before" 
(Kuhn, 1970a, p. llll. 
So, for all these reasons, Kuhn concludes that scien-
tific revolutions are important stages in the growth of 
scientific knowledge that fall outside the logically con-
trolled processes of normal science. He refers to a decision 
to adopt a new paradigm as a conversion experience that 
cannot be forced by logic. And since the conversion results 
in a new way of seeing the world, Kuhn likens the process to 
a visual gestalt switch, or to a man who has put on invert-
ing lenses. "Confronting the same constellation of objects 
as before and knowing that he does so, he nevertheless finds 
them transformed through and through in many of their 
details" <Kuhn, 1970a, p. 122). 
Kuhn's ideas were first brought into economic litera-
ture by Donald Gordon in 1965. Gordon made the claim that 
Kuhn's description of "normal science" is an adequate char-
acterization of economics. He maintains that Adam Smith 
provided the basic paradigm--"the maximizing individual in a 
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relatively free market" <Gordon, p. 123l -- for the develop-
ment of economics as a normal science. According to Gordon, 
most of the research that has been done since Smith readily 
fits Kuhn's characterization of "mopping-up operations". 
However, he claims that unlike the natural sciences, there 
have been no revolutions in economics. There have been 
rebellions (e.g., the historicists and the institutional-
ists). "But the profession has never permitted the dissent 
to get out of hand" (Gordon, p. 124). 
Brian Loasby argued in a 1971 article that the diffi-
culty of overthrowing paradigms in economics is due, in 
large part, to the fact that "to discard a well-established 
paradigm is to discard an important part of one's apparatus 
for recognizing and solving problems" (p. 868). He illus-
trates this incentive for sticking with a paradigm by 
exploring the debate generated by the crisis in Marshallian 
value theory. 
Another strand of Kuhnian thought was taken up by 
Benjamin Ward. 
he explores the idea of academic economics as a special kind 
of social system, a sort of invisible college of economists 
who share a common perspective, complete with a system of 
rewards and punishments, a power elite, etc. He also exam-
ined the question of whether there have been revolutions (in 
the Kuhnian sense) in economics. He reached a different 
conclusion than Gordon. Ward maintains, as does Stanfield 
(19741, "Within economics, the Keynesian revolution was 
definitely a Kuhn ian revolution ... 11 (Ward, p. 40). 
The Keynesian revolution is the one that seems most 
likely to come to mind when Kuhnian thought is applied to 
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economics. But several others have been suggested as candi-
dates for Kuhnian revolutions. Bronfenbrenner (1971), with 
some modifications to Kuhnian thought, suggests that three 
revolutions can be identified. "They might be called the 
laissez-faire revolution, the utility revolution, and the 
macroeconomic revo 1 uti on 11 (Bran fen brenner, p. 150). Blaug, 
in a 1973 article, explored the question of whether there 
was a marginalist revolution. And Hicks, in a 1976 article, 
suggests a Ricardian revolution, a Marxian revolution, a 
marginalist revolution, and a Keynesian revolution. 
Some economists, however, have questioned the applica-
bility of Kuhnian thought to economics, while others have 
suggested that it is applicable only with certain modifica-
tions. Stigler (1969) rejects its applicability to either 
economics or the natural sciences on the ground that it 
lacks empirical content: "My main quarrel with Kuhn is over 
his failure to specify the nature of a paradigm in suffi-
cient detail that his central thesis can be tested 
empirically" (p. 225). 
Coats ( 1969) suggests that Kuhn's description of the 
way change takes place in the natural sciences may not be 
applicable to economics because economics may not be a 
mature science. Coats suggests, .since economists' "efforts 
to improve the match between the facts and the paradigm's 
predictions have met with only limited success ... [doesJ ... 
this not mean that by comparison with the natural sciences 
economics has not yet passed beyond the 'developmental' or 
pre-paradigm stage" Cp. 292)? 
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Bronfenbrenner (1972), on the other hand, maintains 
that Kuhnian thought can provide an appropriate perspective 
for understanding changes in economic thought if it is 
modified to reflect the dialectical nature of economic 
thought. Leonard Kunin and F. Stirton Weaver (1971) agree 
with Bronfenbrenner. They also stress the inherent differ-
ences between the natural sciences and economics. The 
physical sciences that Kuhn was describing are inquiries 
about a universe whose structure and behavior "do not exhib-
it change on a time scale which would alter significantly 
any important characteristics of the population of that 
universe ... [whileJ ... the economist studies a universe which 
changes historically" (Kunin and Weaver, pp. 394-395). 
Economics, they maintain, "is a profoundly historical 
science; its roots lie in the attempt to understand a par-
ticular configuration of human (social) institutions" <Kunin 
and Weaver, p. 395). Hicks ( 1976) also strongly emphasized 
this difference between economics and the natural sciences. 
Ward had suggested that economics is primarily con-
cerned with maintaining control and providing for orderly 
adjustments of liberal society. This, of course, is one of 
the main contentions of radical economists. Gerald Peabody 
(1971) makes essentially the same point in the lead article 
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of the July 1971 issue of Ih§ R§Yi§~ Qf R~~i~~l ~Qli~i~~l 
~~QnQmi~~. an issue devoted to an examination of the rela-
tionship of Kuhnian thought to economics. But Peabody goes 
much further. He points out that radical economists are 
working for a revolution in economic thought because they 
"do not believe that the orthodox paradigm is adequate to 
deal with questions of income distribution, poverty, racism, 
sexism, imperialism, social and economic development in the 
third world, alienation of workers, the meaningless charac-
ter of work, etc" <Peabody, p. 8). 
In a very thoughtful scrutiny of the radical position, 
Stephen Worland C1972) points out that a Kuhnian revolution 
requires that a new paradigm be available to replace the old 
one. The radicals, he claims, have not yet articulated a 
new paradigm. He does, however, see a possible basis for a 
radical paradigm in the remarks of John Gurley at the 1970 
American Economics Association convention. 
Gurley points out that 'political economics 
... studies economic problems by systematically 
taking into account ... the pervasiveness of ruler-
subject relations in society' ... It would seem to 
require only a shift of conceptual view-point to 
convert Gurley's proposition that power relations 
emerge in every human institution into the axio-
matic principle that all aspects of economic 
activity are ultimately determined by power con-
flicts <Worland, p. 280). 
Power conflicts could thus replace utility maximization as 
"the basic force which governs the play of economic varia-
bles" (Worland, p. 281l. Such an eventuality would not 
necessarily mean that the utility-maximization model should 
be totally scrapped; it could simply be incorporated as a 
special case within the power conflict model. 
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So, within a very few years, economists made an exten-
sive exploration of the applicability of Kuhnian thought to 
economics, both retrospectively and with an eye to possible 
future revolutions. Host of these articles were published 
in the early seventies. But with the growing awareness of 
Lakatos' criticism of Kuhn and his suggested methodology of 
scientific research programmes CMSRP), economists began more 
and more to explore the applicability of Lakatos' ideas to 
economics and to evaluations of paradigms versus research 
programmes. 
Lakatos' MSRP and Economics 
Economists' involvement with Lakatos' methodology of 
scientific research programmes CMSRP) apparently began with 
a unique conference held in Nafplion, Greece in 1974 -- the 
Nafplion Colloquium on Research Programmes in Physics and 
Economics. The papers read during the economics sessions of 
the conference plus some others written in response to the 
conference were published in tl~~hQ4 ~n4 AEE~~i~~! in 
~£QnQmi£~ (1976) edited by Spiro J. Latsis. Before 
discussing these and other applications of MSRP to econ-
omics, however, it is desirable to give a brief overview of 
Lakatos' MSRP and his meta-methodology. 
According to Lakatos, most of the important series of 
theories in the growth of science are welded together by a 
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certain continuity of conceptual framework into research 
programmes. Scientists working within a programme tend to 
work as if they had agreed at an early stage on a set of 
methodological rules. The most basic "agreement" concerns 
the conceptual framework that will not be subject to rejec-
tion. Lakatos characterizes this as the "hard core" of the 
programme. It "is 'irrefutable' by the methodological de-
cision of its protagonists" (Lakatos, 1970, p. 133). 
Scientists working within the programme then use their 
ingenuity to articulate or even invent 'auxiliary 
hypotheses', which form a protective belt around 
this core .... It is this protective belt of 
auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt 
of tests and get adjusted and readjusted, or even 
completely replaced, to defend the thus-hardened 
core (Lakatos, 1970, p. 133). 
The protective belt thus provides an indication of the 
acceptable research paths which Lakatos classifies as the 
"positive heuristic." The hard core, on the other hand, 
indicates the "negative heuristic'' -- research paths to be 
avoided. 
Lakatos also provides a guideline for appraising a 
research programme to determine whether it is "progressive" 
or "degenerative". He distinguishes between theoretical 
progressiveness and empirical progressiveness. A programme 
is theoretically progressive "if some of this excess empiri-
cal content is also corroborated, that is, if each new 
theory leads u.s to the actual discovery of some new fact" 
(Lakatos, 1970, p. 118). The research programme is con.sid-
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ered to be progressive only if it is both theoretically and 
empirically progressive. 
Lakatos downplays, severely, the instances of wide-
spread abandonment of one research programme in favor of 
another, the sort of situation Kuhn describes as a religious 
sort of conversion. Lakatos claims that there can be objec-
tive reasons for rejecting one programme for another: 
" ... such an objective reason is provided by a rival research 
programme which explains the previous success of its rival 
and supersedes it by a further display of heuristic power" 
(Lakatos, 1970, p. 155). As has been indicated, a further 
display of heuristic power means, in this context, the 
ability to generate new "facts". But Lakatos claims that 
the progressivity of a programme can only be determined with 
hindsight. "Only an extremely difficult and-indefinitely-
long process can establish a research programme as super-
seding its rival. .. " (Lakatos, 1970, p. 163). 
Lakatos' claim of uniqueness for his methodology of 
scientific research programmes is that it recasts the line 
of demarcation between the internal and external factors in 
such a way that many of the important external factors for 
other methodologists become internal factors for his MSRP. 
"What for Popper, Watkins and Agassi is external, influen-
tial metaphysics, here turns into the internal 'hard core' 
of a programme" <Lakatos, 1971, p. 99). Like other method-
ologies, Lakatos' MSRP is not without epistemological 
problems. But Lakatos implies that the MSRP is preferable 
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because it extends the area that can be covered by a ratio-
nal reconstruction of science, leaving relatively less to be 
explained by "external history." 
Just as the MSRP provides a basis for appraisal of 
research programmes, Lakatos' meta-methodology provides a 
basis for appraising methodologies. His meta-methodological 
criteria can be stated quite simply: A methodology is accep-
table if its application makes the "best gambits" of a 
science appear "rational". That is, if a methodology can be 
used to "rationally reconstruct" the history of a science, 
then it is an acceptable methodology. In terms of the MSRP, 
progressive means rational in the sense that scientists have 
good reasons for supporting a research programme, namely 
that it consistently generates new facts, at least some of 
which are empirically corroborated. Thus, according to 
Lakatos' meta-methodology, the MSRP is an acceptable method-
ology for appraisal of research programmes in economics if 
the "best gambits" of economics (as judged by the profes-
sion) can be shown to be "progressive" with its application. 
Economists have applied Lakatos' MSRP to the theory of 
the firm (Latsis, 1976), the theory of consumer behavior 
(Coats, 1976), international trade theory (de Marchi, 1976), 
Keynesian macroeconomics (Blaug, 1976; Leijonhufvud, 1976), 
and production function theory (fulton, 1984). Latsis con-
eludes that the neoclassical theory of the firm appears to 
be degenerating because the modifications of the model of 
perfect competition (modifications in the direction of 
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increased realism -- monopolistic competition, duopoly, oli-
gopoly, and limit-price theory) contain less and less rather 
than more and more empirical content, and because they rely 
on ad hoc changes in order to preserve the hard core of the 
programme. 
In Coats' article in tl~lhQ~ ~~~ AEEL~i~~l. it appears 
that the applicability of MSRP to economics may be a second-
ary concern. In fact, one reviewer (Archibald, 1979) has 
suggested that Coats would have told the same story, with 
only minor variations of vocabulary and emphasis, even if he 
had never heard of MSRP <p. 306). But regarding Neil de 
Marchi's contribution of "Anomaly and the Development of 
Economics; the Case of the Leontief Paradox" in tl~lhQ~ ~~~ 
AEEI.9:i29:l, Archibald claims: "not only does de Marchi make 
sense, but I doubt if the same sense could be made within 
another methodological programme" <p. 306). He also notes 
that de Marchi's paper "would appear to be a paradigm case 
of the application of MSRP" (Archibald, p. 306). 
De Marchi maintains that Lakatos' MSRP provides a 
useful perspective for understanding that there may be good 
reasons -- not simply inertia or perverseness -- for 
economists clinging to a theory in the face of contradictory 
evidence. As a case in point, he explores the response <or 
lack thereof) of Samuelson and other economists to the 
findings of Leontief's study on U.S. trade which seem to 
obviously contradict the Ohlin-Samuelsen theory of trade. 
Latsis, Coats, and de Marchi (in tl~1hQ~ ~~~ AEEL~i~~ll 
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all dealt with the applicability of MSRP to microeconomics. 
Blaug and Leijonhufvud, on the other hand, turned to macro-
economics. They both examined the Keynesian revolution as a 
Lakatosian research programme. Blaug is straightforward. 
He maintains that this new programme has excess empirical 
content over the old one. "Its principal novel prediction 
was the chronic tendency of competitive market economies to 
generate unemployment" <Blaug, 1976, p. 162). And since, 
according to Blaug, the explanations of the prolonged 
depression that were coming from economists of the old pro-
gramme were ad hoc explanations, he reaches the following 
conclusion: "The tendency of economists to join the rank of 
the Keynesians in increasing numbers after 1936 was 
therefore perfectly rational; it was a switch from a 'degen-
erating' to a 'progressive' research programme, which had 
little to do with contentious issues of public policy" 
(1976, p. 163). 
Leijonhufvud, on the other hand, presents a much more 
complicated analysis. He points out some aspects of econ-
omic inquiry which have no counterpart in the natural 
sciences. These are considerations that call into question 
any straightforward application of Lakatos' HSRP to econom-
ics. Among other things, Leijonhufvud maintains that the 
linkage between the substance and form of economic theories 
is significantly different from the linkage between the sub-
stance and form of theories in physics. He also maintains 
that a statement of the hard-core propositions of an econom-
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ic model is likely to omit crucial hard-core beliefs or 
presuppositions that are important differences in the per-
spectives of the models' proponents. He cites as an 
example, the "belief" of most monetarists that the economy 
will adjust relatively quickly to the equilibrium value for 
certain variables in "real" terms. These kinds of subtle-
ties are then made full use of in his retelling of the 
Keynesian revolution and the neoclassical synthesis. 
Blaug, although on the whole an advocate of Lakatosian 
thought, has also voiced some reservations about its appli-
cability to economics. He notes that economists, while 
paying lip service to the ideal of falsification, display a 
reluctance in practice "to produce theories which yield 
unambiguously refutable implications," (Blaug, 1976, p. 172) 
and that, where testable predictions are involved, "instead 
of attempting to refute testable predictions, economists 
spend much of their time showing that the real world bears 
out their predictions, thus replacing falsification, which 
is difficult, with confirmation, which is easy" (Blaug, 
1976, p. 173) • He points out that this at least raises the 
possibility that 
... MSRP may not fit the history of economics; 
economists may cling to •degenerating' research 
programmes in the presence of rival •progressive' 
research programmes while denying that the 
•degenerating' programme is in need of resuscita-
tion because they are suspicious of hard data, 
inclined to assign low priority to the discovery 
of novel facts, accustomed by long habit to deny 
the feedback of evidence on theory or simply 
because they are deeply attached to the welfare 
implications of their theories <Blaug, 1976, 
p. 176l. 
Douglas Hands (1985l used a different approach in ap-
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praising the applicability of MSRP to economics. He applied 
Lakatos's own meta-methodological criteria. He identifies 
Keynesian economics and general equilibrium theory <GEl a.s 
the best gambits of economics. Both of these, he argues, 
fail to meet the MSRP'.s .standards of progre.ssivity. Hands 
.states, regarding Keynesian theory, "We are told that the 
program's principal novel prediction was the chronic tenden-
cy of competitive market economies to generate unemployment~ 
( 1985, p. 8). Unemployment, Hands points out, was not a new 
fact in any .sense. The existence of unemployment was a 
known fact; it was not in dispute. Furthermore, Keynesian 
theory had le.s.s empirical content than its predecessors 
because it could not be falsified by any level of unemploy-
ment, whereas classical theory did not allow unemployment in 
a competitive economy. Thus, Hands concludes that the ac-
ceptance of Keynesian theory cannot be claimed as "rational" 
under Lakatos' MSRP. 
The progressivity of general equilibrium (GEl theory is 
judged the same way by Hands. "With GE, a.s with Keynesian 
economics, the MSRP has failed to rationalize the generally 
accepted best gambits of the profession ... " <Hands, 1985, 
p. 12). He supports this conclusion, however, with very 
little argument. He simply notes that Weintraub, in his 
1979 book tli£~~f~~~~~1i~~~. used MSRP to claim progressivity 
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for GE, without ever addressing necessary questions regard-
ing factual novelty and empirical content of GE. 
Methodological Pluralism; 
Economics as Rhetoric 
So, the philosophical foundations of positivist philos-
ophy of science appear to have been discredited, there are 
serious questions about the validity of Kuhn's paradigmatic 
perspective for a description of economics, and there are 
good reasons to be dubious about the applicability of 
Lakatos' MSRP to economics. It is, thus, easy to understand 
how Caldwell could conclude that ~the quest for a single, 
universal, prescriptive scientific methodology is quixotic" 
(p. 244). Caldwell thus advocates ~methodological plural-
ism." At the same time, Donald McCloskey whose views appear 
to be complementary to Caldwell's, claims that economic 
argument would be improved by an explicit recognition of its 
rhetorical basis. Economists, he says, ~in their actual 
scientific work ... argue about the aptness of economic 
metaphors, the relevance of historical precedents, the per-
suasiveness of introspections, the power of authority, the 
charm of symmetry, the claims of morality" (McCloskey, 
p. 482). In short, they work within a rhetorical framework. 
McCloskey's complaint is that the rhetoric itself is not 
consciously examined. 
Caldwell's "methodological pluralism" begins with the 
assumption that no universally applicable, logically compel-
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ling method of theory appraisal exists (Caldwell, p. 245). 
This does not, however, mean that there is no way to engage 
in reasonable and fruitful criticism and debate. Caldwell 
suggests that the following approach could be applied to 
various research programs or methodological traditions with-
in economics (i.e., neoclassical, Marxian, institutionalist, 
etc. ) . For any given research program, the first step would 
be a description or "rational reconstruction" of the method-
ological content of the research program. This would be 
followed by a "critical assessment of the methodological 
content", highlighting strengths and limitations. This 
latter step would open up the possibility of critical dis-
cussion and debate. This sort of methodological discussion, 
according to Caldwell, is as much a form of persuasion as it 
is a means of ensuring that problems are viewed from differ-
ent perspectives (Caldwell, p. 251l. 
Methodological pluralism, following Caldwell's sugges-
ted approach, could be a move in the direction of overcoming 
the dogmatism that he claims exists today, a dogmatism that 
derives from the opposite of methodological pluralism: 
"Alternative programs which do not meet the standards of 
scientific practice alleged to be followed by the mainstream 
are often summarily (hence dogmatically) rejected" (p. 251). 
As mentioned above, there appears to be no incompati-
bility between Caldwell's recommendations and McCloskey's 
viewpoint regarding the rhetoric of economics. McCloskey 
claims, "Economists should become more self-conscious about 
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their rhetoric ... " (p. 482). His view of rhetoric, as 
disciplined conversation, is consistent with Wayne Booth's 
definitions of rhetoric which he quotes: "Rhetoric is 'the 
art of probing what men believe they ought to believe, 
rather than proving what is true according to abstract 
methods'; it is 'the art of discovering good reasons, find-
ing what really warrants assent, because any reasonable 
person ought to be persuaded'; it is careful weighing of 
more-or-less good reasons to arrive at more-or-less probable 
or plausible conclusions -- none too secure but better than 
would be arrived at by chance or unthinking impulse' ... " 
(McCloskey, pp. 482-483). 
McCloskey claims that economic discourse is actually a 
rhetorical discourse in spite of economists' claims that it 
is based on "scientific method". He does not see this as, 
in itself, problematic. It is not problematic, in part, 
because the received view of scientific method --"an amalgam 
of logical positivism, behaviorism, operationalism, and the 
hypothetico-deductive model of science" <McCloskey, p. 484) 
is philosophically obsolete and, in any case, impossible 
to practice in economic inquiry. What he does find troub-
ling is that economists do not examine their rhetoric. 
"Everywhere in the literature of economics, one is met with 
premises that are unargued, tricks of style masquerading as 
reason ('it is .evident that'), forms of evidence that ignore 
the concerns of the audience, and other symptoms of a lack 
of self-consciousness in rhetoric" (McCloskey, pp. 493-494). 
According to McCloskey, economists not only use, but 
must use, literary devices in presenting their viewpoints. 
Each step in economic reasoning, even the reason-
ing of the official rhetoric, is metaphor. The 
world is said to be "like" a complex model, and 
its measurements are said to be like the easily 
measured proxy variable to hand. The complex 
model is said to be like a simpler model for 
actual thinking, which is, in turn, an even 
simpler model for calculation (McCloskey, p. 502). 
He even claims that economic literature can be analyzed in 
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the same terms used in analyzing poetry--the demand curve is 
a "symbol"; the Keynesian theory of income determination is 
a symbol system; the statement "the firm behaves as if it 
were one mind, maximizing its discounted value" is "simile"; 
the economics of education using human capital is Halle-
gory", etc. (McCloskey, p. 505). 
These claims are not made in a disparaging way. It iS 
not that economists should choose between scientific method 
and rhetoric. On the one hand, McCloskey is opposed to any 
methodology that claims the power of philosophical authori-
ty. On the other hand, he maintains that rhetoric is both 
desirable and unavoidable. What he sees as undesirable is 
the unconscious or unexamined use of rhetoric. Unexamined 
metaphors in economics are especially capable of mischie-
vousness because they can so easily be used to convey 
indirect political or ideological messages with the implica-
tion of scientific authority and ethical neutrality: "The 
invisible hand is so very discrete, so soothing, that we 
might be inclined to accept its touch without protest ... " 
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<McCloskey, p. 507). 
In short, McCloskey views the unexamined metaphor as a 
substitute for thought and the examined metaphor as an 
instrument of thought. And in a broader sense, he views the 
examination of the rhetoric of economics as a move toward 
greater rationality in economic discourse. "The invitation 
to rhetoric ... is an invitation to leave the irrationality of 
an artificially narrow range of arguments and to move to the 
rationality of arguing like human beings" (McCloskey, 
p. 509). 
An Opportunity for Exploring 
New Perspectives 
It is obvious that economic methodologists have used 
the turmoil in philosophy of science and the accompanying 
breakdown of consensus in economic methodology as an oppor-
tunity to explore new methodological perspectives. Against 
this background of apparent disarray in economic methodology 
the author is suggesting that yet another perspective is 
worthy of consideration -- the hermeneutical perspective 
that has grown out of the German phenomenological movement. 
CHAPTER III 
GADAMER'S PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 
Hermeneutics has a long history. It has gone through 
many transformations; becoming broader and more universal in 
scope with each. The key figure in contemporary hermeneu-
tics is Hans-Georg Gadamer whose magnum opus -- Ir~!h sng 
is the recognized touchstone with which all 
major writers in contemporary hermeneutics must come to 
grips. The theory developed in this work is a theory of 
human understanding. It is not prescriptive. as such. It 
purports to describe the happening of human understanding. 
It provides an explication of the conditions necessary for 
understanding to take place. However, as indicated by the 
title, Gadamer is concerned with some of the same issues --
truth and method -- that have occupied positivist 
philosophers of science. Gadamer's perspective. however, is 
radically different. His questioning originates with pri-
marily ontological concerns. whereas positivist philosophy 
of science grew out of primarily epistemological concerns. 
This, together with the fact that philosophical hermeneutics 
has become very influential in the other social sciences 
warrants its serious consideration by economic methodolo-
gists. Before delving into some of the details of Gadamer's 
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thought, however, it should prove helpful to review briefly 
the historical development of hermeneutical thought and to 
give a brief explication of the contrast between the herme-
neutical perspective and the epistemological perspective. 
The Development of Hermeneutics 
Richard E. Palmer, in 1969, published the first book-
length English introduction to philosophical hermeneutics. 
He traced the development of hermeneutics from its oldest 
usage as the theory of biblical exegesis to its contemporary 
philosophical usage as the theory of all human understand-
in g. He noted that the term "hermeneutics" originated in 
the seventeenth century in reference to the principles of 
biblical interpretation. However, its usage was soon 
broadened to refer to the interpretation of nonbiblical 
texts whose meaning was unclear, especially literary and 
legal works. Under the influence of rationalism and the 
Enlightenment, "Biblical interpretation developed techniques 
of grammatical analysis to great refinement, and interpret-
ers were more than ever before committed to full knowledge 
of the historical context of the biblical accounts" (Palmer, 
p + 39) + The methods of biblical hermeneutics thus gradually 
merged with the methods of classical philology until "the 
conception of hermeneutics as strictly biblical gradually 
shaded into hermeneutics as the general rules of philologi-
cal exegesis, with the Bible as one among other possible 
objects of these rules" (Palmer, p. 40). 
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A major turning point was reached, according to Palmer, 
in the early nineteenth century with Schleiermacher's recon-
ception of hermeneutics as "a science which describes the 
conditions for understanding in all dialogue" (p. 40). Then 
in the late nineteenth century Wilhelm Dilthey put forward 
the idea of hermeneutics as a foundation for all the human 
sciences. Dilthey considered the proper objects of focus 
for the human sciences to be those "expressions of life" 
(ideas, laws, art works, social forms, language, etc.) which 
provide a fixed, objective base for study. And since these 
"expressions of life" are objectifications of "life experi-
ences" (experiences which take on meaning in the context of 
one's life), the understanding that is the proper goal of 
the human sciences is a matter of life understanding life. 
Thus, as Palmer puts it, "Understanding in not a mere act of 
thought but a transposition and reexperiencing of the world 
as another person meets it in lived experience" Cp. 115). 
The next major turning point in hermeneutics was the 
publication of Martin Heidegger's ~~ing ~n4 Iim~ in 1927. 
This work represents the origin of what is properly called 
philosophical hermeneutics. What sets it apart from previ-
ous hermeneutical thought is its incorporation of Edmund 
Husserl's phenomenological philosophy. 
The most significant aspect of Husserl's thought for 
the development of hermeneutics was his demonstration of the 
active role that we unwittingly play in the constitution of 
our own cognitive experience. Every cognitive process is 
intentional in the sense that it is gir~f!~g toward some-
thing. Husserl also calls attention to the way thought-
forms which have been preconceptually developed shape our 
cognition of the world around us. 
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Husserl 's exploration of the active role we unwittingly 
play in shaping our own framework for conceptual understand-
ing had a major positive impact on Heidegger's philosophy. 
But equally significant was the negative response that 
Husserl's Cartesian bent generated in Heidegger. Husserl 's 
aim was to develop an epistemologically sound science of 
cognition. He accordingly built upon Descartes' founda-
tional insight that one cannot doubt the existence of one's 
own mental processes. This is knowledge that involves no 
presupposition, according to Husserl, because "it presents 
nothing else, 'points' to nothing 'outside' itself ... " 
(p. 3). 
Heidegger's opposition to this Cartesian approach to 
philosophy is fundamental not only to his own philosophy, 
but also to the philosophical hermeneutics developed subse-
quently by Gadamer. This opposition is thus fundamental to 
a hermeneutical critique of positivist methodology in the 
social sciences. 
Cartesian philosophy implies that human "consciousness" 
is prior to the world that we become "conscious of". This 
notion of a consciousness existing independently of a 
"wor 1 d" is wrong, according to He idegger. No one, he 
claims, ever exists separate from a "world". There is never 
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an empty consciousness going out in search of a world. We 
are each, as long as we exist, enmeshed in a network of 
relationships within a world. "Consciousness" and "con-
sciousness of" relationships with other entities happens 
simultaneously. As Calvin Schrag puts it in an overview of 
Heidegger's philosophy, "Prior to the rise of the epistemo-
logical question there is already a preconceptual disclosure 
of man's relation to his world" (1967, p. 2831. 
Heidegger also claims that "projection" into the future 
is an ontological characteristic of being human. As hu-
mans, we move through time casting our attention ahead of us 
in concern about the future state of our world. We are 
always engaged in "projects", whether they be trivial and 
mundane -- such as bathing, getting dressed, cooking 
breakfast, etc. or whether they be extraordinary and 
spectacular -- such as moving to another country, fighting a 
war, exploring space, etc. In our looking ahead, or pro-
jecting, we are always directing our attention within a 
context of relationships, and our projection always involves 
a constant interpretation of these relationships. But this 
ongoing interpretation is never a brand-new, original, pre-
suppositionless interpretation. It is always based on, and 
conditioned by, previous interpretations and understandings 
of the fabric of relationships that we have been ongoingly 
caught up in. 
In characterizing our relationship to things in the 
world, Heidegger contrasts practical activity with theoreti-
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cal activity. In our practical activity we interact with 
things automatically and unthinkingly. These things are, in 
He idegger '.s termi no 1 ogy, "ready-to-hand". As a .simple and 
straight-forward example, Heidegger notes that "when I open 
the door ... I use the latch" (p. 96) In this example, using 
the latch is automatic and the relationship with it is 
transparent. The latch is "ready-to-hand". But as 
Heidegger points out, our relationship with those things 
that are ready-to-hand is not a blind relationship; it is 
grounded in our preconceptual understanding. 
In our practical activity, then, the world is largely 
transparent. But in the course of practical activity things 
break down, and this breakdown forces us to "see" the world. 
If, for example, I attempt to open the door and the latch 
doesn't work, I suddenly become very conscious of the latch; 
my involvement with it is no longer transparent. The latch 
is no longer ready-to-hand. In Heidegger's terminology, it 
is now "present-at-hand". I am now curious about the latch. 
I now want to know the nature of the latch. Granted, my 
interest is in fixing the latch so I can get on with my 
business, but in the sense of Heidegger's terminology I am 
now involved in theoretical activity -- I am engaged in an 
effort to determine the nature of the latch. 
According to Heidegger, both practical activity and 
theoretical activity take place within a context of previous 
interpretations and understandings. Heidegger denies that 
theoretical activity, even in the form of scientific inves-
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tigation, can escape the context of previous interpreta-
tions. He thus denies that science can generate presupposi-
tionless knowledge. The desire to do so is analogous to a 
desire to examine the ground on which one is standing. 
Heidegger's specification of the role of preconceptual 
understanding and interpretation was certainly a major turn-
ing point in hermeneutics. It laid the groundwork for 
Gadamer's examination of the role of language. Regarding 
perception as "an act of making determinate", Heidegger 
notes, "What is thus perceived and made determinate can be 
expressed in propositions, and can be regained and preserved 
as what has thus been asserted" Cp. 89). And since the 
perception that has been made determinate is grounded in 
interpretation, "assertion and its structure ... are founded 
upon interpretation •.. " <Heidegger, p. 266). 
Gadamer builds upon Heidegger's ideas of language and 
interpretation in developing a full-blown theory of human 
understanding. His theory stresses the role experience 
plays in understanding, the role of prejudices in shaping 
our experience, the logic of question and answer, the perva-
siveness of language in human life, and the universality of 
hermeneutics. The more significant aspects of Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutics will be examined after a brief 
exploration of the contrasts between the hermeneutical per-
spective and the epistemological perspective. 
The Contrast with the Epistemological 
Perspective 
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As previously noted, Gadamer is concerned with some of 
the same issues that positivist philosophy of science dealt 
With. In fact, those coming from an epistemological per-
spective may tend to jump to the conclusion that a theory of 
understanding is an epistemological subject just as much as 
is a theory of knowledge. Gadamer's theory of understand-
ing, however, is primarily an ontological theory. Whereas 
traditional epistemology is concerned with determining what 
types of claims warrant belief, Gadamer is concerned with 
finding out hQ~ we actually come to believe the things we 
believe. This contrast could also be stated as follows. 
Traditional epistemology is concerned with providing guide-
lines for arriving at a "correct'' understanding of things, 
while philosophical hermeneutics is concerned with providing 
a description of what happens when we understand. 
This issue appears to involve a "chicken-or-egg'' sort 
of question. An epistemological position on what consti-
tutes "correct'' understanding involves a presupposition 
about hQ~ we understand, whereas Gadamer could be asked by 
the epistemologist, "How do you krrQ~ your theory is 
correct?" The necessity of presupposition seems to be 
inescapable. This necessity, however, creates more diffi-
culty for the epistemological position than it does for 
Gadamer's position. 
Epistemologically-centered philosophy starts with the 
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ideal of a logically-certain, presuppositionless foundation 
upon which to build a conceptual picture of reality. No-
tions that cannot be thusly grounded are given no credence 
within this sort of philosophy. The ontologically-centered 
philosophy developed by Gadamer denies that such an ideal is 
attainable. It further claims that the epistemologists' 
ideal of presuppositionlessness is compromised at the out-
set because it, in fact, rests on an ontological presuppo-
sition. 
This can be demonstrated by a consideration of the 
following question: "Is our conceptual world shaped largely 
by our preconceptual experiences in such a way that all 
understanding of anything rests on a fluid bed of previous 
interpretations, many of which are not only preconceptual 
but preawareness?" A "yes" or "no" answer to this question 
presupposes knowledge of the nature of human consciousness; 
it presupposes ontological knowledge. But the epistemolo-
gists' quest for a presuppositionless foundation for know-
ledge implies a "no" answer. 
It seems to me, in simple terms, there exists a contra-
diction in the quest for epistemological foundations -- the 
ideal of presuppositionlessness is contradictory in that it 
rests on an ontological presupposition. Furthermore, if the 
epistemologists are wrong and the answer is ''yes", then the 
usefulness of a system of conceptual knowledge built upon a 
presumed "no" answer would be dubious at best. Thus the 
necessity of presuppositions appears to be a much more 
serious problem for the epistemologist than for Gadamer. 
In any case, the extent of the contrast between the 
hermeneutical perspective and the epistemological perspec-
tive should be apparent. And since economic methodology 
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prior to the current state of turmoil was primarily influ-
enced by positivist philosophy of science which is solidly 
grounded in the epistemological tradition, this contrast 
makes Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics a highly appro-
priate candidate to explore in searching for a new perspec-
tive on economic methodology. 
Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics 
The major milestone in the development of hermeneutics 
after ~~ing ggg Iiill§ was the publication of Ir~!h ~ng tl§!hQg 
in 1960 by Hans-Georg Gadamer. This book, more than any 
other work, laid the groundwork for the various strands of 
contemporary hermeneutical theory. As Palmer points out, 
Gadamer developed comprehensively the hermeneutical direc-
tions inherent in Heidegger's philosophy. Gadamer developed 
the idea that "understanding" is basic to human existence. 
He also provided extensive analysis of the way in which all 
understanding is not only dialectical, but is grounded in 
historicality and linguisticality. "Understanding, says 
Gadamer, is always an historical, dialectical, linguistic 
event -- in the sciences, in the humanities, in the kitchen" 
CPalmer, p. 215). 
Understanding, according to Gadamer, grows out of 
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experience in the sense that a person with great understand-
ing is necessarily a very "experienced" person. But Gadamer 
uses "experience" in a very strict sense. Experience is 
always an event in the sense that it happens when one is 
faced with a new situation or a new development. An element 
of the unexpected or unpredicted is always involved in an 
experience. Thus it is an event that requires an adjustment 
of one's view of the world. In Gadamer's terminology, 
understanding always involves a 11 fusion of horizons". New 
situations are never approached with a clean slate of out-
look and expectations. We always have a perspective that 
has been historically shaped by culture, tradition, and 
personal circumstances. When we are faced with a situation 
that doesn't conform to our expectations, our perspective 
undergoes an adjustment. This is the sense meant by 
Gadamer's "fusion of horizons". 
The experience that brings forth, or expands, under-
standing is caught up in the dialectical process of question 
and answer. Gadamer maintains that "We cannot have experi-
ences without asking questions" (1985, p. 325). In an 
experience we are faced with indeterminacy which necessarily 
involves questions. "The recognition that an object is 
different and not as we first thought, obviously involves 
the question whether it was this or that" CGadamer, 1985, p. 
325). It also involves "a radical negativity: the knowledge 
of not knowing" CGadamer, 1985, p. 325). This knowledge of 
not knowing involves an openness that allows something to be 
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disclosed. "Questions always bring out the undetermined 
possibilities of a thing" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 338). The 
asking of questions "opens up possibilities of meaning and 
thus what is meaningful passes into one's own thinking on 
the subject" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 338). There is a sense, 
then, in which there is an interaction between one's self 
and the content of the experience. The situation raises 
questions which, by definition, involve the awareness of not 
knowing. And the awareness of not knowing creates an atti-
tude of openness which allows us to "see" possibilities that 
we hadn't been open to before. We are thus changed as a 
result of the experience; we have a new understanding. "The 
ex per iencer", says Gadamer, " ... has acquired a new horizon 
within which something can become an experience for him" 
( 1985, p. 317) + 
Understanding also involves temporality in all its 
modes -- past, present, and future. We are always projec-
ting our possibilities into the future. Our projections, 
our projects, our intentions, are shaped by our past. Our 
horizon of understanding that we bring into any situation is 
always inescapably a horizon that has been shaped by cul-
ture, tradition, and personal circumstances. We bring a 
whole interrelated set of prejudgments into any situation. 
Gadamer uses "prejudice" in this sense of prejudgment, 
i . e. , not in the negative or pejorative sense. 
Long before we understand ourselves through the 
process of self-examination, we understand 
ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, 
society and state in which we live... The self-
awareness of the individual is only a flickering 
in the closed circuits of historical life. That 
is why the prejudices of the individual, far more 
than his judgments, constitute the historical 
reality of his being (Gadamer, 1985, p. 245). 
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Gadamer takes considerable pains to "rehabilitate" the 
concept of prejudice, since "all understanding inevitably 
involves some prejudice ... " (1985, p.239). In fact, he 
devotes a major subsection of I~~1h ~rr~ tl~1hQ~ to the expo-
sition of the necessity of prejudice as a condition of all 
understanding. Intimately connected with this is the reha-
bilitation of the concept of authority. Gadamer explicates 
the positive sense of authority; the sense in which "author-
ity has nothing to do with obedience, but rather with 
knowledge" (1985, p. 248). For example, the "authority 
claimed by the teacher, the superior, the expert" (Gadamer, 
1985, p. 249) is of this sort. This sort of authority, 
Gadamer claims, "has nothing to do with blind obedience to a 
command" ( 1985, p. 248). It is an authority which "cannot 
actually be bestowed, but is acquired and must be acquired, 
if someone is to lay claim to it" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 248). 
The acceptance of someone else's authority, in this sense, 
"rests on recognition and hence on an act of reason itself 
which, aware of its own limitations, accepts that others 
have better understanding" CGadamer, 1985, p. 248). 
It is this sense of authority that Gadamer has in mind 
when he examines the role of tradition in shaping our insti-
tutions and attitudes. 
The fact is that tradition is constantly an 
element of freedom and of history itself. Even 
the most genuine and solid tradition does not 
persist by nature because of the inertia of what 
once existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, 
cultivated. It is, essentially, preservation, 
such as is active in all historical change. But 
preservation is an act of reason, though an incon-
spicuous one. For this reason, only what is new, 
or what is planned, appears as the result of 
reason. But this is an illusion (Gadamer, 1985, 
p. 250). 
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It is with this role of the active preservation of tradi-
tion in mind that Gadamer claims "That which has been sane-
tioned by tradition and custom has an authority that is 
nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the 
fact that always the authority of what has been transmitted 
-- and not only what is clearly grounded -- has power over 
our attitudes and behavior" ( 1985, p. 249). 
This, of course, does not mean that Gadamer is advocat-
ing the unquestioned acceptance of what is handed down in 
the form of tradition. His use of "authority" suggests 
precisely the opposite, as does the notion that understand-
ing grows out of experience. The following quote illus-
trates succinctly the necessary relationship that Gadamer 
sees between prejudices and experience . 
... the historicity of our existence entails that 
prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, 
constitute the initial directedness of our whole 
ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of 
our openness to the world. They are simply 
conditions whereby we experience something --
whereby what we encounter says something to us. 
This formulation certainly does not mean that we 
are enclosed within a wall of prejudices and only 
let through the narrow portals those things that 
can produce a pass saying, 'Nothing new will be 
said here.' Instead we welcome just that guest 
who promises something new to our curiosity. But 
how do we know the guest whom we admit is one who 
has something new to say to us? Is not our 
expectation and our readiness to hear the new also 
necessarily determined by the old that has already 
taken possession of us (Gadamer, 1976, p. 9)? 
None of this takes place, however, without language. 
According to Gadamer, language is the way tradition is 
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passed on to us. This alone would be ~ufficient to posit a 
major linguistic role in understanding. But Gadamer goes 
much further. He maintains that a "world" is disclosed to 
us QnlY through language. In short, everything that makes 
experience possible is grounded in linguisticality. Thus, in 
the sense that understanding is a mediation between past, 
present, and future, language is the medium of that media-
tion. In fact, Gadamer claims, "Being that can be under-
stood is language" ( 1985, p. 432). 
We are in language the way a fish is in water. That 
is, we can never completely get outside linguisticality to 
examine it. We are born into a linguistic environment. Not 
only do we interact via language, but "reality" is given 
order by language -- by a language that was prior to us as 
individuals. The tradition that shapes our horizons is 
transmitted via language. Our concepts are linguistically 
shaped. And we think in language. According to Gadamer: 
Language is not just one of man's possessions 
in the world, but on it depends the fact that man 
has a world at all. For man the world exists as 
world in a way that no other being in the world 
experiences. But this world is linguistic in 
nature. This is the real heart of Humboldt's 
assertion ... that languages are views of the world. 
By this Humboldt means that language maintains a 
kind of independent life over against the indiv-
idual member of a linguistic community and 
introduces him, as he grows into it, to a particu-
lar attitude and relationship to the world as well 
( 1985' p. 401) . 
Gadamer distinguishes between "world" and "habitat". 
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Animals are El~£~4 in a habitat on which their life depends. 
And they can, in some sense, communicate. But human lin-
guisticality and the human "world" is radically different. 
As Palmer puts it: 
World is not impersonal, nor does it circle 
an isolated individual, figuratively speaking, 
like a giant balloon projected by mind and 
perceptions. World is more aptly seen as Q~1~~~n 
persons. It is the shared understanding between 
persons, and the medium of this understanding; and 
what makes it possible is language (p. 206). 
Language allows us as humans to transcend our habitat 
in a way that is not possible for other creatures. Gadamer 
points out that "For man ... to rise above the habitat ... does 
not mean that he leaves his habitat, but that he has another 
attitude towards it, a free, distanced attitude, which is 
always realized in language" (1985, p. 432). It is on this 
basis, then, that Gadamer claims that anything that can be 
understood is disclosed in a world made possible by lan-
guage. 
Being that can be understood is language (Gadamer, 
1985, p. 432). 
Hence language is the real medium of human being, 
if we only see it in the realm that it alone fills 
out, the realm of human being -- together, the 
realm of common understanding, of ever-replenished 
common agreement -- a realm as indispensible to 
human life as the air we breathe (Gadamer, 1976, 
p. 68). 
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Thus, Gadamer claims a universal scope for the applica-
bility of hermeneutics. We are always involved in interpre-
tation in all facets of life. Interpretation, in Gadamer's 
terminology, is the process of making understanding expli-
Cit. Understanding grows out of experience. And human 
experience is dialectical, historical, and linguistic. 
Gadamer sums up the task of philosophical hermeneutics as 
follows: 
Philosophical hermeneutics takes as its task 
the opening up of the hermeneutical dimension in 
its full scope, showing its fundamental signifi-
cance for our entire understanding of the world 
and thus for all the various forms in which this 
understanding manifests itself: from interhuman 
communication to manipulation of society; from 
personal experience by the individual in society 
to the way in which he encounters society; and 
from tradition as it is built of religion and law, 
art and philosophy, to the revolutionary con-
sciousness that unhinges the tradition through 
emancipatory reflection (1976, p. 18). 
Gadamer's Perspective on Science 
Gadamer indicts the human sciences for attempting to 
emulate the natural sciences. Thus, a brief explication of 
his view of the natural sciences will provide a useful 
backdrop against which his methodological considerations 
regarding the human sciences can be discussed. 
It would be incorrect to characterize Gadamer as hos-
tile to science. He does, however, offer some sobering, if 
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not pessimistic, considerations about science. Our civili-
zation, he maintains, is founded on modern science. It is a 
civilization characterized by the extensive domination made 
possible by scientific technology. Technology has obviously 
made possible the extensive domination of nature by human 
beings. But the increasing mastery of nature has also, 
according to Gadamer, led to the domination of human beings 
over each other. "A result of technology is that it leads 
to such a manipulation of human society, of the formation of 
public opinion, of the life conduct of everyone, of the 
disposition of each individual's time between job and fami-
1 y , and i t t a k e s our b r eat h away " CG ad am e r , 1 9 8 2 , p . 3 l . 
It is not by chance, claims Gadamer, that our scientif-
ically grounded civilization is characterized by domination. 
Scientific knowledge is, he maintains, knowledge for domina-
tion. This is a perspective that Gadamer has taken over 
from Heidegger, who had demonstrated that classical Greek 
metaphysics was the source of concept formation that made 
science possible. 
In ~~irrg ~rr~ Ii~~ Heidegger, as I see it, attains 
a position from which both the differences and he 
similarities between Greek science and modern 
science can be considered. When he showed the 
concept of presence-at-hand to be a deficient mode 
of being and saw it as the background of classical 
metaphysics and its continuance in the modern 
concept of subjectivity, he was pursuing an onto-
logically correct connection between Greek theoria 
and modern science. Within the framework of his 
temporal interpretation of being, classical meta-
physics as a whole is an ontology of what is 
present-at-hand, and modern science is, unbe-
knownst to itself, its heir <Gadamer, 1985, 
p. 413). 
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The deficiency of the present-at-hand relationship is 
that it lacks the unity and connectedness of ready-to-hand 
relationships. Ready-to-hand relationships are character-
ized by the lack of a sense of separation, by the lack of a 
sense of where "I" end and "other things" begin. Something 
that is present-at-hand, however, is seen as a specific, 
separate object, as a thing-in-itself. 
In any case, Gadamer maintains, along with Heidegger, 
that our conceptual language reflects an ontology of things 
present-at-hand, an ontology of "absolute objects". And 
this ontology, he claims, can be traced to the Greeks. 
And if we look about us in a world that is tending 
to cultural levelling ... do we not begin to 
recognise that the whole of our conceptual 
philosophical language and its derivative, the 
conceptual language of modern science, are in the 
final analysis of Greek origin? It is the 
language of metaphysics with whose categories we 
are familiar from grammar -- subject, predicate, 
nomen, verbum, noun and verb (Gadamer, 1985, 
p. 494). 
All of this is connected with Gadamer's claim that 
scientific knowledge is knowledge for domination. The aim 
of science is to achieve objective knowledge. In 
Heidegger's terminology, such objective knowledge is know-
ledge of things present-at-hand. In other words, science 
attempts to find knowledge of the thing-in-itself. And as 
Gadamer points out, something that is "known in its being-
in-itself, is made available in the sense that one can deal 
with it, ie use it for one's own purposes" (1985, p. 408). 
The truth of this is made abundantly clear, it seems to me, 
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by the extensive domination of nature that has resulted from 
the technological applications of scientific knowledge. 
The development of knowledge that allows us to use 
nature is not, in itself, what Gadamer finds so ominous. He 
sees modern science as out of control and potentially 
destructive because it produces dangerously incomplete know-
ledge as far as human life experience is concerned. Scien-
tific knowledge is incomplete in that it is not cognizant of 
the extensiveness of the ready-to-hand mode of being that so 
pervades most of our life experience, especially via the 
role of preconceptual understanding. And so Gadamer sug-
gests that 
... over against the whole of our civilization 
that is founded on modern science, we must ask 
repeatedly if something has not been omitted. If 
the presuppositions of these possibilities for 
knowing and making remain half in the dark, cannot 
the result be that the hand applying this know-
ledge will be destructive (1976, p. 10)? 
Gadamer thus maintains that "the central question of 
the modern age is the question of how our natural view of 
the world -- the experience of the world that we have as we 
·simply live out our lives -- is related to the unassailable 
and anonymous authority that confronts us in the pronounce-
ments of science" (1976, p. 3) This, he claims, is the 
question that raises the real task of philosophy to the 
forefront: "our task is to reconnect the objective world of 
technology, which the sciences place at our disposal and 
discretion, with those fundamental orders of our being that 
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are neither arbitrary nor manipulable by us, but rather 
simply demand our respect" (Gadamer, 1976, pp. 3-41. Stated 
more simply, Gadamer is saying that our real task is to 
regain control over science and technology by somehow making 
them function for us ~i!hin the context of our holistic 
experience of life. 
This is a task that would involve the so-called human 
sciences. However, the human sciences are precluded from 
making a valid contribution to this task as long as they 
persist in emulating the natural sciences. An examination 
of the implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics for methodolo-
gy in the human sciences should clarify this claim. 
Implications for Methodology 
In a recent book, ti§£ill§ll§~1i£~~Q~§~1iQn~ ~n~ 
~[Q~E§£1~(1984), Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica note that 
"Gadamer's account of interpretation •.. is descriptive, not 
prescriptive; he is trying 'to envisage in a fundamentally 
universal way what always happens'" (p. 5). In the very 
strictest sense, this is true. However, Gadamer's philo-
sophical hermeneutics is chock full of implications for 
methodology in all areas of academic inquiry. And these 
implications have not gone unnoticed. As pointed out by 
Joel Weinsheimer in a 1985 book on ~~~~mgr~~ Hgrmgn§~!i£~, 
"Gadamer's thought has left its mark everywhere among the 
human sciences--in sociology, literary theory, history, 
theology, law -- and indeed in philosophy of natural 
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science" Cp. ix). 
Gadamer sees the human sciences as fundamentally dif-
ferent from the natural sciences, and he finds much of 
relevance for the human sciences in the Aristotelian view of 
ethics. In Aristotle's view, human being is not something 
that is fixed, but is always changing; it is becoming. And 
human reason and knowledge are not detached from that 
process of becoming. On the contrary, human reason and 
knowledge are caught up in an interplay with the process of 
becoming, in such a way that human knowledge is determined 
by the process and the process is determined by human know-
ledge. As humans we are continually faced with situations 
requiring action. How we choose to respond to a situation 
depends partly on the knowledge we bring into the situation. 
At the same time, however, our knowledge expands with our 
experience, with our exposure to various situations and our 
responses to them. 
As Gadamer points out, the object of the human sciences 
"is man and what he knows of himself ... [and theJ ... purpose 
of his knowledge is to govern his action" (1985, p. 280). 
Furthermore, such knowledge "is clearly not objective know-
ledge, ie the knower is not standing over against a situa-
tion that he merely observes, but he is directly affected by 
what he sees" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 280). This makes for a 
fundamental difference, according to Gadamer, between the 
natural sciences and the human sciences; a difference that 
is clearly implied in the following quote: 
Human civilisation differs essentially from 
nature in that it is not simply a place in which 
capacities and powers work themselves out, but man 
becomes what he is through what he does and how he 
behaves, ie he behaves in a certain way because of 
what he has become. Thus Aristotle sees ethos as 
differing from physis in that it is a sphere in 
which the laws of nature do not operate, yet not a 
sphere of lawlessness, but of human institutions 
and human attitudes that can be changed and have 
the quality of rules only to a limited degree 
(Gadamer, 1985, p. 279). 
In Gadamer's view, then, the human sciences err in 
attempting to be objective in the manner of the natural 
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sciences. "The scientific nature of modern science consists 
precisely in the fact that it makes tradition objective and 
methodically eliminates any influence of the interpreter on 
understanding" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 297). But for the human 
sciences to attempt this is an attempt to distance them-
selves from the human situation. And the understanding that 
results from such procedures is a form of alienated under-
standing in that it is cut off from history and tradition. 
As Gadamer notes, "knowledge which cannot be applied to the 
concrete situation remains meaningless and even risks 
obscuring the demands that the situation makes" (1985, 
p. 279). 
Gadamer thus charges the human sciences with fostering 
methodological sterility. "Any experience of life can 
confirm the fact that there is such a thing as methodologi-
cal sterility, that is, the application of a method to 
something not really worth knowing, to something that has 
not been made an object of investigation on the basis of a 
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genuine question" CGadamer, 1976, p. 11). Methodological 
sterility thus impedes the ability to produce knowledge that 
is relevant to the human situation. 
The human situation is rooted in tradition, and 
language is the most powerful medium through which tradition 
pervades and influences our attitudes and understanding. 
Gadamer thus sees the process of abstraction and its atten-
dant construction of technical terminologies as a signifi-
cant source of methodological sterility. Human tradition 
plays its role via living, spoken language. But technical 
terminology is an attempt to circumvent the necessary flexi-
bility and adaptability of the living, spoken language. "In 
contrast with the living meaning of words in spoken lan-
guage, to which ... a range of variation is essential, the 
technical term has become ossified. The terminological use 
of a word is an act of violence against language" CGadamer, 
1985. p. 375) . 
Gadamer's view of the role of language in human expert-
ence and the impact that science has on that role are 
expressed succinctly in the following lengthy quote: 
We know that we are able to cope with an experi-
ence by grasping it in language. It is as if its 
threatening, even annihilating, immediacy is 
removed, brought within proportions, made communi-
cable and hence dealt with. This coping with 
experience, however, is obviously something 
different from the way science works on it, 
objectivising it and making it available for 
whatever purposes it likes. Once a scientist has 
discovered the law of a natural process, he has it 
in his power. There is no question of this in the 
natural experience of the world expressed in 
language. The use of language by no means 
involves making it available and calculable. It 
is not just that the statement and the judgment 
are merely one particular form among the multipli-
city of linguistic attitudes --they themselves 
remain bound up with man's attitude to life (1985, 
p. 411). 
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Technical terminology is usually created as part of the 
process of theory construction. But Gadamer claims that 
theoretical knowledge itself grows out of an attempt at 
domination. "The modern theory", he says, "is a tool of 
construction, by means of which we gather experiences 
together in a unified way and make it possible to dominate 
them" (1985, p. 412). Domination happens when the response 
to a life situation is governed by theoretical knowledge. 
In such a case, one is not open to other interpretations of 
the situation and what it calls for. The interpretation of 
the situation is dominated by previously formed theoretical 
knowledge. The danger implicit in this sort of domination 
of experience by theoretical knowledge is that it can result 
in alienation. The term "alienation" is being used to refer 
to a sense of being severed from social reality, as when 
contemporary social institutions, seem to be divorced from 
the living historical tradition. This is especially sig-
nificant for a social science such as economics; a social 
science which has had such a powerful impact on public 
policy. 
Just as individuals are continually faced with choices 
about how to respond to situations they find themselves in, 
contemporary society is such that collectivized decisions 
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are ongoingly necessary. That is, we collectively face 
situations day after day that require collective responses. 
Public policy is what guides those responses. Those respon-
ses have an impact on institutional arrangements which, in 
turn, have an impact on the pattern of individual develop-
ment. In short, the public policy decisions of today 
influence the course of events in such a way that the 
concrete human situations faced tomorrow, both collectively 
and individually, are altered. 
So, what is the sense in which a danger is posed? 
There is a danger that the economic, social and political 
institutions that evolve in this fashion, may be institu-
tions that are more and more divorced from the living 
historical tradition that is such a shaping influence on 
human understanding. To the extent that this happens, 
individuals find themselves facing situations they do not 
understand and, accordingly, do not know how to respond to. 
In short, the author sees the potential of widespread alien-
ation as the danger posed by public policy decisions that 
are based on theoretical knowledge generated by human 
sciences that are trying to emulate the methodology of the 
natural sciences. In the most extreme formulation, the 
movement of the human enterprise through time is always an 
uncharted movement, but one that nevertheless has the poten-
tial of a unity of understanding in that historicality and 
tradition, operating via the medium of language, provide a 
thread of continuity. The danger of alienation is a danger 
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of breaking that thread of continuity and ultimately 
destroying the potential for unity Within human understand-
ing. 
Perhaps the case has been overstated, and almost 
certainly have overstepped the boundaries of Gadamer's view-
points. Nevertheless, it seems that the above analysis is a 
credible extrapolation from Gadamer's hermeneutical philoso-
phy. 
All of these methodological considerations, however, 
are negative in that they deal with methodological approach-
es that .should be avoided. Does Gadamer give any clues to 
positive methodological considerations? Yes, he does, 
albeit they are very aptly characterized as "clues". These 
"clues" are found mainly in his discussion of conversation 
and the logic of question and answer. 
If the human sciences are to generate knowledge 
(understanding) that i.s useful in dealing with the human 
.situation, they must first of all ask the "right'' questions. 
The right questions would be those raised by the situation 
itself. If there is no problematic situation, then there is 
no need for those fields of inquiry referred to as the 
social sciences, or, more broadly, as the human .sciences. 
A problematic .social situation would be one that arose in 
contradiction to expectations. This would indicate a need 
for an adjustment of our understanding. The role of the 
social sciences is to engage in inquiry that facilitates 
such an adjustment. The "clue" found in Gadamer's philoso-
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phy that would be relevant to the pursuit of inquiry in such 
an instance is his discussion of the logic of question and 
answer, discussed briefly earlier in this chapter. If 
methodological sterility and alienated understanding are to 
be avoided, the social scientist must follow a course of 
inquiry that is analogous to conversation. 
True conversation, according to Gadamer, requires open-
ness (i.e., the suspension of prejudices). It also requires 
that one allow oneself to be led by the object of conversa-
tion. These are not disconnected requirements. When one is 
engaged in a ''conversation" with the attitude of trying to 
''out-argue" the other, the result cannot truly be considered 
conversation. A conversation cannot get underway until the 
participants allow the object of conversation to pose a 
genuine question. This requires the suspension of prejudg-
ments, the recognition that one does not know. It requires 
being open to various possibilities. When this happens then 
the parties to the conversation will be able to consider the 
weight of the other person's opinion. As Gadamer points 
out, "Dialectic consists not in trying to discover the 
weakness of what is said, but in bringing out its real 
strength" ( 1985, p. 3311. Reference in this situation is 
always to the object of conversation. True conversation, 
then, is a process that allows mere individual opinion to be 
overcome and replaced by a commonly held view of the truth 
regarding the object of conversation. 
This approach to inquiry would be the opposite of what 
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Kuhn characterizes as "normal science". Normal science 
consists of research aimed at the fleshing out and extension 
of the already accepted theoretical framework (paradigm), 
and contradictory theories and viewpoints tend to be sup-
pressed by the established scientific community. Kuhn 
claims that normal science can be seen as "an attempt to 
force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible 
box that the paradigm supplies" ( 1970a, p. 24). 
Finally, it seems likely that a complementary relation-
ship exists between Gadamer's logic of question and answer 
and the method of pattern modeling discussed by Abraham 
Kaplan in his Ih~ QQrr4~£1 Qf lrr~~iLY (1964). The potential 
for complementarity can be seen in the following quote from 
Kaplan. 
According to the pattern model ... something is 
explained when it is so related to a set of other 
elements that together they constitute a unified 
system. We understand something by identifying it 
as a specific part in an organized whole (p. 54). 
This potential complementarity will be explored further in 
Chapter IX where the debate in economics over explanation 
versus prediction is discussed. 
CHAPTER IV 
A "RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION" 
OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
Before jumping into a methodological appraisal of neo-
classical economics, it seems appropriate, if not mandatory, 
to delineate the relevant boundaries of "neoclassical econ-
omics" as it is used in this appraisal. The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide that sort of delineation. In the 
spirit of Caldwell's program for methodological pluralism, 
this chapter is a rational reconstruction of neoclassical 
economics. It is intended to provide a unified picture of 
the whole from which specific components have been selected 
for detailed appraisal in subsequent chapters. 
What is a "Rational Reconstruction"? 
Lakatos pointed out that historians of science employ a 
screening process in determining which theories or which 
events to include in their history. The screening criteria 
often have not been explicitly spelled out. But whether 
implied or explicitly stated, the criteria have typically 
been derived from some notion of scientific mehtodology. 
Lakatos thus maintains that scientific methodologies tend to 
serve as "'theories of scientific rationality'" ( 1971, 
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p. 92) • Basically, he is saying that modern methodologies 
consist of sets of rules that are intended to disallow 
scientific status for theories violating those rules. Those 
rules embody the 'reasons' for accepting or rejecting theo-
ries. Thus, Lakatos maintains, the historian of science 
reconstructs the history in accordance with some theory of 
scientific rationality. 
In doing an appraisal of a particular school of 
thought, research programme, or paradigm in economics, a 
screening process is also employed, either implicitly or 
explicitly. The purpose of starting with a 11 rational recon-
struction" is to make the screening process as explicit as 
possible. 
While the differences between mainstream neoclassical 
economics and Marxian economics, or even institutional 
economics, may seem patently obvious, the differences 
between mainstream neoclassical and Austrian economics are 
not very well understood. Also, it is not always clear 
whether 11 neoclassical economics" is meant to include 
Keynesian macroeconomics or not. The remainder of this 
chapter is intended to clarify and make explicit the 
"screening" rationale employed in appraising neoclassical 
economics. 
The Transition from Classical 
to Neoclassical Economics 
In a definitional sense, neoclassical economics refers 
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to a contemporary or modified version of classical econ-
omics. In this sense, a delineation of neoclassical econ-
omics is derivative from classical economics, and the 
crucial question is: In the transition to neoclassical 
economics, what remains unchanged from classical economics 
and what has changed? Has the methodology changed? Have 
crucial assumptions been changed? Have the basic conclu-
sions changed? Or, is it simply that the theoretical 
content changed so drastically as to warrant a distinction? 
It is widely accepted among economists that the 
"marginal revolution" is the most obvious dividing line 
between classical and neoclassical economics. The specific 
substantive basis for a reclassification, however, is not as 
widely agreed upon. As Blaug notes, 
... there appears to be no agreement as to just 
what the new paradigm was that Jevons, Menger, and 
Walras put forward. Was it a new emphasis on 
demand rather than supply, on consumer utility 
rather than on production costs? Was it something 
as ambitious as a subjective theory of value, 
which was to supplant the objective labor-cost 
theories of the past? Was it rather the extension 
of the principle of maximization from business 
firms to households, making the consumer and not 
the entrepreneur the epitome of rational action? 
Was it perhaps the equimarginal principle, 
enshrined in the proportionality of marginal 
utilities to prices as the condition of consumer 
equilibrium? Was it instead, as Schumpeter liked 
to say, the explicit or implicit discovery of 
general equilibrium analysis? Or lastly, was it 
simply the first conscious recognition of con-
strained maximization as the archetype of all 
economic reasoning (1973, pp. 8-9)? 
Regardless of the ambiguity noted by Blaug, his quote 
definitely indicates the extensiveness of the impact of the 
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marginalists on economic thought. 
Sir John Hicks maintains that the primary distinction 
of the "marginalist revolution" was the substitution of a 
vision of economic life based on a theory of exchange for 
the classical vision which was based on a theory of produc-
tion. He considers the term "marginalists" to be a bit of a 
misnomer since, "The •margin' is no more than an expression 
of the mathematical rule for a maximum (or minimum) ... [and 
therefore] ... any sort of economics is marginalist when it 
is concerned with maximi.sing 11 (Hicks, p. 212). Since 
"catallactic.s" was the term used at that time to refer to 
the theory of exchange, Hicks opts for renaming the margin-
alist.s a.s catallactists. 
The essential conclusions of classical economics 
regarding the desirability of market .solutions was not, 
however, disturbed by the new "catallactic" vision of econ-
omic life. As Blaug points out, although the development of 
a marginalist theory of distribution solidified the logical 
conflict with classical economics, "In 1891 Marshall pro-
vided a reconciliation between marginal utility economics 
and classical economics which made the new ideas palatable 
by showing that they could be fitted together into a wider 
context" (1973, p. 13). 
If the marginalists did not change the overall conclu-
sions of classical economics, what did they change? The 
author agrees with Blaug that the most significant impact 
was on the way the economics profession saw itself in terms 
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of a legitimate claim to be called a science. It marked the 
beginnings of 11 economic science" and the end of 11 political 
economy". 
Possibly the most significant aspect of the marginalist 
approach in triggering this change in perspective was its 
potential for mathematical construction in economic theory. 
In an address to the Royal Economic Society, Phyllis Deane 
noted that 
... the abstract theorists succeeded in capturing 
the imagination of a rising generation of econo-
mists with the aid of an analytical tool based on 
the calculus. The marginal technique of analysis 
could be used to reconstruct the weakest link in 
the classical theoretical system -- the cost of 
production theory of value -- without denting the 
hard core of orthodox classical doctrine. It was 
a particularly attractive development for econo-
mists who had ambitions to mimic the methods of 
the natural sciences for three sorts of reasons: 
first because the moit progressive natural 
sciences were obviously benefitting from mathemat-
ical tools of analysis; second, because retention 
of the hard core doctrine of the self-regulating 
economic system under competitive conditions 
implied the continuity of classical and neoclass-
ical economics and made it easier to believe in 
the cumulative advance of economic theory; and 
thirdly because the independent application of the 
marginal technique in three separate geographical 
locations in the early 1870s, gave the intellec-
tual community of economists a sense of 
international consensus which is rare for social 
scientists (p. 2). 
Another very significant implication of the marginalist 
view of economics was that it was a value-free analysis, not 
ethically or politically biased. This bolstered the notion 
that it was a "scientifiC 11 analysis. It was also an attrac-
tive characteristic to those classical economists who wanted 
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a defense against the accusations of the historical econo-
mists. "In effect, the classical economists were accused of 
devising amoral (if not immoral) theories involving implicit 
presumptions in favour of a laissez-faire stance in economic 
policy at a time when ethical considerations demanded a 
programme of legislation to protect the under-privileged 
sectors of the economy" <Deane, p. 3). 
This claim of value neutrality had another impact on 
economics in addition to bolstering its scientific image --
it severely narrowed its scope. As noted by Deane, "1 i ft i ng 
the central body of economic theory out of the arena of 
ethical and political debate ... narrowed the scope of the 
theoretical core of the economists' research programme so 
that it was largely reducible to a theory of exchange under 
competitive conditions" (p. 6). 
In summary, the most significant characteristic of the 
transformation from classical to neoclassical economics was 
the birth of a professionalized economics that laid claim to 
being a value-free social science. As Blaug notes, "It is 
precisely in this period that economics began to emerge as a 
professional discipline with its own network of associations 
and journals, the dilettante amateur of the past giving way 
for the first time to the specialist earning his livelihood 
under the title of 'economist'" ( 1973, p. 12). In the 
words of Robert Heilbronner, 
... economics had ceased to be the proliferation of 
world views that, in the hands of now a philoso-
pher, now a stockbroker, now a revolutionary, 
seemed to illuminate the whole avenue down which 
society was marching. It became instead the 
special province of professors, whose investiga-
tions threw out pinpoint beams rather than the 
wide-searching beacons of the earlier economists 
(1980, p. 170). 
Does Neoclassical Economics include 
Keynesian Economics? 
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"Neoclassical economics" is often used in a very loose 
way to refer to mainstream or orthodox economics in general. 
When it is so used, it implies that Keynesian economics is 
part of "neoclassical economics." It has, in fact, been 
claimed by some economists that Keynes' ideas did not con-
stitute a revolutionary break in economic thought. Coats, 
for example, in arguing that there have been no Kuhnian-type 
revolutions in economics denies such status to Keynesian 
thought because it lacked one essential attribute of a 
Kuhnian scientific revolution: "the Keynesian paradigm was 
not 'incompatible' with its predecessor ... " (1969, p. 293J. 
Among the economists who explored the question of revo-
lutions in economics, however, Coats seems to be in the 
minority. Ward and Stanfield are two of the economists who 
argued forcefully that Keynesianism was a Kuhnian-type 
revolution; that it did represent a major break with neo-
classical thought. 
Neoclassical economics was in a crisis by the 1930s, 
according to Ward, due to the persistence of certain anoma-
lies which could no longer be ignored; anomalies in monetary 
theory, capital theory, and business-cycle analysis. Money 
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remained outside the neoclassical supply and demand analysis 
although "it was clear that there was some sort of relation-
ship between short-run fluctuations in economic behavior, 
and the amount of money available to the economy and its use 
by citizens ... " (Ward, p. 35). At the same time capital 
theory emphasized real factors and neglected monetary fac-
tors. Business-cycle analysis, on the other hand, posed a 
different sort of anomaly. It was a peripheral subject 
because the subject itself was anomalous. "It studied vari-
ations in the level of economic activity that were certain, 
according to neoclassical theory, to be corrected by the 
operation of market forces" (Ward, pp. 35-36). But by the 
1930s real economic events had placed the business cycle 
squarely in the center of public concern: "the great factual 
anomaly of the period was the persistence of massive unem-
ployment ... " (Ward, p. 36). The Keynesian paradigm went a 
long way toward resolving these anomalies. In fact, Keynes' 
analysis is most well known for its demonstration that 
massive unemployment can persist for long periods of time 
within a market economy. Thus, what was an anomaly in the 
neoclassical paradigm was not anomalous in the Keynesian 
paradigm, and the study of variations in the level of aggre-
gate output which had previously been a peripheral subject 
was placed squarely in the center of conventional economics. 
"Furthermore, Keynes played a very important role in devel-
oping a theory of money in terms of supply and demand, so 
that one major anomaly of the older theory has virtually 
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disappeared" (Ward, p. 38). 
Stanfield, in a 1974 article, also makes the case for 
the Keynesian revolution being a Kuhnian revolution. He 
maintains that, "The basic anomaly of the pre-Keynesian 
heritage is found in the area of automatic full employment 
based upon Say's Law and the quantity theory, which deny the 
possibility of general market gluts" (Stanfield, p. lOll. 
Keynes' ~~ll~£~1 Ih~~£Y not only provided a solution to the 
anomaly, it provided a different world view with new puzzles 
to be solved and new tools of analysis. "In the new view ... 
the government is given a consistent theoretical rationale 
for fiscal intervention" <Stanfield, p. 103). 
The so-called neoclassical synthesis, however, appar-
ently convinced the economics profession at large that, when 
fully and adequately analyzed, the apparently "revolution-
ary" thought of Keynes can be seen to be merely a special 
case Rilhill neoclassical thought. This notion has been 
explored at length, and disputed, by Leijonhufvud. 
Keynes, claims Leijonhufvud, was chiefly challenging 
the "'orthodox' presupposition that the economic system 
'naturally' and 'automatically' works to coordinate 
activities ... " (p. 91). Keynes' theory embodied the polar 
opposite presupposition, and its acceptance among econo-
mists, he implies, was made possible by the trauma generated 
for economists by the Great Depression. 
Leijonhufvud points out that Keynesianism did not 
result in an outright abandonment of orthodox theory. The 
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macro part of neoclassical economics was abandoned, but the 
micro part was retained. Neoclassical microeconomics was 
retained because "the 'revolutionary' Keynesian doctrine 
provided no sufficiently coherent and well-developed substi-
tute ... [for its] ... innumerable applications to important 
guns-or-butter issues ... " (Leijonhufvud, p. 84l. 
So, we have the survival of contradictory research 
programmes; programmes that are built on contradictory 
presuppositions. The external world described by the micro-
economics courses in most universities has to be a different 
world, claims Leijonhufvud, than the one described by the 
counterpart macroeconomics courses . As he puts it, 
. . . economists have lived since the Keynesian 
revolution with two bodies of theory ('micro' and 
'macro') based on incompatible presuppositions 
about what the real system under study is like. 
How could we possibly have done so? The two 
theories could not possibly be 'true' of the same 
external world. Yet, they have survived side-by-
side for decades in reasonably peaceful coexis-
tence and without a climactic confrontation. That 
a relationship of victor to vanquished, of 
progressive to degenerating programme has not 
developed is easily understandable. As previously 
indicated, each of the two is singularly ill-
adapted for coping with the phenomena that the 
other accords the first order of priority. But 
the actual 'truce', that allowed these two incom-
patible views of the world to be simultaneously 
entertained without acute intellectual discomfort 
by a couple of generations of economists, is so 
implausible on the face of it as to require 
explanation (Leijonhufvud, p. 92l. 
The "truce" was, of course, the "neoclassical synthe-
sis" which, according to Leijonhufvud, simply amounted to a 
couple of trite and trivial conclusions of Keynesian econom-
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ics being incorporated into neoclassical economics as a 
special case, while ignoring the revolutionary "gestalt" of 
Keynes' theory. What allowed this to happen were certain 
incongruities between the form and the substance of Keynes' 
theory. The most crucial of these incongruities are stated 
by Leijonhufvud as follows: 
First, in directing his revolt most specifically 
against the Marshallian economics reigning in 
Cambridge, he sought to vanquish it with its own 
analytical weaponry. Among the main 'neoclassical 
schools' of the time, the Marshallian stands 
distinct from the rest by its conscientious 
guardianship of the 'plutological' analytical 
tradition. Keynesian aggregative economics bears 
this plutological heritage. For the formal 
statement of the coordination problem, however, a 
'catallactic' approach would have been more 
appropriate.... Second, Keynes 'cast his theory 
in static, equilibrium form' whereas the coordina-
tion problem will ultimately require the develop-
ment of methods of 'dynamic', 'disequilibrium• 
process analysis (pp. 93-94). 
These incongruities in Keynes' theory, according to 
Leijonhufvud, allowed the gradual undermining of the 
Keynesian perspective as economists attempted to reconcile 
neoclassical microeconomics with Keynesian macroeconomics. 
Even though Keynes' theory was dynamic in substance, the 
fact that it was static in form allowed the analysis to be 
carried out with the use of static equilibrium models. 
"Elements of Keynes's theoretical statement that were not to 
be captured by such representation drifted out of view" 
<Leijonhufvud, p. 95). Also, the use of a microeconomic 
model that Leijonhufvud characterizes as a monetary neo-
Walrasian model allowed "Keynes's model ... to be 
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reinterpreted as an 'aggregative, catallactic' structure 
rather than being seen as a late product of Marshallian 
plutology" (Leijonhufvud, p. 95l. And finally, 
Leijonhufvud notes that, "As the debate proceeded ... the 
accumulation of ... substitutions of 'what Keynes ought to 
have said' for what he did say came to falsify the original 
gestalt conception" (p. 95). Leijonhufvud sums up the 
result as follows: 
all. 
The process leading up to the neoclassical 
synthesis featured the standard equilibrium con-
structions mindlessly eating away at the main 
Keynesian ideas until nothing was left but the 
trite and trivial propositions that if wages are 
(i) 'too high' for equilibrium, and (iil 'rigid 
downwards', then unemployment will exist and 
persist. That end-product is the neoclassical 
synthesis in a nutshell (p. 98). 
Leijonhufvud does not buy the neoclassical synthesis at 
He calls it "patent nonsense any way you look at it" 
(Leijonhufvud, p. 98). What was accomplished by the 
"synthesis" is caustically summarized by Leijonhufvud as 
follows: 
The 'synthesis' gave an understandable answer 
to only one question, namely Humpty-Dumpty's: 'Who 
is to be master?' The neo-Walrasian programme 
came out the master with the Keynesian subordi-
nated to the role of one of its 'special cases' 
( p. 98) . 
If one accepts Leijonhufvud's analysis, then, neoclas-
sical economics is essentially microeconomics. In any case, 
the present appraisal is aimed at neoclassical microeconom-
ics, and is not intended to address Keynesian economics or 
neoclassical macroeconomics, however the latter might be 
construed. 
Marxist and Institutionalist Criticism 
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While there are technical subtleties involved in delin-
eating neoclassical economics from Keynesian economics, 
there are no difficulties involved in delineating neoclassi-
cal from Marxian or from institutionalist economics. The 
reason for including a discussion of the differences at this 
point is primarily to highlight the most distinctive charac-
teristics of neoclassical economics when viewed from a 
distance. The differences that stand out when viewed from a 
distance, but are obscured when one is close-up, are pre-
cisely the differences that should be considered as points 
of focus in an over-all appraisal. This is especially true 
when the appraisal is from a "foreign" perspective, such as 
hermeneutics. 
The most distinctive characteristic of neoclassical 
economics from a Marxist perspective is surely the consis-
tency of its basic conclusions. As has already been 
mentioned, Adam Smith's basic conclusions regarding the 
efficacy of market solutions remained essentially unchanged 
in the transition from classical to neoclassical economics. 
That is, both classical and neoclassical economists have 
concluded that a market system in which all parties pursue 
their own self interests would yield the most desireable 
solution to economic problems. 
... as Samuelson said in the fQ~llg~1iQn~: 'At least 
from the time of the physiocrats and Adam Smith, 
there has never been absent from the main body of 
economic literature the feeling that in some sense 
perfect competition represented an optimal situa-
tion.' The modern Invisible Hand theorem provides 
a rigorous demonstration of that feeling: every 
long-run perfectly competitive equilibrium yields 
an optimal allocation of resources and every 
optimal allocation of resources is a long-run 
perfectly competitive equilibrium. Of course, 
this leaves out the •justice' of the associated 
distribution of personal income; furthermore, 
•optimal allocation' is strictly defined with 
reference to the three basic value judgements of 
Paretian welfare economics. Nevertheless, every 
economist feels in his bones that the Invisible 
Hand theorem is almost as relevant to socialism as 
to capitalism, coming close indeed to a universal 
justification for the role of market mechanisms in 
any economy (Blaug, 1976, p. 176). 
Blaug, in the above quote, overstates the case. Not 
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~Y~~y economist shares this feeling regarding the Invisible 
Hand theorem and the justification of market mechanisms. 
Marxian economists certainly do not share this feeling, nor 
do very many institutionalists. In fact, Marxists and 
institutional economists have often and loudly criticized 
neoclassical economists for what they claim amounts to 
dressing up an ideological position as a scientific conclu-
sion. 
The view that neoclassical economists are actually 
reflecting an ideological position is developed by Benjamin 
Ward. 
neoclassical economics is held together by a framework of 
consensus that is based solidly upon classical liberal 
philosophy with its principles of hedonism, rationalism, and 
atomism. Neoclassical economics uses the market place as 
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the key to the reconciliation of atomism with the need for 
order and a harmony of interests. "The autonomous individ-
uals of economic science come into conflict, but this 
conflict is dramatically transformed by the bargaining pro-
cesses of the market place into a harmony of interests, a 
Pareto-optimality in principle, whose liberal credentials 
are impeccable" (Ward, p. 26). 
Marxists and institutionalists also criticize 
neoclassical economists for their use of methodological 
individualism and its unrealistic assumptions about human 
behavior. In neoclassical economics, market oriented econo-
mies are assumed to be driven by the preferences of rational 
maximizing individuals acting in their self-interest. These 
preferences are furthermore assumed to be given, that is, 
exogenous to the economic system. 
This difference with Marxist economics is spelled out 
explicitly by Herbert Gintis. 
'By acting on the external world and changing it,' 
Karl Marx once remarked, '[the worker] at the same 
time changes his own nature.' Much of Marxist 
theory is a development of this basic observation. 
The special position in Marxist theory of economic 
structure, its conception of materialism, of ide-
ology, of classes and of social change, hinge on 
this connection. Indeed, again to quote Marx, 
'the whole of history is nothing but a continual 
transformation of human nature.' 
It is less than happenstance that the major 
competitor to Marxist theory, the tradition culmi-
nating in modern neo-classical economics, is 
grounded firmly not merely in the abstraction 
from, but the negation of this insight. The 
Marxist observation, translated into neo-classical 
terminology, holds that individual preference 
structures are products of economic activity. Or 
more precisely, individual preferences develop and 
change according to variables endogenous to the 
economic model: prices, quantities, and availabil-
ities of consumption goods, jobs, and the social 
institutions conditioning the supply of labor. 
Neo-classical theory starts from the contrary 
position: the Walrasian system takes preferences 
as either fixed, or changing only in response to 
variables external to the model (p. 415). 
Institutionalists share this same difference with 
neoclassical economists. They maintain that individual 
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preferences are shaped largely by the institutional environ-
ment surrounding the individual. They furthermore claim 
that economic activity and economic changes are major influ-
ences on the evolution of social and cultural institutions. 
Nor do institutionalists accept the notion that rationality 
in decision-making can provide an adequate account of the 
behavior of economic actors. According to Charles Wilber 
and Robert Harrison: 
At the motivational level, institutional 
economics always has recognized the importance of 
tnonrational' human behavior in economic decision 
making. A thirst for power and adventure, a sense 
of independence, altruism, idle curiosity, custom, 
and habit may all be powerful motivations of 
economic behavior. Thus, institutionalists have 
been particularly critical of the economic man 
assumption of neoclassical economics <p. 72). 
Marxists and the institutionalists, in short, share the view 
that meaningful economic analysis must take into considera-
tion the psychological, social, political ~n4 ~fQllQIDlf 
forces that have a shaping influence on individuals. 
A Lakatosian Construction of 
Neoclassical Economics 
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So, this seems an appropriate point at which to intro-
duce not only a Lakatosian reconstruction of neoclassical 
economics, but one that gives the Cor, at least one) 
rationale for not dealing with the psychological, social, 
political and economic influences on individuals. Such a 
reconstruction is contained in the article by Latsis in 
tl~1hQg ~gg AEEr~i§~l. apparently the first attempt to intro-
duce the ideas of Imre Lakatos into economic methodology. 
Latsis maintains that neoclassical microeconomics has 
been dominated by a single research programme which he 
characterizes as "situational determinism". Situational 
determinism, as it is used by Latsis, is especially useful 
in understanding how economists have managed to consistently 
maintain such complete independence of psychology and soci-
ology. It also underscores the importance of the concept of 
rationality in that independence. 
The central characteristic of situational determinism, 
according to Latsis, "is the autonomy of economic decision-
making and the deliberate exclusion of the decision-maker's 
inner environment from explanations of economic behavior" 
( 1976b, p. 17). The inner environment of the decision-maker 
refers here to the unique psychological make-up of the 
individual. Decision situations which require knowledge of 
this inner environment to predict the decision that the 
actor will make are what Latsis refers to as multiple-exit 
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situations. Single-exit situations, on the other hand, are 
those which require only knowledge of the situation to 
predict what the response of the actor will be. 
Equilibrium models in microeconomics tend to be based 
on single-exit situations that do not require any assump-
tions about the social-psychological conditioning of the 
economic actors. Latsis elucidates this by quoting Herbert 
Simon regarding an analogous situation ragarding the behav-
ior of liquids. 
Suppose we were pouring ... molasses into a 
bowl of very irregular shape .... How much would 
we have to know about the properties of molasses 
to predict its behavior under the circumstan-
ces .... The single essential assumption would be 
that molasses, under the force of gravity would 
minimize the height of its centre of gravity. 
With this assumption, which would apply as well to 
any other liquid, and a complete knowledge of the 
environment -- in this case the shape of the 
bowl -- the equilibrium is completely deter-
mined .... equilibrium behavior depends only on 
its goal and its environment, it is otherwise 
completely independent of the internal properties 
(1976b, p. 18). 
Just as a prediction of the behavior of molasses in this 
situation requires only a knowledge of a certain character-
istic common to all liquids, the prediction of the behavior 
of an individual in situational determinism requires only a 
knowledge of a certain characteristic that is common to all 
humans, namely rationality. 
Microeconomists have, for the most part, tacitly 
adopted the rationality principle. Their models are 
typically built upon certain assumptions (including the 
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rationality principle) which are sufficient to render con-
elusive predictions of the behavior of economic actors. 
That is, they set up what Latsis refers to as single exit 
situations. Thus, according to Latsis, the neoclassical 
research programme can be described as follows: 
The hard core of the neoclassical programme 
may be put forward in the following four proposi-
tions: 
(i) Decision-makers have correct knowledge 
of their economic situation. 
(ii) Decision-makers prefer the best availa-
ble alternative given their knowledge of the 
situation and of the means at their disposal. 
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), situations generate 
their internal 'logic' and decision-makers act 
appropriately to the logic of their situation. 
(iv) Economic units and structures display 
stable, coordinated behavior. 
The positive heuristic of the programme may 
be expressed in terms of the following maxims: 
( i) 'Construct static models.' 
Cii) 'Minimize and if possible completely 
eliminate psychological and, in general, non-
economic content from the model.' 
(iii) 'Set up the situational assumptions in 
such a way that a determinate equilibrium issues.' 
(iv) 'Where possible construct functions 
which are suitable for the application of the 
procedures of the calculus.' 
(v) 'If the model yields no determinate 
equilibrium, modify the situational assumptions 
until such a solution becomes possible.' 
(vi) 'When the model yields a determinate 
equilibrium, attempt to refine it by introducting 
more realistic situational assumptions' (1976b, 
p. 22) • 
Both the perfect competition and the pure monopoly 
models are set up in accordance with this positive heuris-
tic, and both yield unique determinate equilibrium 
solutions. After reviewing these basic models, Latsis 
reviews the models of monopolistic competition, duopoly, 
oligololy, and limit price theory, all of which can be 
viewed as extensions of the basic models which have been 
obtained by altering the situational assumptions in the 
direction of increased realism. 
The author has only one quarrel with Latsis' recon-
struction of the neoclassical research programme, and that 
is his implication that it is built on a theory of ration-
ality. Neoclassical economics merely assumes rationality. 
Austrian economics, on the other hand, incorporates a very 
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specific theory of rationality. Insofar as the neoclassical 
research programme is to be distinguished from the Austrian 
research programme, that distinction must begin with the 
Austrian's theory of rationality on which they base !h~ir 
legitimation for the use of methodological individualism. 
It seems that Latsis has inappropriately attributed an 
Austrian-type theory of rationality to the neoclassical 
research programme. It thus seems appropriate at this point 
to explore the distinction between neoclassical economics 
and Austrian economics -- a distinction between the praxeo-
logical approach and the positivist approach. 
Praxeology versus Positivism 
Positivism has been the most important philosophical 
influence on the methodological thought of neoclassical 
economists. There have, of course, been numerous variations 
on positivist thought. But regardless of the variations, 
the emphasis on empirical testing of knowledge claims makes 
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for a definitive dividing line between neoclassical economic 
thought and Austrian economic thought. 
The first major work in economic methodology from a 
positivist perspective was Terence Hutchison's Ih~ 
§ignifi£~n£~ ~gg ~~~i£ ~Q~!~l~!~~ Qf ~fQllQillif Ih~Q£~, pub-
lished in 1938. This book was an attempt to establish a 
solid logical foundation for economics as an empirical sci-
ence. He followed the positivists in maintaining that the 
propositions of economic science must be either analytical 
or empirical. The analytical propositions are true because 
they are tautological, as are the propositions of mathemat-
ics and logic. As such they cannot be proven false by any 
conceivable set of events. Thus~ they have no empirical 
content. The truth or falsity of empirical propositions, on 
the other hand, does hinge on actual events. "CTJhese 
propositions must conceivably be capable of empirical test-
ing or be reducible to such propositions by logical or 
mathematical deduction" (Quoted in Caldwell, p. 107). 
According to Hutchison, all the propositions of pure 
economic theory are devoid of empirical content. The use-
fulness of pure theory, however, is only accessory. The 
objective of economics is to find empirical generalizations 
which are "conceivably falsifiable, though not practically 
falsified, empirically" (Quoted in Caldwell, p. 111). 
These generalizations, Hutchison maintained, constitute 
scientific laws. 
Hutchison also kicked off the most famous debate in 
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neoclassical economic methodology by further maintaining 
that the assumptions on which theories are built should be 
grounded in empirical investigation. Fritz Machlup attacked 
Hutchison's position, which he labeled "ultra-empiricism". 
Machlup claimed that this sort of position did not recognize 
the fact that propositions of different levels of generali-
ty, and thus of different levels of testability, are not 
only useful but necessary in science. He also claimed that 
the more general propositions need not be tested directly 
and individually; they can be tested indirectly in the 
context of testing the theory as a whole (see Caldwell, 
pp. 141-143). 
Milton Friedman's position regarding the assumptions or 
basic postulates of economic theory is also at odds with 
Hutchison's position. But it is also different from 
Machlup's position. Whereas Machlup maintained that the 
basic assumptions of economic theory need not be directly 
; 
testable because they can be indirectly tested, Friedman 
claimed that they needn't be testable at all. According to 
Friedman, "The ultimate goal of a positive science is the 
development of a •theory' or 'hypothesis' that yields valid 
and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about phe-
nomena not yet observed" (p. 7l The assumptions on which 
the theory is built are important as instruments only; their 
realism or lack thereof is irrelevant. 
Freidman's view was, in turn, attacked by Paul 
Samuelson who argued that economists should be concerned 
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with providing an accurate description of the economic 
world. Samuelson thus claims that Friedman "is fundamental-
ly wrong in thinking that unrealism in the sense of factual 
inaccuracy even to a tolerable degree of approximation is 
anything but a demerit for a theory or hypothesis" (Quoted 
in Blaug, 1980, p. 111). 
Prior to Kuhn, then, the primary methodological dis-
putes among neoclassical economists in this century have 
been about direct versus indirect testability of hypotheses, 
the importance or irrelevance of assumptions being realis-
tic, and about whether predictive accuracy, explanatory 
power, or descriptive accuracy should be the goal of econ-
omic theory. But, there has been general agreement that the 
validity of economic theory must at some point be judged on 
the basis of empirical evidence. In this stance, mainstream 
neoclassical economists are definitely at odds with Austrian 
economists. 
The ''Austrian" economic thought specifically referred 
to, is that line of thought usually associated with Ludwig 
von Mises. Mises developed a unique praxeology (theory of 
human action) on which he bases his view of economics. 
According to Mises, "economic science is praxeological ... 
CandJ ... the basic postulates of the discipline are necessary 
and unquestionable truths about the human condition ... " 
<Caldwell, p. 104). 
The praxeological point of view relies on a distinction 
between h~m~n action -- that is, a type of action that is 
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presumably unique to humans -- and all other types of 
action. 
( 1960l, claims that the important contribution of praxeology 
in understanding human action is that it has isolated an 
element in human action that operates in addition to any 
physiological, psychological, or physical influences. That 
element is human reason or logic. Human reason, according 
to Kirzner, provides a unique guide to the selection of one 
or more courses of action that hold out the promise of 
altering one's state of affairs in a way that is perceived 
to be desireable. "In so far as human behavior is guided by 
logic, then, conduct will follow a path that has been se-
lected by reason. This path of conduct is what is known 
praxeologically as h!:!-!!!9:!1 §:f!:.iQ!l 11 (Kirzner, p. 149). 
Kirzner does not deny that specific environmental con-
ditions or physiological and psychological characteristics 
play a role in human action. What he is claiming is that 
there is something more at work in human action; " ... some-
thing more than a bundle of reflexes responding to specific 
stimuli" (Kirzner, p. 151). The something more is "man's 
power to weigh, arrange, and choose among courses of 
behavior ... " (Kirzner, p. 151 l. 
Not only do the Misean-type Austrian economists main-
tain that humans possess a logic of analysis that is not 
available to other species, but they claim that this logic 
of analysis is grounded in common properties of the human 
mind. As Caldwell puts it, 11 Mises ... takes a Kantian per-
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spective in arguing that the axioms of praxeology ... involve 
necessary categories of the mind ... " (p. 121). He quotes 
Mises' argumept that it is "the human mind with its logical 
structure, its apriori categories" (Caldwell, p. 121) that 
allows human beings to take advantage of their sensory input 
in a way that is not possible for animals. 
Kirzner gives a clear-cut description of how this pro-
vides an epistemological foundation for knowledge claims 
regarding human behavior. 
Given all the physical, physiological, and 
psychological influences on the setting of an 
action, action of a .specific form might be predic-
ted with assurance. But such prediction is 
conceivable not because these influences irr 
1h~m~~lY~~ determine action, but because action is 
.subject to the mandate of reason, which guides the 
act into the path that i.s to be preferred among 
those indicated by the external influences. A 
complete knowledge on the part of an observer of 
these external influences might allow prediction 
of the form to be taken by action only because the 
logic of the observer enables him to know with 
certainty the path that the actor's own logic will 
select. When a man is about to perform a mathema-
tical computation upon given data, an observer of 
the data may attempt to predict the results that 
the computer will arrive at. But for such a 
prediction to be .successful, it is not .sufficient 
to rely on the fact that these results are 'deter-
mined' by the data; it is necessary that the 
observer with his own logic be able to reproduce 
mentally the logical operations performed by the 
computer in arriving at his results (Kirzner, 
p. 150). 
And since, according to Mises and his followers, human 
action is logical by definition, and since we are all 
equipped with the same mental categories that shape human 
logic, then it follows that if we know the external influ-
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ences at work in any situation we can predict with certainty 
the course of human action that will follow. Thus Mises 
makes claims that are epistemologically uncompromising. 
The theorems attained by correct praxeological 
reasoning are not only perfectly certain and 
incontestable, like the correct mathematical 
theorems. They refer, moreover, with the full 
rigidity of their apodictic certainty and incon-
testability to the reality of action as it appears 
in life and history. Praxeology conveys exact and 
precise knowledge of real things (Quoted in 
Caldwell, pp. 121-122). 
This, then, is the epistemological foundation for 
Misesian-type Austrian economic thought. It also, according 
to Mises, allows economics to claim a unique methodological 
position: "What assigns economics its peculiar and unique 
position in the orbit of pure knowledge and of the practical 
utilization of knowledge is the fact that its particular 
theorems are not open to any verification or falsification 
on the ground of experience ... the ultimate yardstick of an 
economic theorem's correctness or incorrectness", says 
Mises, "is solely reason unaided by experience" (Quoted in 
Blaug, 1980, p. 92). 
There are other notable differences between mainstream 
neoclassical economics and Austrian economics, such as the 
latter's denial of the propriety of general equilibrium 
analysis. But the primary distinction is the extreme dif-
ference regarding the methodological basis for knowledge 
claims. 
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Summary 
In summary, for purposes of this appraisal, 
''neoclassical economics" refers to the body of mainstream 
microeconomic doctrine that is perpetuated and extended by 
those economists who characterize their work as positive 
social science. The rational reconstruction developed by 
Latsis is accepted as a valid Lakatosian characterization of 
neoclassical economics, except for his apparent conflation 
of neoclassical economic methodology with Austrian method-
ology. Even if neoclassical economists do not, as Blaug 
charges, practice what they preach, in terms of empirical 
methodology, it is still an important characteristic of the 
neoclassical position in that it is used to claim scientific 
l~gitimacy for neoclassical economic theory. 
CHAPTER V 
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC INQUIRY AND THE 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMATIC 
SITUATION 
According to Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, 
questioning typically originates when our expectations are 
contradicted by experience. Gadamer implies that this 
source of questions has implications for the human sciences. 
He maintains that the purpose of the human sciences is to 
generate knowledge that is useful for guiding human actions. 
And since guidance is most needed in problematic situations, 
it follows that such situations are a source of inquiry for 
the human sciences. This chapter presents an exploration of 
the way neoclassical economics responds to problematic sit-
uations. It is a critical exploration which relies fun-
damentally on Gadamer's model of conversation in which he 
elaborates the role of questions. First, however, a brief 
sketch of the contemporary role of neoclassical economics is 
presented as a backdrop for the exploration. 
The Contemporary Role of Neoclassical 
Economics 
Milton Friedman has expressed the view that positive 
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economics is concerned with ~what is'' and not with ~what 
ought to be". He also maintains that the goal of economic 
theory is prediction and not explanation. Economic theory, 
in this view, is solely a tool to be used to make predic-
tions. Economists, armed with their theory, can predict 
what the economic results of a given policy are likely to 
be. The theoretical knowledge of economists, in this view, 
is extremely valuable to those in policy-making positions. 
It is not the role of the economist, however, to make pol-
icy; that is done via the political system in Friedman's 
ideal world. For Friedman, then, the fact that economics has 
become extremely influencial with respect to public policy 
is not, in itself, a negative development. As a citizen, 
however, Friedman has been extremely critical of economic 
policy that is not based on neoclassical economic theory. 
There is no doubt that neoclassical microeconomic 
theory has had a tremendous impact on public policy. It has 
informed the analysis of the impact of antitrust legisla-
tion, utility rate regulation, public project analysis (via 
cost/benefit analysis), excise tax policy, and on and on. 
But it also has had an impact in another way; neoclassical 
economics has provided the dominant image of our economic 
system. As John Kenneth Galbraith has pointed out, it is an 
image that is implanted in several hundred thousand students 
each year. 
neutral. 
And the implications for public policy are llQ1 
Although the accepted [neoclassical] image of 
economic society is not the reality, it is what is 
available. As such it serves as a surrogate for 
the reality for legislators, civil servants, 
journalists, television commentators, professional 
prophets -- all, indeed, who must speak, write or 
act on economic questions. It helps determine 
their reaction to the economic system; it helps 
set the norms of behavior or action -- in work, 
consumption, saving, taxation, regulation -- which 
they find good or bad (Galbraith, p. 7). 
In short, the promotion of the neoclassical image of 
economic society in the classroom helps to assure public 
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support for public policy analysis that is based on neoclas-
sical economic theory. This consideration considerably 
heightens the importance of how neoclassical economics deals 
with issues raised by the contemporary human situation. 
Before turning to this question, however, a review of 
Gadamer's views on the initiation of inquiry is in order. 
Gadamer's Model of Conversation and 
the Primacy of Questions 
In Gadamer's view, no inquiry is initiated unless some-
thing has happened or some situation has arisen that poses a 
question. So, the product of any inquiry can, or rather 
must, be seen as the answer to a question. 
It is quite artificial to imagine that statements 
fall down from heaven and that they can be sub-
jected to analytic labor without once bringing 
into consideration why they were stated and in 
what way they are responses to something. That is 
the first, basic, and infinitely far-reaching 
demand called for in any hermeneutical under-
taking. Not only in philosophy or theology but in 
any research project, it is required that one 
elaborate an awareness of the hermeneutic situa-
tion. That has to be our initial aim when we 
approach what the question is <Gadamer, 1882, 
p. 107). 
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But questions can be misunderstood. Or, what means the 
same thing in Gadamer's philosophy, the inquirer may not 
recognize the question posed by the situation. In this 
case, the "wrong" question will be addressed. Later in this 
chapter an attempt will be made to establish that a "normal" 
social science systematically obscures the questions being 
raised by the human situation. First, however, this notion 
of "right" and "wrong" questions, can be brought into 
sharper focus by referring once again to Gadamer's model of 
conversation as an analogy to the process of inquiry. 
For two people who do not agree on some subject and who 
wish to achieve agreement, conversation holds the possibil-
ity of the desired agreement. True conversation, however, 
is only possible if both parties are willing to be open to 
the other's point of view. When both parties are open in 
this way, then the conversation is guided, in a sense, by 
the subject of the conversation. The matter under discus-
sion, in this case, generates questions -- is it like this 
or like that? 
On the other hand, if the parties are not open but only 
pretend to be, then the questions they pretend to have are 
false questions . Thus, according to Gadamer, 
. . . a question can be right or wrong, according as 
it reaches into the sphere of the truly open or 
fails to do so. We call a question false that 
does not reach the state of openness, but inhibits 
it by holding on to false presuppositions. It 
pretends to an openness and susceptibility to 
decision that it does not have. But if what is 
undecided is not distinguished, or not correctly 
distinguished from those predispositions that are 
effectively held, then it is not brought into the 
open and nothing can be decided (1985, p. 327). 
In the case of false questions, not only do they pro-
hibit the issue at hand from being decided, but they stand 
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in the way of discovering what Gadamer refers to as ''truth". 
Truth, in the sense that Gadamer uses the term, refers to 
shared understanding and is caught up with the notion of 
community, as is illustrated in the following quote: 
Every conversation presupposes a common language, 
or, it creates a common 1 anguage. Something is 
placed in the centre, as the Greeks said, which 
the partners to the dialogue both share, and 
concerning which they can exchange ideas with one 
another. Hence agreement concerning the object, 
which it is the purpose of the conversation to 
bring about, necessarily means that a common 
language must first be worked out in the conversa-
tion. This is not an external matter of simply 
adjusting our tools, nor is it even right to say 
that the partners adapt themselves to one another 
but, rather, in the successful conversation they 
both come under the influence of the truth of the 
object and are thus bound to one another in a new 
community. To reach an understanding with one's 
partner in a dialogue is not merely a matter of 
total self-expression and the successful assertion 
of one's own point of view, but a transformation 
into a communion, in which we do not remain what 
we were (Gadamer, 1985, p. 341). 
With these notions of "right" and "wrong" questions in 
mind we can now turn to an examination of the questions 
addressed by neoclassical economics. This will be done in 
two steps. First, a look at the questions addressed by 
classical economics is in order because these have been, to 
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a large extent, carried over into neoclassical economics. 
Second, the change in questioning that resulted from the 
transition from classical to neoclassical economics is exam-
ined. 
The Originative Questions for Economics 
It is widely acknowledged by historians of economic 
thought that economics as a distinct field of inquiry began 
in the eighteenth century and that Adam Smith's Th§ M§~l!h 
Qf N~!iQll~ published in 1776 was the single most identifi-
able work that provided a comprehensive unifying perspective 
for this new field of inquiry. This work, more than any 
other, marked the beginning of classical economics. 
The late eighteenth century was a time of transition. 
The old feudal arrangements had largely broken down. 
Markets had historically played a very small role, an almost 
incidental role, in the workings of society. But by the 
eithteenth century the role of markets had expanded dramat-
ically. The expansion of markets for movable goods was 
dramatic in itself. But the expansion of markets to include 
land and labor was much more significant. Under feudal 
arrangements, of course, land had not been considered to be 
"for sale". And the "serfs" -- the workers in the feudal 
system -- were tied to the land and the "nobleman" who 
"owned" the land in a relationship which had no similarity 
to an employee/employer relationship. 
The transition to a market system was anything but 
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.smooth. From the .sixteenth century until well into the 
nineteenth century the proce.s.s of enclosing the common lands 
to raise .sheep for wool resulted in wave after wave of 
peasants being released from the land with no means of 
livelihood. The towns and cities were flooded with paupers. 
Riots erupted against the enclosures. Robert Heilbroner, in 
Ih2 ~Qrl41Y fhilQ~QEh2r~, notes that .some 3500 people were 
killed in one .such riot. He also notes that 15,000 peasants 
were dispossessed in 1820 when the Dutchess of Sutherland 
replaced them with 131,000 .sheep (p. 30). 
The peasants were not the only one's to experience 
dislocation. Heilbroner notes that many of the "nobility" 
were displaced a.s power shifted away from them and into the 
hands of the merchants who understood money and commerce. 
But merchants and capitalists were also not without chal-
lenge. They were faced with change on every side; change 
which was often fiercely resisted. Heilbroner further 
described the atmosphere of disruption: 
Capital i.s fighting against change, and no holds 
are barred. In England in 1623 a revolutionary 
patent for a stocking frame not only is denied, 
but the Privy Council orders the dangerous con-
traption abolished. In France the importation of 
printed calicoes i.s theatening to undermine the 
clothing industry. It i.s met with measures that 
cost the lives of 16,000 people! In Valence alone 
on one occasion 77 persons are .sentenced to be 
hanged, 58 broken on the wheel, 631 .sent to the 
galleys, and one lone and lucky individual i.s .set 
free, for the crime of dealing in forbidden calico 
wares ( 1980, pp. 28-29). 
In .short, the transition from feudal .society to a 
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market system was confusing, disruptive, and generally 
threatening. Long established customary relationships and 
ways of doing things were ripped apart by forces that were 
not understood, and thus were feared. Consequently, 
Heilbroner maintains that, 11 Nobody wanted this commerciali-
zation of life 11 (1980, p. 28). 
It was against this background that Adam Smith wrote 
Ih~ ~~~llh ~f N~li~Q~. giving classical economics its first 
comprehensive expression. The questions addressed by Smith 
have been stated as follows by Heilbroner: 
How is it possible for a community in which every-
one is busily following his self-interest not to 
fly apart from sheer centrifugal force? What is 
it that guides each individual's private business 
so that it conforms to the needs of the group? 
With no central planning authority and no steady-
ing influence of age-old tradition, how does 
society manage to get those tasks done which are 
necessary for survival ( 1980, pp. 51-52)? 
Smith's answers to these questions are, of course, well 
known. He formulated the laws of the market and demon-
strated how the markets for land, labor, and capital are 
self-adjusting on the production side and how production 
responds to a self-adjusting market for goods and services. 
The overall result being a demonstration of how a market 
system acts as an "invisible hand" to coordinate production 
and distribution of those goods desired by society, subject 
only to the restraint of natural resources. 
From the perspective of Gadamer's hermeneutics the 
questions addressed by Smith, the originative questions for 
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classical economics, must be judged as questions that were 
posed by the problematic historical situation facing society 
at that time. It would not be easy to make a credible case 
that they were the "wrong" questions. But that was 200 years 
ago. And to the extent that neoclassical economics is still 
pushing roughly the same conclusions as Smith's, it must be 
asked where neoclassical economics is getting the questions 
that drive its inquiry. Can they possibly be the same 
questions that Smith was addressing? Or is neoclassical 
economics a Kuhnian-type hormal science, addressing ques-
tions (puzzles) that arise in the process of extending a 
basic paradigmatic conceptual framework? 
Neoclassical Economics as 
a Normal Science 
A good case can be made that neoclassical economics 
does, in fact, function as a normal science. In fact, the 
transition from classical to neoclassical economics marked 
the beginning of economics as a normal science which has 
been concerned primarily with fleshing out and extending the 
basic paradigm provided by Adam Smith. As was noted in 
Chapter II, Donald Gordon made essentially this claim back 
in 1965, as did Benjamin Ward in a much more extensive 
analysis in his ~h~1~§ ~£Qng ~i1h ~£QTIQmi£§1 in 1972. A 
closer look at Ward's analysis is in order after a review of 
Kuhn's concept of normal science. 
According to Kuhn, most scientific activity is carried 
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out within an accepted conceptual framework which has been 
built upon past scientific achievements. The accepted 
framework reflects certain beliefs about the world, and it 
serves as a foundation for the articulation of problems that 
must be solved if the range of explanatory power is to be 
extended. The process of solving these problems is what 
Kuhn characterizes as paradigm-based research. The term 
"paradigm", in the broad sense, "stands for the entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on 
shared by the members of a given community" (Kuhn, 1970a, 
p. 175) . Paradigm-based research is also what Kuhn refers 
to as normal science. Normal science is research aimed at 
the fleshing out and extension of the already accepted 
theoretical framework, and contradictory theories and view-
points tend to be suppressed by the established scientific 
community . Normal science, Kuhn claims, can be seen as 
.. . an attempt to force nature into the preformed 
and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm 
supplies. No part of the aim of normal science is 
to call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed those 
that will not fit the box are often not seen at 
all. Nor do scientists normally aim to invent new 
theories, and they are often intolerant of those 
invented by others. Instead, normal-scientific 
research is directed to the articulation of those 
phenomena and theories that the paradigm already 
supplies (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 24). 
Accordingly, Kuhn claims that the research problems 
pursued tend to be those which are seen as holding the most 
promise for extending the explanatory power of the accepted 
theoretical framework. Kuhn has likened the process to 
puzzle-solving, and has even claimed that the puzzle-type 
challenges to ingenuity and skill are strong motivating 
factors for scientists. 
Though its outcome can be anticipated, often in 
detail so great that what remains to be known is 
itself uninteresting, the way to achieve that 
outcome remains very much in doubt. Bringing a 
normal research problem to a conclusion is 
achieving the anticipated in a new way, and it 
requires the solution of all sorts of complex 
instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical 
puzzles. The man who succeeds proves himself an 
expert puzzle-solver, and the challenge of the 
puzzle is an important part of what usually drives 
him on CKuhn, 1970a, p. 13). 
Such puzzle-solving activity consists mostly of what Kuhn 
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characterizes as ''mopping-up operations", which he claims to 
be the substance of most scientists' careers. 
In exploring the extent to which mainstream economics 
<neoclassical and Keynesian) functions as a normal science, 
Ward took Kuhn's suggestion that "the most useful way to 
look at a science is as a special kind of social system" 
C Ward, p. 5) . When functioning normally, it is made up of 
researchers who "form a sort of invisible college, based on 
common interests, shared commitments, and frequent inter-
action" (Ward, p. 6). Ward claims that economics does fit 
this description. The training program centered around the 
Ph.D. curriculum serves as the foundation for the invisible 
college. These programs tend to have roughly the same basic 
core which is perpetuated by the fact that a more or less 
standard set of texts and "classic" papers serve as the main 
resource for the topics to be learned. He also claims that 
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economists' tendency toward a common perspective is height-
ened by contact among colleagues, especially the frequent 
conferences, national committee work, etc., generated by 
research. Research, which is governed by the informal 
rules of the profession, is such a potent influence because 
its successful completion is the primary source of prestige 
within the profession. 
The abundance of disagreement among economists should 
not be taken as evidence against an invisible college of 
economists, Ward points out, because it is generally bounded 
by agreement on the broader framework of economics. 
"Keynesians and monetarists generally agree as to the nature 
of their disagreement and the kinds of tests that are likely 
to help resolve the controversy" !Ward, p. 11). 
Another important consideration, according to Ward, is 
that, "Economics has acquired a hard core of quite esoteric 
knowledge which serves to separate sharply the solid, main-
line practitioner from others" (p. 12). This hard core 
consists mainly of the use of mathematics to extend and 
formalize economic theory. Economists in this area are 
widely considered to be the elite of the profession. "For 
practitioners within this area of economics there can be no 
appeal other than to their peers in the field; no one else 
knows what they are talking about when they are talking the 
language of their science" CWard, pp. 12-13). 
These considerations, plus the fact that almost all 
fields of economics have been self-sustaining, lead Ward to 
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conclude that economics passes Kuhn's most crucial tests for 
a normal science. And the practice of economics has puzzle-
solving at its heart just as other normal sciences do. Ward 
claims that puzzles in economics "serve to focus the atten-
tion of a number of researchers on a particular problem 
area, since there is usually widespread agreement that a 
particular puzzle is in fact a puzzle, and other members of 
the profession will be excited and impressed by a solution, 
or even by one of those ingenious attempts" (Ward, 
pp. 19-20) . 
A related aspect of economic practice is the widespread 
use of what Ward calls "stylized facts". "These," he says, 
"are false or at least exaggerated assumptions about some of 
the facts of the situation under study which are designed to 
get the researcher's attention away from these facts and 
onto others" (Ward, p. 20 l. He cites as an example, the 
assumption of stable prefences in the theory of consumer 
behavior. 
Economists are well aware that this is a stylized 
fact, that it is often wrong. And there are some 
studies in which changes in preferences are ad-
mitted. But studies that find it convenient to 
make this assumption are not very likely to be 
criticized from within the science for this par-
ticular stylized fact, because of its familiarity 
to economists from their training and because of 
its centrality to the basic normative propositions 
of welfare economics. Any serious critique of 
this stylized fact would strike at the heart of 
neoclassical economics. This raises the question: 
To what extent are stylized facts used to conceal 
anomalies, to discourage consideration of topics 
in ways that would be destructive of the framework 
of consensus of economic science (Ward, 
pp. 21-22)? 
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Finally, Ward claims that, like any .social .system, 
economics has certain instruments of incentive and punish-
ment to keep the members of the profession in line. The 
economists who wield these instruments, those in positions 
of power "tend to be among the leaders of the profession, 
men whose status has been acquired by the high quality of 
the work they have performed as judged by the profession's 
current and quondam leaders" <Ward, p. 29). These men are 
"the censors who eliminate from professional consideration 
some work and who allocate praise among the acceptable 
studies ... " <Ward, p. 29). The process of "censorship" is 
alluded to by Ward as follows: 
The discipline's censors occupy leading posts in 
economics departments at the major institutions, 
and their students and lesser confreres occupy 
similar posts at nearly all the universities that 
train new Ph.D.'s. The lion's .share of appointment 
and dismissal power has been vested in the depart-
ments themselves at these institutions. Any 
economist with serious hopes of obtaining a ten-
ured position in one of these departments will 
soon be made aware of the criteria by which he is 
to be judged. In a word, he i.s expected to become 
a normal economic scientist (pp. 29-30). 
These claims advanced by Ward cannot be dismissed as an 
isolated view of a disenchanted economist. Lester Thurow, a 
solidly mainstream liberal economist, has recently issued 
essentially the .same view in terms that are bitingly criti-
cal. Economics, he suggests, i.s on its way to becoming a 
guild which preserves and advances the traditional equilib-
rium price-auction view of the world: "all honor i.s reserved 
for those who can explain current events in terms of 'The 
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Theory', while anyone trying to develop new theories to 
explain recent developments is regarded with suspicion at 
best" (Thurow, p. xix). "The Theory" is blessed, he says, 
because of its internal logical consistency and its capacity 
for being expressed in mathematical form. But a logically 
consistent theory expressed in mathematical form is not, in 
and of itself, a sufficient foundation for public policy. 
And Thurow leaves no doubt about his view of the inadequacy 
of traditional neoclassical economics for public policy. 
I am convinced that accepting the conventional 
supply-demand model of the economy is rather like 
believing that the world is flat, or that the sun 
revolves around the earth -- you can make a 
rigDrous case, on paper, for both propositions, 
but hard evidence is more than a bit scarce. 
Moreover, if you choose to act on either belief, 
you can get into a lot of trouble <Thurow, 
p. XV i i ) . 
"The Theory", Thurow claims, is actually an ideology with 
noticeable similarities to religious fundamentalism. Both 
are motivated, he suggests, by "a desire for psychological 
certainty in a world that is, in the last instance, uncer-
tain" (Thurow, p. xix). 
These normal science tendencies of neoclassical econ-
omics raise severe doubts about the adequacy of the way it 
deals with issues generated by the contemporary human situa-
tion. The normal social scientist certainly cannot 
consistently avoid recognition of aspects of the current 
situation that are anomalous with respect to the ruling 
paradigm. In such cases, however, the normal scientist does 
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not suspend his or her preconceived viewpoints and become 
open to the questions being raised by the situation. In-
stead, he or she sees the anomalous situation as a puzzle to 
be solved, and sets out to find some way to extend the 
accepted theoretical framework so that the anomaly is ex-
plained within the paradigm. 
The paradigmatic viewpoint of the normal neoclassical 
economist, however, is at least 200 years old; it is the 
paradigm provided by Adam Smith. The image of economic 
society thus provided has been summarized succinctly by 
Daniel Hausman as follows. 
Since Adam Smith, a particular vision of such 
[market] economies has dominated economic theori-
zing. One conceives of an economy as made up of a 
number of separate agents -- individuals or 
households or firms -- whose only interactions 
with one another are voluntary exchanges of goods 
and services. Everybody knows that people have 
all sorts of other interactions with one another, 
but the economist assumes, as a first approxima-
tion, that these other connections among agents 
can be ignored. Economic agents are conceived of 
as well-informed, rational, and self-interested 
maximizers. They exchange with one another 
because they prefer their after-exchange 
circumstances to their before-exchange 
circumstances, and their preferences are complete 
and consistent. In the background is an 
institutional setting that insures that contracts 
are kept, violence and coercion and trickery pre-
vented, and so forth. Adam Smith formulates these 
conditions more loosely than I have, whereas con-
temporary theorists formulate them with greater 
precision. But the basic model or vision has 
persisted (p. 30). 
It seems unlikely that the issues generated by the human 
social situation of the late twentieth century could be 
adequately addressed within the paradigmatic viewpoint 
developed to cope with the problematic situations of the 
eighteenth century. 
Technology as the Twentieth 
Century's Key Issue 
The most spectacular developments since the time of 
Adam Smith have resulted from the expansion of scientific 
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knowledge. Scientific knowledge and its application in the 
form of technology were certainly beginning to have a far-
reaching impact on eighteenth century society, but certain 
major implications that were then only seeds of possibility 
have come to fruition in the twentieth century. Gadamer 
maintains that "the twentieth century is the first to be 
determined anew in a decisive fashion by technology, with 
the onset of the transfer of technical expertise from the 
mastery of forces of nature to social life" ( 1982, p. 72). 
Prior to the rise of scientific knowledge, the patterns 
of civilization were modeled after nature. With the rise of 
scientific knowledge, however, the patterns of civilization 
are more and more the patterns of human creation. They are, 
in a sense, artificial patterns. In prescientific soci-
eties technical endeavor was subordinated to human needs. 
In contemporary society, on the other hand, human wants and 
needs are shaped by technology. As Gadamer puts it, " ... in 
our civilization, characterized by technological growth, 
what has been artificially produced sets the new terms --as 
a consumer-awakening and need-stimulating industry is built 
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up around us" ( 1982, p. 71). What has become pervasive as 
a result of our technological society is a loss of freedom 
in the way we interact with our world. This, Gadamer main-
tains, is the price we pay for the comforts and wealth that 
technology makes available to us. 
Whoever makes use of technology -- and who does 
not? -- entrusts himself to its functioning. It 
is by means of a primary renunciation of freedom 
in relation to one's own overall ability to act 
that one has come into the enjoyment of these 
astonishing comforts and enlargements of wealth 
that modern technology makes available 
<Gadamer, 1982, p. 71). 
This situation, says Gadamer, has obscured two ques-
tions: "For whose benefit is the work being accomplished? 
And how much do the achievements of technology serve life" 
C1982, p. 71)? The second of these questions is obviously 
of pressing concern in the form of the nuclear arms situa-
tion and the threat of annihilation that it poses. It is 
also pressing, in a less drastic and immediate sense, in the 
form of the ecological crisis. Not only do the life threat-
ening dangers of technology pose very pressing questions; 
they also raise very unique questions because the applica-
tions of technology have gone much further than ever before 
in making the destiny of humankind a common destiny. 
The (Neoclassical) Economics 
of Technology 
Neoclassical economists have, of course, addressed the 
issue of technology, but the subject has only recently 
(within the last couple of decades) begun to develop as a 
recognizable field within microeconomics. In fact, Ra 1 ph 
Landau, in a lengthy article entitled "Technology, 
Economics, and Public Policy," has commented that, 
The modern economics profession awoke to a 
comprehension of the major role technology has 
played only in the middle 1950s, when two 
economists, Robert Solow of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology and Moses Abramovitz of 
Stanford University, published works examining the 
sources of American economic growth since the 
Civil War. By comparing the conventional inputs 
with the outputs of the economy for the century 
following that conflict, they found the inputs 
were far smaller than the outputs, the difference 
being attributed to a residual they equated with 
'technological progress,' which seemed to 
constitute nearly 90 percent of the growth during 
the period from the Civil War until the 
midfifties (p. 1). 
Landau notes that after numerous additional papers on the 
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subject, "It is now widely believed that from one-third to 
one-half of all our growth has come from technological 
progress, and that it is the principal driving force for 
long-term economic growth and the increased standards of 
living of modern industrial societies" (p. 2). 
Quite appropriately, then, the economics of technology 
is becoming a recognizable field of study. One of the 
leaders in this field, Edwin Mansfield, introduces students 
to the field in his popular tli~~Q~£QllQmi~~ textbook. 
First we take up the definition, measurement, and 
determinants of the rate of technological change. 
Then we discuss the limitations of static effic-
iency, the economics of the patent system, and 
the effects of market structure on the rate of 
technological change and the rate of productivity 
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increase (Mansfield, 1982, p. 492). 
Mansfield does all of this primarily within the framework of 
the neoclassical microeconomic paradigm developed in his 
textbook. 
Most of the other mainstream writings on the economics 
of technology have likewise been in the nature of an 
extension of the explanatory power of the neoclassical 
microeconomic paradigm. For example, Mansfield ( 1983) has 
studied technological change and market structure within the 
general conceptual framework of industrial organization 
economics, including such considerations as "Effects of 
Major Process Innovations on Minimum Efficient Scale of 
Plant" (p. 205) and "The Rate of Technological Change, the 
Character of Process and Product Innovation, and Changes in 
Concentration" (p. 208). F. M. Scherer ( 1983) has studied 
"R & D and Productivity Increases" with an eye toward public 
policy implications. His analysis included considerations 
such as the profitability of R & D and the effects of 
divergences between the marginal private efficiency of R & D 
and the marginal social efficiency of R & D. A recent book, 
I~~hrr~l~gy ~rr~ ~~~rr~~i~ ~~li~Y ( 1986), edited by Ralph 
Landau and Dale Jorgenson, is primarily a collection of 
articles using the conceptual framework of public finance to 
study various aspects of federal tax policy on technological 
innovation. Another recent book, Ih~ ~£QllQmi£~ Qf E ~ ~ 
fQli£Y ( 1985l, edited by George Tolley, James Hodge, and 
James Oehmke, is a collection of numerous articles which 
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represent extensions of the range of applicability of 
neoclassical economic tools of analysis. It includes 
articles which address the resource allocation problem in 
R & D (Brian Wright), the effect of the patent system on 
profit incentive (Carole Kitti), and the application of 
benefit-cost analysis to R & D project evaluation (George 
Tolley and Stuart Townsend). 
Neoclassical economists have also done research which 
attempts to apply their analytical tools to some of the 
global problems that have resulted from the cumulative 
effects of technology and the industrialized world it has 
made possible. William Nordhaus, for instance, has 
addressed the question, uHow Fast Should We Graze the Global 
Commons?" He argues that "the pace and extent of use of our 
global commons [should] be subject to the same reasoned 
balancing of costs and benefits as other economic 
activities ... " (p. 242). He specifically uses the problem 
of the global atmospheric buildup of carbon dioxide to 
illustrate how such an economic approach to such issues 
might work . The carbon dioxide problem, he maintains, 
. .. presents a classical problem in intertemporal 
choice. Economic analysis suggests that alterna-
tive control strategies be weighed by examining 
their implications for the consumption (or real 
income) of different generations (p. 242). 
Nordhaus developes a model which, given certain 
parameter specifications, yield a solution for a carbon 
dioxide shadow price which can be used to determine a path 
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for optimal carbon dioxide buildup. The model utilizes a 
social utility function which "states that society seeks to 
maximize a function that depends only on consumption over 
time ... " (p. 2431. Applying the carbon dioxide shadow price 
in the form of a carbon tax, Nordhaus says, would be one 
possible approach to the development of a potentially 
efficient control program. "An efficient control program is 
one in which each individual has an incentive to reduce 
emissions up to the point where further reductions cost more 
than the benefits of emission reduction" Cp. 245). 
Nordhaus recognizes, however, that this sort of 
approach -- or any approach -- to global environmental 
problems must overcome monumental realistic problems in 
agreeing on global policy. After noting that, "Host 
externalities are ones that are internal to nations ... " 
Cp. 244), he points out how the carbon dioxide problem is 
different. 
The COC2J problem is different from conven-
tional pollutants because it is an externality 
across space and time. Once in the atmosphere, 
C0<2J disperses across the globe and has a half-
life of centuries. In such a situation, a C0<2J 
control strategy would be effective only if major 
nations were farsighted and successfully negoti-
ated a global policy. While such an outcome is 
possible, there are few examples where a multi-
national environmental pact has succeeded -- the 
nuclear test ban treaty being the most prominent. 
Other clearly recognized international problems 
whales, acid rain, undersea mining -- provide a 
career for negotiators but little concrete 
agreement Cp. 244). 
Hermeneutical Criticisms of the 
Economics of Technology 
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The cursory review of the economics of-technology 
presented in the previous section revealed the tendency of 
neoclassical economists to view technology and its resultant 
global problems through the spectacles of the neoclassical 
economic paradigm. In doing so they have essentially been 
working within the confines of Kuhnian normal science. That 
is, they have been extending the explanatory capability of 
neoclassical economic theory to new problematic areas in 
such a way that the economic world continues to fit the 
predetermined boxes of the basic paradigmatic conception. 
This is not to say that their efforts have been of no 
value. It is, however, a suggestion that their approach may 
be less than adequate, since they are not really open to the 
contemporary situation. In Gadamer's terms, normal science 
inquiry fails to reach into the sphere of the truly open. 
"It pretends to an openness and susceptibility to decisions 
that it does not have ... [andJ ... what is undecided is not 
distinguished, or not correctly distinguished from those 
predispositions that are effectively held ... " (Gadamer, 
1985, p. 327). 
An examination of Gadamer's views on science and 
technology and the contemporary human situation indicates 
that the most salient feature of the current problematic 
situation is that our capability for technical reason has 
far out-paced our capability for social reason. Gadamer 
sees human solidarity, in the sense of 11 insight into the 
suitability of any means to commonly willed ends" ( 1982, 
p. 77), as the basis for social reason. The explanations 
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provided by neoclassical economics, on the other hand, are 
highly individualistic and thus may tend to undermine our 
sense of solidarity and common reality. It may well be, 
therefore, that the individualist perspective of neoclassi-
cal economics renders economists of that persuasion 
incapable of comprehending the questions about social reason 
that are being raised by the contemporary situation. This 
subject is explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS 
OF METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
The core of neoclassical economic theory is the theory 
of perfect competition. The thoroughly individualistic 
character of this theory is conveyed succinctly by the 
following quote from Frank Knight: 
The 'economic man' is not a 'social animal', and 
economic individualism excludes society in the 
proper human sense. Economic relations are imper-
sonal. The social organization dealt with in 
economic theory is best pictured as a number of 
Crusoes interacting through the market 
exclusively ... (Lowe, p. 105). 
Some version of this individualist perspective contin-
ues to be perpetuated either explicitly or by implication in 
the literature of neoclassical economics, despite continu-
ing criticism from Marxists (such as E. K. Hunt, pp. 78-78) 
and institutionalists (such as William Dugger, pp. 314-315). 
Marxist and institutionalist critics such as Hunt and Dugger 
frequently imply that the reason for the perpetuation of 
methodological individualism in neoclassical economics is 
that it provides support for the ideological sympathies of 
neoclassical economists. This sort of explanation gains 
credence if one accepts Mark Blaug's definition of methodo-
111 
112 
logical individualism as: "The view that social theories 
must be grounded in the attitudes and behavior of individu-
als, as opposed to 'methodological holism,' which asserts 
that social theories must be grounded in the behavior of 
irreducible groups of individuals" ( 1980, p. 266). Lawrence 
Boland points out that Blaug's definition leads to the 
notion that, "For political reasons, it would seem we have 
to favor individualism in order to avoid inadvertently advo-
eating any ideology based on 'holism' 
socialism, Marxism, etc. "Cp. 29). 
e.g., communism, 
Boland, in his 1981 book Ih§ tQ~ng~1iQn~ Qf ~~QnQffii~ 
tl§1hQg, has suggested a much different explanation of the 
perpetuation of methodological individualism in neoclassical 
economics. This work is a unique and thoughtful appraisal 
of neoclassical economics. An overview of it will be pro-
vided in this chapter and certain aspects of it will be 
taken up in each of the next three chapters. 
Individualism and the Hidden Agenda 
of Neoclassical Economics 
Boland makes an argument that ties the persistence of 
methodological individualism in economics to the acceptance 
of what he terms "justificationism". By justificationism, 
he means the attitude that "knowledge claims'' must meet the 
terms of logical certainty if they are to be granted legiti-
macy. This attitude among economists is, to some extent, a 
holdover from the inductive logic that John Stuart Mill 
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advocated as the basis for economic inquiry. Mill promoted 
the notion that economists formulate theories inductively on 
the basis of their knowledge of certain atomistic facts. 
These atomistic facts were provided in the form of knowledge 
of the psychological states of individuals. The assumption 
of uniformity of psychological make-up for human beings 
allowed economists to extrapolate inductively from their own 
economic behavior to the economic behavior of human beings 
in general. Economists thus claimed logical certainty for 
conclusions deduced without error from their inductively 
generated general laws of economic behavior. Individuals, 
in this view, represent the irreducible atomistic building 
blocks of economic explanations. 
Economists, Boland claims, no longer accept the notion 
that there is a valid inductive logic. But, he maintains, 
they still hang onto several remnants of Mill's methodologi-
cal approach in their attempts to circumvent the "problem of 
induction". Specifically, neoclassical economists still 
tend to see individuals as the irreducible building blocks 
necessary for valid economic explanation. They still tend 
to associate individuals with their psychological states. 
And, they still tend to consider rationality to be a psycho-
logical process. 
Neoclassical economists have given up inductivism --
or at least temporarily set it aside -- and have embraced 
what Boland calls "conventionalism". That is, instead of 
seeking the one 1rg~ theory to explain the economic world, 
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economists have opted for the next best thing -- the £~2! 
theory. Conventionalism, recognizing there is no logical 
foundation for inductive truth claims, substitutes what is 
perceived to be the next best thing -- a conventionally-
accepted criterion for the best theory. 
In their concern for logical certitude, economists have 
tended to adopt a hypothetical deductive approach to econom-
ic theory: an ''if __ , then __ " approach. The hypothetical 
"if" requires assumptions. Once the assumptions are estab-
lished, the conclusions are worked out by deductive logic. 
Thus, if one believes that the assumptions are true, one is 
bound to accept the conclusions of the model, barring an 
error in logical deduction. 
In this sort of approach the assumptions must be care-
fully chosen so as to ensure logically certain conclusions. 
If Bol·and is correctly understood, it is at this point that 
he suggests a link between conventionalism and individual-
ism. A significant part of that link has to do with the 
notion of rationality. The assumption of rationality on the 
part of decision-makers has been considered necessary if the 
conclusions of an economic model are to be logically neces-
sary. Otherwise, the outcome of economic decisions would be 
logically unpredictable. Since economists still tend to 
accept the notion that rationality is a psychological pro-
cess, an impetus exists for assuming that decision-makers 
are individuals, and that they can be identified with their 
psychological states. 
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Psychologistic individualism serves another function 
it facilitates an explanation of the economic world with 
a minimum of givens. This is most noteworthy with respect 
to institutions. To the extent that institutions act as 
constraints on the choices of individuals, an acceptable 
economic model must explain the existence of those institu-
tions. The explanation of social institutions, given 
psychologistic individualism, is quite simple --they may be 
considered "mere epiphenomena". 
Confirmation is the conventionalist criterion applied 
to most articles in the genre of positive economics. That 
is, most economics articles that purport to test economic 
theories are essentially attempts to show that empirical 
data are consistent with the theory: the data "confirm" the 
theory. 
Applied or "positive" economics articles, according to 
Boland, tend to conform to the following format: 
Specifically, after the introductory section of a 
typical positive economics article there is a 
section titled 'The Model' or some variation of 
this. This is followed by a section titled 
'Empirical Results' or something similar, and a 
final section summarizing the 'Conclusions' 
(p. 116). 
Boland says "The Model" is almost always a conjunction of 
three sets of assumptions. He outlines them as follows: 
( ll A set of behavioral assumptions about people 
and/or institutions. This set might include, 
for example, the behavioral proposition 
Q = f(Pl, where dQ/dP is negative. The con-
junction of all the behavioral assumptions is 
what traditionally constitutes a <theory'. 
(2) A set of simplifying assumptions about the 
relationships contained in the above set. For 
example, the demand function stated in the 
theory might be specified as a linear 
function, Q = a + bP, where <a• is positive 
and tb' is negative. 
C3) A set of assumed parametric specifications 
about the values of those parameters created 
in the second set set above. For example, the 
parameter <b' above might be assumed to have 
the value b = -4.2; or the specification that 
the above model fit the available data accord-
ing to certain statistical criteria <Boland, 
p. 120). 
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"The Model" is typically tested in accordance with conven-
tionally accepted statistical procedures in order to 
establish its acceptability or unacceptability. 
Such testing, however, can never establish with logical 
conclusiveness the truth or falsity of the theories embodied 
in the model. Boland illustrates the logical impossibility 
of proving the truth of a theory by testing models as 
follows: 
Even though one may confirm a neoclassical model's 
application to one market during one period of 
time, one still has not proven that the same model 
can be applied to any other market or any other 
period of time. To say that a behavioral theory 
is true is to say that it applies to every situa-
tion to which it purports to be relevant. That 
is, if a theory is true, then it is possible to 
build at least one model that will fit the data in 
any given situation. If the theory is not a 
tautology (i.e., an argument which for logical 
reasons cannot be falsel, then to prove it true we 
would have to provide a potentially infinite 
series of models. That is, no finite set of 
confirmed models will do, since there will always 
be the logical possibility of a situation which 
cannot be modeled or fitted. It is easy to see 
that this is merely the Problem of Induction 
restated at a slightly different level of 
discussion (Boland, p. 1211. 
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It is equally impossible to prove a theory false by 
such model testing. It only takes one set of contradictory 
empirical data to prove that a model is not true. Proving 
that the mQ~~l is not true, however, does not prove the 
ih~Q~Y to be false. The disconfirming instance may be taken 
as an indication that the functional relationship has been 
misspecified -- it may be nonlinear instead of linear. Or, 
the disconfirming instance may be taken as an indication 
that the parameters have been misspecified. Since there are 
an infinite number of possible relational and parametric 
specifications, no finite number of disconfirming instances 
could ever prove conclusively that it is the lh~Q~Y itself 
that is false. 
Boland's point is that "building models of a theory in 
effect insulates the theory from empirical testing if our 
purpose in testing is either refutation or verification" 
<Boland, p. 121). This raises an obvious question: If 
economists who are not prone to logical error persist in a 
sort of testing that can neither refute nor verify their 
theories, what are they up to? What is their purpose? 
Boland answers this question as follows: 
We now argue that if the usual published 
positive neoclassical articles ... are actually con-
sidered contributions to 'scientific knowledge', 
then it can only be the case that the hidden 
objective of such positive economics is a long-
term verification of neoclassical economics. 
Specifically, each paper which offers a confirma-
tion of the applicability of neoclassical 
economics to 'real world' problems must be viewed 
as one more positive contribution towards an ulti-
mate inductive proof of the truth of neoclassical 
theory. Our reason for concluding this is merely 
that logically all that can be accomplished by the 
typical application of neoclassical theory to 
'real world' phenomena is a proof that it is 
possible to fit at least one neoclassical model to 
the available data. Critics can always say that a 
model's fit may be successful in the reported case 
but it does not prove that it will be successful 
in every case. We argue that the agenda of posi-
tive neoclassical research programs presumes that 
if we can continue to contribute more confirming 
examples of the applicability of neoclassical 
economics, then eventually we will prove that it 
is the only true theory of the economy (p. 128). 
In summary, since conventionalism is considered by 
Boland to be an attempt at circumventing the problem of 
induction (as opposed to setting the problem aside alto-
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getherl and since methodological individualism facilitates 
the conventionalism of neoclassical economics, Boland main-
tains that a commitment to long-run inductivism based on 
methodological individualism is foundational to neoclassical 
economic methodology. Since this commitment is not overtly 
specified by neoclassical economists, Boland refers to it as 
a "hidden agenda". The main thesis in Boland's book (Ih~ 
... the foundations of neoclassical economic 
methodology, the hidden agenda, consist of two 
related but autonomous methodological problems. 
The first is the much discussed 'Problem of 
Induction'. The other is the less discussed but 
more pervasive 'Explanatory Problem of 
Individualism' Cp. 8). 
More specifically, he argues that "every neoclassical 
research program is designed (1) to be consistent with 
acceptable ways of dealing with the Problem of Induction, 
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and (2) to provide a methodological individualist explana-
tion of economic behavior of the economy, that is, one which 
is based on the methodological prescription that allows only 
individuals to be posited as the locus of decision-making" 
( Bo 1 and, p. xi i i ) . 
Individualism and Philosophical 
Liberalism 
Boland's argument appears quite unique, provocative and 
logically compelling. But, it falls way short of being the 
complete explication of the role of individualism in neo-
classical economic methodology. That Boland has not dealt 
with the roots of the neoclassical economists' reliance on 
individualism is strongly indicated by his own stated 
objective: "I shall attempt to show that the essential 
individualist spirit of neoclassical economics can be pre-
served if the Problem of Induction is rejected and the 
concept of individualism is freed of its usual psychologism" 
(p. XiV). 
Why is Boland concerned with preserving "the essential 
individualist spirit of neoclassical economics"? And, in 
what sense is the spirit of neoclassical economics essen-
tially individualist? Benjamin Ward was on the right track, 
in the author's opinion, when he linked neoclassical econom-
ics with philosophical liberalism. He claims, "Economics is 
a liberal profession, and almost all of the [invisible] 
college's members at major institutions in the United States 
are liberals, both by self-avowal and by philosophical 
orientation" (Ward, p. 24). 
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The conjunction between philosophical liberalism and 
neoclassical economics, both in origin and as an ongoing 
predisposition, can be briefly traced in such a way as to 
make a very credible case for the claim that the commitment 
of neoclassical economists to individualism is rooted in the 
neoclassical economists' commitment to liberalism. 
In the midst of the Great Depression, John Dewey deliv-
ered a series of lectures that were subsequently published 
The first 
of these lectures is a brief history of liberalism, in which 
Dewey notes that the origins of philosophical liberalism can 
be traced back at least as far as John Locke. Locke's phi-
losophy linked such notions as reason, liberty, rights, and 
property with individualism. As Dewey put it, "The outstand-
ing points of Locke's version of liberalism are that 
governments are instituted to protect the rights that belong 
to individuals prior to political organization of social 
relations" (p. 4). 
Locke's conception of human nature was devoid of the 
necessity of social relations. Ideas, according to Locke, 
were produced by physical sensations and could apparently be 
generated even without any history of exposure to other 
human beings. Thus, as Dewey notes, "Reason was ... made an 
inherent endowment of the individual, expressed in men's 
moral relations to one another, but not sustained and devel-
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oped because of these relations" (p. 5). CThis conception 
is notably at odds with Gadamer's philosophy.] 
Since individuals were presumed to exist independently 
of social organization, Locke conceived of liberty as free-
dom for individual action and rights as natural rights of 
individuals. The only legitimate role for the state in this 
conception was to protect the natural rights of individuals. 
Dewey made note that, "Among the 'natural' rights especially 
emphasized by Locke is that of property, originating, ac-
cording to him, in the fact that an individual has 'mixed' 
himself, through his labor, with some natural hitherto unap-
propriated object" (p. 4l. 
Locke's idea about labor as the basis for natural 
property rights was, of course, a major cornerstone of 
classical economic theory. Dewey pointed out that by the 
time of Adam Smith -- roughly a century after Locke -- the 
advancement of industry and commerce and the accompanying 
interest in the production of wealth resulted in a somewhat 
different interest in Locke's conception of natural property 
rights: "The conception of labor as the source of right in 
property was employed not so much to protect property from 
confiscation by the ruler ... as to urge and justify freedom 
in the use and investment of capital and the right of labor-
ers to move about and seek new modes of employment ... " 
(p. 6). 
This new conception of the relationship between labor 
and property was, of course, the labor theory of value. It 
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was a central aspect of the transformation of liberalism 
from a primarily political conception of individual liberty 
to an economic conception. The most notable name associated 
with this transformation was, of course, Adam Smith. As 
summarized by Dewey, Smith "held that the activity of 
individuals, freed as far as possible from political re-
striction, is the chief source of social welfare and the 
ultimate spring of social progress" Cp. 7). Smith provided 
a new and powerful twist to liberalism's argument against 
political action for social change. As Dewey put it, "Such 
action was not only an invasion of individual liberty but it 
was in effect a conspiracy against the causes that bring 
about social progress" (pp. 8-9). 
The origins of classical economics not only solidly 
linked up with the early stages of philosophical liberalism 
but, in fact, provided the very core of its disposition in 
favor of the economic freedom of individuals which is per-
petuated to this very day. As was established in Chapter 
IV, the transition from classical economics to neoclassical 
economics left this disposition very much intact. The 
ongoing predisposition of most economists in favor of a 
liberal view of individualism and its expression in their 
theorizing about economics is captured very succinctly in 
the following quote from Daniel Hausman: 
Since Adam Smith, a particular vision of 
[capitalist] economies has dominated economic 
theorizing. One conceives of an economy as made 
up of a number of separate agents -- individuals 
or households or firms -- whose only interactions 
with one another are voluntary exchanges of goods 
and services. Everybody knows that people have 
all sorts of other interactions with one another, 
but the economist assumes, as a first approxima-
tion, that these other connections among agents 
can be ignored. Economic agents are conceived of 
as well-informed, rational, and self-interested 
maximizers .... 
Given these assumptions, economists since 
Adam Smith have believed that voluntary exchange 
among such agents would result in a systematic and 
efficient organization of economic life with an 
outcome that would be beneficial to the agents 
involved. In Smith's view, and in the view of 
most economists since, such a market economy also 
allows individual agents much greater individual 
liberty than does any other economic arrangement 
( pp. 30-31) . 
A connection can also be established between the 
logical/epistemological predispositions of philosophical 
liberalism and Boland's arguments regarding the role of 
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methodological individualism in neoclassical economics. In 
a recent book -- §1LQ~g ~~~Q£L~£y( 1984) -- Benjamin Barber 
presents a thorough critique of liberalism. His critique 
provides strong support for the claim that the neoclassical 
economist's acceptance of "justificationism" (to use 
Boland's term) is rooted in the logical/epistemological 
predispositions of liberalism. "The claim advanced here", 
says Barber, "is that this re 1 en t 1 ess quest for certainty 
has been a particular feature of liberal political philoso-
phy from its inception" (p. 47). 
Liberal political philosophy, according to Barber, has 
attempted to emulate Cartesian philosophy. Descartes sought 
to find an undoubtable foundation upon which to build a 
system of knowledge that would be logically indubitable. 
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The liberal philosopher sought to build, in Barber's words, 
"A sturdy house of politics ... on an inexpungable and infal-
lible foundation, set deep in prepolitical granite" Cp. 51J. 
This tendency is nowhere more explicit than in the writings 
of Thomas Hobbes, one of the philosophical fathers of liber-
ali sm. The foundation laid down by Hobbes and his followers 
is a thoroughly atomistic individualistic foundation. 
Barber summarizes the Hobbesian perspective as follows: 
... Hobbes and his successors persuaded themselves 
that theories of political life had truly to be 
erected de novo on wholly nonpolitical founda-
tions. Political obligation had to rest on the 
prepolitics of human interaction in a hypothetical 
state of nature; political freedom had to derive 
from natural liberty and stand without reference 
to politics; political rights had to issue from 
natural rights established without reference to 
social or political conditions; and the whole 
subtle complex of social and political relations, 
which the Greeks thought defined the individual 
human being from the outset, had to be reduced to 
a physics-based psychology of individual atoms 
defined in radical isolation from one another 
( p. 48) . 
Upon such a foundation, then, the liberal political 
philosopher builds an explanatory structure of the political 
world that is intended to command assent by virtue of its 
logical consistency. But, the logical derivation of liberal 
philosophy follows from a predisposition which, according to 
Barber, equates reasoning with ideational concatenation. 
That is, the liberal philosopher tends to construct politi-
cal theory that can be seen as a chain of ideas that are 
linked by logical necessity. Barber provides the following 
illustration: 
With one starting point and one model of reason-
ing, there can only be one true (logically 
consequential) outcome and thus only one true 
notion of politics, rights, obligation, and so 
forth. Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, 
Bentham, Rawls, Nozick, and countless others who 
have employed analytic-dissective or resolutive-
compositive or genetic-reductionist methods in the 
search for a viable political theory have hoped to 
seduce their antagonists and overwhelm the skep-
tics by demonstrating that if only they accept A 
(which as rational persons they are bound to do), 
they will be able to swallow B Cwhich after all 
follows necessarily from A), and so on to C and D, 
until they reach N. And however unpalatable N may 
seem, and however at variance it is with their 
original political convictions, it too must be 
accepted because it is the final link in a chain 
of reasoning that leads without a break from that 
first link -- the one that, as rational persons, 
they felt bound to accept in the first place 
(p. 31). 
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The typical microeconomics textbook uses basically this 
same sort of approach to economic theory. Given certain 
assumptions, including rational individual decision-makers, 
a chain of logical reasoning leads to conclusions such as 
the following: the firm in perfect competition will, at 
equilibrium, produce at the lowest possible cost per unit 
(implying efficiency) and will earn zero economic profits 
(implying no unjustified profits); workers in a perfectly 
competitive economy at equilibrium will be paid in propor-
tion to their marginal revenue product (implying reward in 
proportion to contribution); and the finite resources of a 
competitive economy at equilibrium will be used according to 
the dictates of consumers "voting with their dollars" 
(implying democracy in resource allocation). 
The author can remember, a.s a sophomore, being led 
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through the compelling chain of reasoning that leads to 
these conclusions. And the author has subsequently led 
students through the same process. It is undoubtably a 
process of nullifying sophomore skepticism. They cannot 
deny the inescapable logical necessity of each link in the 
chain of reasoning, but some of the initial assumptions are 
major stumbling blocks. For instance, sophomores naturally 
balk at the notion that human beings behave rationally. The 
students usually begin to relax their skepticism, however, 
when told that economists use the word "rational" as fol-
lows: given a clear-cut choice between more or less of a 
desirable good, a "rational" person will, other things being 
equal, choose more. And, in any case, it is always ex-
plained that the model of perfect competition is not 
intended to be an accurate portrayal of the real world, but 
only a useful conceptual tool. Then the instruction pro-
ceeds to relax certain of the unrealistic assumptions and 
I 
illustrate the analytical usefulness of the theory for poli-
cy implications. 
After all is said and done, however, the student 
appears to have been endowed with the inclination to feel 
that market solutions to public policy issues will promote 
the implied virtues of a perfectly competitive economy. In 
the last decade or so, this sort of inclination has provided 
the foundational support for such economic policies as mar-
ginal cost pricing in utility regulation, deregulation in 
the airline industry, and benefit/cost analysis of major 
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public projects. 
In a broader and more general sense the student has 
been endowed with an affirmative inclination toward competi-
tive market arrangements and a negative inclination toward 
any sort of social reform that smacks of collectivism. This 
inclination is largely due to the association of individual 
political liberty with competitive market systems -- an 
association that is implicitly or explicitly perpetuated by 
the instruction provided in economics and political science 
courses. 
In summation, it appears that economists see methodo-
logical holism as the only alternative to methodological 
individualism. They cling to the latter because their liber-
al intuitions feed the fear that the former implies, or 
might lead to, a collectivist political system. It also 
appears that contemporary neoclassical economists still see 
the same dichotomy that Schumpeter expressed in 1909: 
We seem to be faced by this alternative: 
either we are to assume social utility curves, in 
which case society must be the sole owner of 
capital and land, the society is communistic, and 
no rent or interest will be paid to individuals; 
or rent and interest are paid, in which case there 
are no social values, but only individual ones, 
and society as such does not control production ... 
(Quoted in Boland, p. 27). 
This does not imply that the author rejects Boland's 
analysis of methodological individualism as a major item on 
the hidden agenda of neoclassical economics. Methodological 
individualism, in Boland's analysis, assists neoclassical 
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economists in dealing with the problem of logical certainty. 
However, as pointed out above, the concern of logical cer-
tainty is not unique to economics; it is an underlying 
concern of philosophical liberalism itself. So, ultimately, 
the author accepts both Boland's analysis of the reason why 
neoclassical economists cling to methodological individual-
ism and the notion that they cling to it due to their 
predisposition in favor of a liberal political philosophy. 
What's Wrong with Individualism 
What has been presented so far in this chapter is not a 
criticism of methodological individualism, but simply an 
analysis of the role it plays and the apparent motivations 
for its continual incorporation in neoclassical economics. 
In this section, a critique from a hermeneutical perspective 
shall be presented. First, the argument that the assumption 
of society as the mathematical summation of atomic individ-
uals is blatantly at odds with Gadamer's hermeneutics will 
be reviewed. Secondly, it shall be argued that the assump-
tion of individualism as a methodological technique is 
instrumentally counterproductive in terms of addressing 
questions raised by the contemporary human situation. 
Gadamer's philosophy is a denial of the notion that 
h~m~rr being can happen in isolation. As was pointed out in 
a previous chapter, in Gadamer's philosophy the most salient 
feature of h~m~n being is tied to the existence of a h~m~n 
world. Whereas the other animals merely have a habitat, 
I 
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humans have a "world" that allows them to transcend their 
habitat. It is language that makes the human world possi-
ble. We are born into a world which, by virtue of its 
linguisticality, has order and structure. That order and 
structure plays a basic role in an ongoing process of 
meaning-formation that gives shape to our conception of self 
and world. Our knowledge of self and world is a product of 
all sorts of interactions with others. As philosopher 
Ca 1 vi n Schrag puts it, "In the performance of everyday 
speech, in the production and use of tools and utensils, in 
the handshake and in the embrace, in laughing and crying, in 
the poetics of the dance, in the rituals of etiquette and 
religion, in the planning of affairs of households and 
economy, and in the posture of silence, a comprehension of 
self and world is already at work" (1980, p. 63). 
In short, it is obvious that the notion of atomistic 
individuals as the building blocks that constitute society 
must be judged patently false from a hermeneutical perspec-
tive. There, however, appears to be reason to dwell at 
length on this fact. A much more significant issue is 
whether methodological individualism in the social sciences 
is instrumentally appropriate. This, however, depends on 
the purpose of the social sciences. 
Fortunately, Schrag has conducted a very useful explor-
ation in search of the "origin" of the human sciences. His 
R~~i£~1 R~fl~£1iQrr ~rr~ 1h~ Q~i&irr Qf 1h~ tl~m~rr ~£i~rr£~~ 
( 1980l provides a hermeneutical perspective on social sci-
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ence inquiry that will be extremely useful not only for a 
critique of the instrumental propriety of methodological 
individualism in economics, but also for the critique of the 
"rationality postulate" (Chapter VIIl and the normative/ 
positive debate (Chapter VIII). 
The social sciences have their roots, Schrag claims, in 
the ongoing stream of prescientific and prephilosophical 
interpretive life experiences: "The complex of interests, 
motivations, and meaning-endowed actions which comprise the 
world of pure experience is ultimately the base of opera-
tions not only for the psychological sciences but also for 
sociology, anthropology, history, jurisprudence, politics, 
and economics" ( 1980, p. 64). The significance of this, if 
Schrag is understood correctly, is that the social sciences 
are not doing original interpretation, but are engaged in a 
secondary sort of interpretation. The social sciences are 
interpreting the interpretations that have already happened 
at a more primordial level. And, if Gadamer is understood 
correctly, the human sciences are open to the charge of 
methodological sterility when they lose touch with this 
originary (primordial) stream of experience. 
The social scientist, in Schrag's view, is involved in 
dealing with certain constellations of meaningfulness that 
have originated in the stream of lived-experience: 
"Proceeding from the taken-for-granted shared meanings and 
activities within the originary stream of experience, the 
special sciences of man adjust their lenses to focus on 
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particular constellations of these lived meanings" (1980, 
p. 65) . 
The result of the work of the social scientist can be 
considered as a partial profile of the life-world or, as 
Schrag puts it, " ... the required task of each of the special 
human sciences is that of a special 'constitution' of world 
... out of a primordial world of originary experience" (1980, 
p. 66). In his view, the world constituted by a social 
science is inseparably associated with the knowledge con-
cerns of a group or community. The word "constitution" has 
a special meaning for Schrag. He attempts to shed light on 
this meaning as follows: 
... we would recommend that constitution be under-
stood as the shared project of a community of 
investigators and interpreters, guided by an in-
terest in the communication of common knowledge 
concerns .... It is the work of various communi-
ties of investigators (scientists, philosophers, 
artists, and theologians) seeking agreement on 
common topics of concern (Schrag, 1980, p. 66 J • 
What Schrag means by "world" is considerably less 
obscure. It is easily conveyed by the following quote: 
The meaning of world that is at stake in our 
understanding of the constitution of world by 
philosophy and the human sciences has more the 
character of a field or horizon of human concerns. 
We commonly speak of the "world of the child," the 
"world of sports," the "business world," and the 
"academic world." It i.s this .sense of world that 
is at issue in our question of origin. And it is 
in this sense of world that we can meaningfully 
speak of the worlds explored by sociology, psy-
chology, political science, anthropology, 
linguistics, economics, and history CSchrag, 1980, 
p. 67) . 
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Schrag points out that natural scientists as well as 
social scientists are engaged in the constitution of world. 
He also emphasizes the very considerable difference in 
implication of the constituted worlds. The behavior of the 
data investigated by the natural scientist is not endowed 
with meaning. The thematic horizon of the human world, 
however, is obviously different. Schrag describes it as 
follows: 
The psychologist, sociologist, anthropolo-
gist, and political scientist ... constitute a 
perspective on the life-world in such a manner 
that the investigatable data are human agents who 
endow their own gestures, speech, and actions with 
signification. What is at issue for the human 
scientist is human actions, motives, purposes, and 
concerns, which directly and indirectly inform the 
self-understanding of the agents and actors 
under investigation (1980, p. 69). 
It is in view of Schrag's hermeneutical perspective on the 
social sciences, then, that the author argues that methodo-
logical individualism in economics is instrumentally 
inadequate. 
The argument that is spelled out in the remainder of 
this chapter can be summarized as follows. The self-
understanding that is perpetuated by the "economic world" as 
constituted by neoclassical economics is counter-productive 
in dealing with the major question which, according to 
Gadamer, is facing humanity today. That question can be 
phrased as "How can we gain control over the forces of 
science and technology?" Those very forces, Gadamer claims, 
are underneath a movement in the direction of "social 
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irrationality", while an increase in "social reason" is what 
is necessary to gain control of those forces. A very thor-
ough case has recently been made by Benjamin Barber, a 
prominent political scientist, indicting philosophical lib-
eralism on charges that would, in Gadamer's terms, amount to 
fostering "social irrationality". Since the individualist 
world constituted by neoclassical economics is a cornerstone 
of philosophical liberalism, then methodological individual-
ism must be indicted as instrumentally counterproductive. 
Gadamer sees human solidarity as the basis for social 
reason which, in turn, is viewed as "insight into the suita-
bility of any means to commonly willed ends ... " (1982, 
p. 77) . This insight has declined, according to Gadamer, at 
the same time that technical rationality has increased. This 
inverse relationship, he suggests, is not merely coinci-
dence. As technological civilization has expanded, so has 
our reliance on experts. Therein lies a very significant 
problem. 
Put in terms of a slogan, the society of experts 
is simultaneously a society of functionaries as 
well, for it is constitutive of the notion of the 
functionary that he be completely concentrated 
upon the administration of his function. In the 
scientific, technical, economic, monetary pro-
cesses, and most especially in administration, 
politics, and similar forms, he has to maintain 
himself as what he is: one inserted for the sake 
of the smooth functioning of the apparatus. That 
is why he is in demand, and therein lie his 
chances for advancement. Even when the dialectic 
of this evolution is sensible to each one who 
asserts that ever fewer people are making the 
decisions and ever more are manning the apparatus, 
modern industrial society is oppressed by immanent 
structural pressures (Gadamer, 1982, p. 74). 
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All of this is destructive of solidarity, in Gadamer's 
view, because it is destructive of the sense of identity. 
Our identity is inseparably rooted in a common reality, in 
his philosophy, and anything that atomizes common experien-
ces is destructive of our sense of common reality. Thus, to 
the extent that technological society tends to generate a 
sense of isolation and helplessness in individuals, it 
destroys the sense of identity and solidarity and undermines 
the potential of social reason. Gadamer points out that the 
path of our economic and technological growth certainly has 
the potential of "making life on this planet impossible" 
(Gadamer, 1982, p. 84), and that "The closed work place of 
the earth ultimately is the destiny of everyone" (Gadamer, 
1982, p. 85). He maintains therefore that " ... the chances 
of anyone's survival are ... small ... if humanity ... does not 
learn to rediscover out of need a new solidarity" (Gadamer, 
1982, p. 85). 
All of this makes a strong argument that methodological 
individualism is not adequate for addressing what Gadamer 
sees as the major question of our time. The individualist 
world constituted by neoclassical economics tends to under-
mine the sense of solidarity and identity rooted in a common 
reality. This argument is dramatically extended by Benjamin 
Barber in his book ~!~Q~g ~~~Q£~~£Y (1984l. 
Barber's views are very much in line with the notion 
that the human world i~ the shared understanding that exists 
between persons. The human world is thus extremely mallea-
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ble and is, in fact, constantly changing. The primary force 
behind changes in the human world, in Barber's view and in 
the hermeneutical view, is language and its use in conversa-
tion. Our shared understanding changes in the course of 
genuine conversation. Our political understanding is no 
exception. "Political talk is not talk ~~Q~1 the world; it 
is talk that makes and remakes the world" (Barber, p. 177). 
Political talk thus, according to Barber, shapes our politi-
cal knowledge. The knowledge thus shaped guides our 
responses, or lack thereof, to present events and circum-
stances. "It answers such questions as 'What shall we do?' 
and 'How shall we reconcile our differences?' and 'How can 
we conduct ourselves as a just community'" (Barber, p. 169J? 
In light of all this, Barber is concerned with the 
direction of change in our political understanding that is 
fostered by philosophical liberalism. Liberalism, he main-
tains, fosters the expansion of the private political world 
and the contraction of the public political world. 
In Barber's view, common value, public goods and public 
interest grow out of a sense of commonality, mutuality and 
citizenship which, in turn, is dependent on and nurtured by 
political conversation. The following quote highlights the 
contrast between his view and the liberal individualist view 
of human nature. 
The author of human language, thought, phi-
losophy, science, and art as well as of law, 
convention, right, authority, and freedom is not 
Man but men. It is from common rather than indi-
vidual consciousness -- from generations of 
communal labor and not the passing whimsies of 
individuals -- that the enduring features of human 
identity are born. We are above all creatures of 
time, defined by a history that we make together. 
The unique capacities that comprise our humanity 
--memory (the capacity to recall and use the 
past), rationality (the capacity to analyze and 
use the present), and imagination (the capacity to 
link past and future in an act of creation) 
merge our singularities into the commonness of 
time and thus bind us to one another, above all in 
language and conversation and in the politics that 
conversation makes possible <Barber, p. 90). 
The goals inherent in the liberal view -- however 
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honorable and well-intentioned -- appear quite impotent when 
contrasted with the creative human potential that Barber 
sees in an expansion of our sense of mutuality and citizen-
ship. 
Protection, preservation, and the security of 
private interests (including liberty and property 
as well as life) are the whole of the liberal 
agenda. It is a difficult and an honorable agenda 
to be sure. But it is nonetheless a very small 
agenda tailored to the small men its theories 
portray (Barber, p. 911. 
The most extreme version of the small individual of 
liberalism is, of course, the modern consumer of neoclassi-
cal economic theory. 
The modern consumer is the most recent incar-
nation of this small man, the last in a long train 
of models that depict man as a greedy, self-
interested, acquisitive survivor who is capable 
nonetheless of the most self-denying deferrals of 
gratification for the sake of ultimate material 
satisfaction. The consumer is a creature of great 
reason devoted to small ends. His cherished free-
dom is chained to the most banal need. He uses 
the gift of choice to multiply his options in and 
to transform the material conditions of the world, 
but never to transform himself or to create a 
world of mutuality with his fellow humans CBarber, 
p. 22) . 
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In the liberal view private interests are fundamental, 
with public interests considered as products of private 
interests. Host of the potential conflicts are worked out 
through the economic system which ideally transforms con-
flicting private interests into a social harmony. The 
conflicts which cannot be worked out in the market place are 
resolved politically. As Barber points out, in the liberal 
perspective, politics is "nothing more than the chambermaid 
of private interests" Cp. 118). Or, even more cynically, 
politics is "the conduct of public affairs for private 
advantage" (Barber, p. 4). 
The liberal view is reflected most strongly in the 
definition of "public goods" by neoclassical economists. 
Public goods, in the neoclassical economist's conception, 
are characterized by non-exclusivity in consumption. That 
is, use by one person does not preclude use by others. If 
such a good cannot be produced in such a way as to preclude 
others (the public) from using it, then the market will not 
supply this good. It will be produced only as a result of a 
collective decision. It is thus, in the terms of neoclassi-
cal economic theory, a public good. 
In Barber's view, this is a weak conception of "public 
good" in that it is essentially a negative conception. It 
characterizes public goods in terms of qualities that are 
missing. A strong version of public good would be charac-
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terized in terms of positive qualities. In Barber's view, a 
public good is ineluctably associated with the public will. 
Public goods, in his view, are those which are desired by 
the public as a community. He thus maintains that a mean-
ingful account of public goods must take into consideration 
the process involved in the establishment of community and 
public will. This process entails participation and citi-
zenship: "public ends ... are literally forged through the act 
of public participation, created through common deliberation 
and common action and the effect that deliberation and 
action have on interests, which change shape and direction 
when subjected to these participatory processes" (Barber, 
p. 152) • 
Neoclassical economics, on the other hand, has devel-
oped a very powerful conceptual tool -- benefit/cost 
analysis -- by which "public goods" can be analyzed in terms 
of individual private interests. The benefits to be consid-
ered are the incremental areas under the demand curves for 
private goods and services that would result from the pro-
duction of the good under consideration. The costs to be 
considered are the resulting incremental areas under the 
supply curves <marginal cost curves) of individual produc-
ers. In this way, then, the collective aspects of the 
decision can be eliminated, or at least minimized, and the 
primacy of liberal individualism thus protected. 
Galbraith has argued that, "Economics provides ... 
[citizensJ. .. with their image of economic society" (p. 5J. 
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The image provided by neoclassical economics is that the 
economic system is "in the ultimate service of the 
individual ... " (Galbraith, p. 4). That service lies prin-
cipally in providing the goods and services desired by 
consumers as private individuals. The effect of the image 
is to highlight the importance of the process of private 
production. It is an image, Galbraith claims, that "notably 
affects their [citizens] behavior -- and how they regard the 
organizations that comprise the economic system'' Cp. 5). 
If Galbraith is correct, then neoclassical economics 
would appear to be less than effective in striving for the 
goals advocated by Barber -- "the development of a citizenry 
capable of genuinely public thinking and political judgment 
and thus able to envision a common future in terms of genu-
inely common goods" (p. 187). What Barber wants, in other 
words, is an expansion of the capacity for social reason. 
What the perspective of the neoclassical economist does, on 
the other hand, is to propagate the idea that public ends 
deserving of collective action can be determined by the 
appropriate analysis of marketplace decisions about private 
goods; it does not emphasize the need for community partici-
pation regarding collective action. But participation plays 
a crucial role in the development of a citizenry capable of 
social reason. In Barber's view, "participation has as its 
primary function the education of judgment. The citizen is 
the individual who has learned how to make civic judgments 
and who can evaluate goods in public terms" (p. 158). 
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Summary and Conclusion 
The link between the individualism of liberal political 
philosophy and the methodological individualism of neoclass-
ical economics is deeply rooted. This does not at all 
contradict Boland's argument that neoclassical economists 
cling to methodological individualism because of its presup-
posed utility for achieving epistemological legitimacy. In 
~1£Qrr& ~~~Q~[~~y, Barber illustrated in detail that philo-
sophical liberalism itself has been dominated by the quest 
for logical certainty. So, the tendency of neoclassical 
economists to feel bound by "justificationism", as Boland 
calls it, can be seen as merely another aspect of their 
liberal heritage. 
Both neoclassical economics and political liberalism 
continue to be wed to the Cartesian philosophical tendency 
to place epistemological questions prior to ontological 
questions. The argument in this chapter could, in fact, be 
construed as a claim that we have lost control of science 
and technology largely because modern western society has 
been built on an ontologically defective understanding of 
That ontologically defective understanding is 
epitomized by methodological individualism. 
Barber's §1[22& ~~~2£[~£Y can be read as an intellectu-
ally sophisticated plea for a ne~ direction which would 
correct this ontological defect. He argues for the replace-
ment of the liberal conception of democracy Cwhich he 
characterizes as weak democracy) with what he calls strong 
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democracy. His notion of strong democracy emphasizes the 
mutuality rather than the separateness of human beings. It 
emphasizes the participatory process of £~2~!irrg public ends 
rather than the science of choosing among preexisting ends. 
It views individuality in the context of human interdepen-
dency. In short, Barber's strong democracy envisions, in 
his words, "the way that human beings with variable but 
malleable natures and with competing but overlapping inter-
ests can contrive to live together communally not only to 
their mutual advantage but to the advantage of their mutual-
ity" Cp. 1181. It is a vision that is radically at odds 
with the methodological individualism of neoclassical 
economics. 
Barber's vision is, on the other hand, consistent w1th 
philosophical hermeneutics in its conception of human na-
ture. It is a view that illustrates how the capacity for 
social reason could be expanded. At the same time, it 
illustrates how the individualism of neoclassical economics 
is linked to the forces that impede the development of 
social reason. 
If Gadamer is correct in his notion that the most 
pressing issue for humanity today is loss of control over 
the forces of science and technology, and if an expansion of 
social reason is necessary to regain control, then methodo-
logical individualism will not be effective. In sum, 
methodological individualism must be indicted for being in 
"cahoots" with the forces of social irrationality. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE THEORY OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 
AND THE RATIONALITY POSTULATE 
The theory of consumer behavior has long been consid-
ered by most economists to be an indispensable cornerstone 
of neoclassical economics. As a core component of liberal 
political philosophy, neoclassical economics has propagated 
the notion of "consumer sovereignty" -- that in a market 
economy it is the desires and preferences of consumers 
(registered via marketplace decisions) that determine what 
goods and services are to be ~reduced with society's scarce 
resources. In this sense, "consumer sovereignty" has far-
reaching political implications which highlight the impor-
tance (to liberal economists) of demonstrating that 
neoclassical economics is built on nonpolitical foundations. 
The theory of consumer behavior can be seen as an attempt at 
such demonstration. 
Even if political motivation is denied, another reason 
exists for claiming that the theory of consumer behavior 
plays a foundational role in neoclassical economics --
market analysis relies fundamentally on the notion that 
demand curves are negatively sloped. The theory of consumer 
behavior can be seen as an attempt to show that negatively 
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sloped demand curves are not merely arbitrarily assumed by 
economists. 
In any case, the "economic man" of neoclassical econom-
ics is essentially a product of the theory of consumer 
behavior. It is this portrait of "economic man" that has 
been the main focus of criticism of neoclassical economics. 
Some of the criticism has been neutralized by advancements 
in the theory of consumer behavior, but the assumption of 
rationality remains a salient and very embattled feature of 
neoclassical economic man. 
In this chapter, a review is presented of some of the 
methodological appraisals of the theory of consumer behav-
ior, as well as a critique from a hermeneutical perspective. 
Special attention is given to the rationality postulate 
which, according to Caldwell, can be stated in its simplest 
formulation as "the assertion that atomistic economic agents 
pursue their own self-interest: that consumers (or house-
holds) seek to maximize utility and that firms seek to 
maximize profits" <p. 146). 
From Utility Theory to 
Revealed Preference 
Bentham's utilitarianism had a profound impact on the 
initial development of the neoclassical theory of consumer 
behavior. 
Spiegel notes that, "Jevons's utility theory contained 
frequent references to Bentham, and in line with Bentham's 
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approach Jevons visualized economics as a •calculus of 
pleasure and pain"' (p. 517l. Jevons rejected the notion 
that the utility of a good is exclusively rooted in quali-
ties of the good itself. 
Citing a number of forerunners, he argued that 
portions of the same commodity do not possess 
equal utility. Up to a certain quantity, a com-
modity may be indispensable. Further quantities 
have various degrees of utility, and beyond a 
certain quantity the utility gradually sinks to 
zero and may even become negative as further 
supplies become inconvenient and hurtful (Spiegel, 
pp. 517-8). 
From this conception Jevons developed what came to be 
known as the "law" of diminishing marginal utility. He also 
developed the criteria for maximizing utility and for con-
sumer equilibrium. A consumer maximizes utility and is in 
equilibrium when the ratio of marginal utility to price is 
equal for each good purchased. 
This depiction of consumer behavior provided a fertile 
ground for applying calculus to economic theory. It also 
provided critics with a portrait of human nature that could 
be devastatingly caricatured. The most widely quoted, and 
the most sarcastic, caricature of neoclassical economic man 
was, of course, provided by Thorstein Veblen. 
[This] conception of man is that of a lightning 
calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates 
like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness 
under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about 
the area, but leave him intact. He has neither 
antecedent nor consequent. He is an isolated 
definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium 
except for the buffets of the impinging forces 
that displace him in one direction or another. 
Self-imposed in elemental space, he spins symmet-
rically about his own spiritual axis until the 
parallelogram of forces bears down upon him, 
whereupon he follows the line of the resultant. 
When the force of the impact is spent he comes to 
rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before 
CQuoted in Hunt, p. 81). 
Nevertheless, the rational utilitarian portrait of 
economic man became solidly embedded as a cornerstone of 
neoclassical economic theory. As neoclassical economic 
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theory became more and mar~ tightly woven into a logically 
consistent and mathematically precise formulation, demand 
analysis and the theory of consumer behavior took shape as 
an identifiable research programme within neoclassical eco-
nomics. A. W. Coats has used Lakatosian terms to describe 
the ''hard core" of the programme as follows: 
By the end of the 1920s the essential com-
ponents of the hard core of orthodox demand 
analysis had emerged, by implication if not 
explicitly, in roughly the following form: 
Cil Basic economic theory is necessarily 
abstract, static and general in form. 
(iil The fundamental assumptions must, therefore 
be simple, uniform and constant; they can neither 
be •realistic' nor subject to falsification. 
(iii) It is assumed that consumers aim to maxi-
mize their satisfactions (total utility). 
Civl They have limited incomes. 
Cv) They have unlimited wants in general, but 
normally experience eventually diminishing mar-
ginal utility from consuming successive units of a 
given commodity. 
(vil They have full (or perfect) knowledge of 
relevant market conditions, for example, prices, 
the range of available goods and services, etc. 
(vii) They make rational calculations of alter-
native uses of their income, especially by 
adjusting their expenditures at the margin. 
(viii) The individual's decisions are indepen-
dent of those of other individuals ( 1976, p. 531. 
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The positive heuristic of this research programme, 
according to Coats, implicitly included the following in-
struct ion for researchers: "concentrate on the ana 1 ys is of 
prices or exchange values (ignoring, as far as possible, 
such questions as the origin and nature of wants and satis-
factions, the structure and stability of preferences, 
processes of valuation, etc.)" (1976, p. 54) This 
"instruction" is incorporated into the neoclassical model, 
by some economists, as specific assumptions that wants are 
given and preferences are stable. For liberal economists 
who wish to maintain that a market economy is one in which 
the consumer is sovereign, the assumption that wants are 
exogenously determined is crucial. For economists who more 
modestly make no explicit political claims but instead 
suggest the use of neoclassical microeconomic theory for 
limited market analysis, the assumption of stable preferen-
ces is still crucial while the assumption of exogenously 
determined wants can be dispensed with. 
During the formative years of this programme, the 
primary challenge was from the newly developing field of 
empirical psychology. Coats maintains that there were 
repeated attempts from the early 1880s to the late 1920s to 
establish an alternative research programme for consumer 
behavior theory based on the findings of empirical psychol-
ogy. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century 
the development of new ideas and experimental 
methods in psychology led to the formulation of 
three major new approaches in the USA, each of 
which seemed directly applicable to economics: 
namely, William James's conception of the physio-
logical and biological determinants of human 
behavior; William McDougall's instinct theory; and 
John Broadus Watson's behaviourism. At about the 
same time, the new 'subjective' theories of value 
commonly associated with the so-called 'marginal 
revolution' of the 1870s were being assimilated, 
not without difficulty, into the central corpus of 
economic theory. In retrospect it seems hardly 
surprising that the trend towards objectivism in 
psychology should clash with an apparently contra-
dictory trend in economics (Coats, 1976, p. 46). 
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According to Coats, the main criticisms leveled at the 
neoclassical view of consumer behavior during this period 
included the following: ( 1) The assumptions regarding human 
behavior are blatantly unrealistic in that human wants are 
not exclusively exogenous variables, preferences are not 
stable, and human beings are neither inclined toward nor 
capable of the rational calculations performed by the neo-
classical economic man; (2) In any case, neither cardinal 
measures of utility nor interpersonal comparisons of utility 
can be made; (3) And finally, it is not only unscientific 
but unnecessary to base economic theory on subjective no-
tions, since the new field of psychology provides empirical 
evidence regarding consumer behavior. But regardless of the 
potency of these criticisms, the critics failed to displace 
the utility-based theory of consumer behavior. The failure, 
according to Coats, was due to the fact that the critics 
never succeeded in formulating a viable alternative research 
programme. "The critics had failed to offer any construe-
tive proposals and they had 'made little headway in bringing 
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forth substitute principles'" (Coats, 1976, p. 52). Thus, 
Coats points out, "By the end of the 1920s it was already 
clear that the more ambitious efforts to infuse psychology 
into economics, or to reconstruct basic economic theory in 
terms compatible with the new psychologies, had manifestly 
failed" (1976, p. 52). 
The challenge from empirical psychology did, however, 
produce some positive results, according to Coats. It 
forced an effort to find a more "objective" approach to 
consumer behavior, as well as an effort to rid the theory of 
"unnecessary and suspect propositions" (Coats, 1976, p. 53). 
The result was, of course, the replacement of utility 
analysis with indifference-curve analysis, and finally with 
revealed preference theory. 
Actually the indifference curve had been introduced by 
Edgeworth in the early 1880s. But, Edgeworth used the 
indifference curve as a tool within utility analysis. It 
was Pareto who intentionally set out to eliminate the reli-
ance on utility theory. Pareto made use of Edgeworth's 
indifference curve in establishing a new approach to the 
theory of consumer behavior. Spiegel points out that econo-
mists were not widely aware of this new approach until 
" ... Hicks and Allen called attention to it under more favor-
able circumstances in the 1930s ... " (p.557). 
The indifference curve approach to consumer bahavior 
managed to eliminate any implication of reliance on cardinal 
measures of utility. It did nothing, however, to eliminate 
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the charge that the neoclassical theory of consumer behavior 
was unscientific because its subjective theory of value, 
whether based on utility analysis or indifference curve 
analysis, relied on introspection. As Mark Blaug puts it in 
his appraisal of the neoclassical theory of consumer behavior: 
Indifference theory, coming after a genera-
tion of hostile but ineffective criticism of 
marginal utility theory by the leaders of American 
institutionalism, reaffirmed the concept of eco-
nomic man as possessed of what John Maurice Clark 
called an 'irrationally rational passion for 
dispassionate calculation,' while taking inordi-
nate pride in deriving all the classical results 
from an ordinal rather than a cardinal utility 
calculus. The concept of 'indifference', invol-
ving as it does pairwise comparisons between 
commodity bundles that are infinitesimally close 
to each other, is just as introspective and unob-
servable as the concept of cardinal comparisons 
between marginal utilities (1980, p. 165). 
In an effort to eliminate this problem, Paul Samuelson 
developed the revealed preference theory; a move which Blaug 
characterized as a move from introspective ordinalism to 
behaviorist ordinalism <Blaug, 1980, p. 162). Blaug 
summarizes the revealed preference theory (RPTJ and its 
implications as follows: 
If consumers prefer more goods to less, choose 
only one definite bundle of goods in every budget 
situation, and behave consistently in successive 
choices, they will buy less of a good when its 
price rises if they would have bought more of that 
good when their incomes rose. This generalized 
law of demand, or, 'fundamental theorem of con-
sumption theory' as Samuelson called it, includes 
all of the observable implications of indifference 
theory and, in addition, has the advantage of 
inferring consumers' preferences from their re-
vealed behavior, not the other way round ( 1980, 
p. 166). 
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The Falsificationist Critique 
So, neoclassical economists have made some progress in 
eliminating some of the criticisms of institutionalists 
regarding the theory of consumer behavior, but very substan-
tial components of the institutionalist critique (especially 
the rationality postulate) remain as relevant as ever. A 
different sort of criticism has come from certain mainstream 
economists who are well trained in methodology. This criti-
cism is exemplified by Blaug's appraisal of neoclassical 
economics from a falsificationist perspective. 
It is patently obvious that the theory of consumer 
behavior, and the ''law" of demand cannot be falsified by any 
empirical observation if utility theory is the basis for the 
theory. The advance to indifference curve analysis is sub-
ject to the same criticism . As Blaug points out, 
... the apparatus of indifference curves is of no 
help in telling us beforehand which demand curves 
have negative rather than positive slopes: since 
we can never directly observe either the substitu-
tion or the income effect (the income effect being 
defined with reference to an original level of 
total utility), we cannot measure the size of one 
to add it to the other for purposes of predicting 
the total change in the quantity demanded result-
ing from a change in price. As before, the theory 
of consumer behavior remains an ~~ EQ~1 f££1Q 
rationalization of all final demand outcomes, 
whatever they are. We can confirm the law of 
demand, but we can never disconfirm it ( 1980, 
p. 165). 
The advance to revealed preference theory fares no 
better from a falsificationist perspective. Certainly, we 
can observe whether an individual purchases less of a good 
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when the price rises. If the individual purchases more in 
the face of a price increase, does that indicate a positive-
ly sloped demand curve -- a Giffen good? In accordance with 
RPT, we can conclude nothing about the slope of the demand 
curve in this situation without making an assumption as to 
whether the income effect of the good is positive or nega-
tive. Thus, as the English economist E. J. Mishan has 
noted; 
We cannot fail to notice that such demand theorems 
are conditional theorems, not universal ones. If 
the income effect is not positive -- or, in the 
one derivable from the indifference map, the 
income effect is negative -- we can say nothing of 
the response of the individual to a change in the 
price of a single good (1967, p. 91). 
Thus, in the eyes of a falsificationist, such as Blaug, 
"The predictive power of RPT in respect to demand relation-
ships is ... no better than the older theories of consumer 
behavior: it too is empirically nonfalsifiable because it 
relies on unrestricted universal statements" (1980, p. 167J. 
But, Blaug is not totally pessimistic about the possibili-
ties for empirically grounding the theory of consumer 
behavior. He sees the empirical work on demand as holding 
much promise for such grounding. 
Mishan, on the other hand, is admittedly cynical. In 
his article entitled "Theories of Consumer's Behaviour; A 
Cynical View". he states that: 
My aim is to convince the reader that, after all 
the display of technical virtuosity associated 
with such theorems, there is nothing the prac-
tising economist can take away with him to help 
him come to grips with the complexity of the real 
world. Indeed, he would be no worse off if he 
remained ignorant of all theories of consumer's 
behaviour, accepting the obviously indispens-
able 'Law of Demand' on trust ( 1967, pp. 82-83). 
The Rationality Postulate 
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Since, in the words of Lawrence Boland, "neoclassical 
economics is a discipline which is primarily concerned with 
the consequences of 'rational' decision-making" (p. 2), it 
is important to clarify the notion of rationality. For even 
if one accepts the "Law of Demand" on trust as Mishan sug-
gests, the significance of neoclassical economics itself 
still hinges on what one means by "rational" and the way 
rationality is employed in economic analysis. 
In a general sense, the hypothetico-deductive neoclas-
sical economics model requires the assumption that decision-
makers are logically consistent in pursuing their goals; 
otherwise there would be no basis for the logical deductions 
which constitute the bulk of the model. Rationality as 
logical consistency in the pursuit of goals is consistent 
with the way rationality has been used in technical philo-
sophical and scientific literature from the earliest stages 
of our western scientific tradition. Although this general 
notion of rationality has been uncontroversial, there have 
been many methodological disputes about the assumption of 
rationality in economic analysis. These disputes have 
mainly been about the realism of the assumption of rational 
economic man. 
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There have been some curious tests of the rationality 
postulate. Caldwell discusses the results of an experiment 
in which a token economy was set up in a mental ward. At 
least half of the chronic psychotics involved in the experi-
ment exhibited a high degree of logical consistency in that 
their preferences were transitively ordered. In another 
study, rats were given the possibility of pressing levers to 
get dipper cups filled with root beer or collins mix. The 
"budget set" could be altered by changing the number of 
lever presses necessary for a reward or by changing the size 
of the dipper cup. Caldwell noted, "The experiments showed 
that the rats changed consumption patterns in response to 
changes in the budget set, consuming more of the lower 
priced commodities and less of the higher priced commodi-
ties" Cpp. 152-153). Other studies have involved the 
ranking of commodity bundles by subjects in different age 
groups, and consistency in household food purchases. 
Caldwell notes that initially such studies "seem to 
support the hypothesis that transitively ordered preferences 
are commonly encountered, be the subjects adolescents, 
households, female psychotics, or albino rats" Cp. 153). On 
closer examination of the confirming instances, however, he 
points out that, "The strongest result we can claim is that 
in some of the studies most of the subjects chose consis-
tently" (Caldwell, p. 153). In any case, the broader 
significance of the confirming results is not clear-cut. 
For instance: 
... which of the following conclusions follows most 
naturally from the results of the experiments with 
rats? 
a. Consumer theory is .so general, it appl ie.s 
even to nonhuman populations. 
b. Consumer theory is .so restrictive, it works 
only in extremely simple two-good cases in which 
all outside disturbances are held constant. 
c. For consumer theory to work, a subject must 
be ratlike, something like Veblen's 'lightening 
calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates 
like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness 
under the impulse of stimuli that shifts him about 
the area ... ' (Caldwell, p. 154). 
The disconfirming instances, on the other hand, can 
never force the rejection of the rationality assumption. 
All of the studies discussed by Caldwell reported some 
disconfirming results, but as he pointed out: 
... in the face of disconfirming results, one can 
assert that the consumer still chose rationally in 
each case, but that his preferences had changed. 
One need not assume schizophrenic behavior on 
the part of the consumer to argue that changing 
preferences can explain observed intransitivities 
in choice. Hirshleifer argued convincingly that 
children's preferences may change as they grow and 
gain experience, but why should we assume that 
such a growth process comes to an end at the age 
of majority? Certainly there are other periods in 
our lives when changing circumstances might bring 
even drastic changes in our tastes -- leaving 
school, changing jobs, changing marital status, 
having children, 'finding' God, or discovering the 
joys of gardening are but a few of these <p. 155). 
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The point Caldwell tries to drive home is that there is 
no clear-cut way of testing the rationality postulate. 
Revealed transitivities are confirming results if unchanging 
preferences are assumed, but disconfirming results if 
changed preferences are assumed. Revealed intransitivities, 
on the other hand, are disconfirming results if unchanging 
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preferences are assumed, but confirming results if changed 
preferences are assumed. According to Caldwell, "Neither a 
confirming nor a disconfirming test result ... is unambiguous-
ly interpretable" (p. 156). 
In the view of Fritz Machlup, all of this empirical 
ambiguity is of no consequence. Economists, according to 
Machlup, would be wise to consider rational economic man 
(homo economicus) as an "ideal type" instead of a real 
type -- a mental construct designed strictly to facilitate 
the completion of the abstract economic model. Rational 
economic man is not intended to be real. As summarized by 
Caldwell, Machlup views economic theory as "primarily an aid 
to thinking, a heuristic device in which we trace out the 
predicted responses of imagined agents to imagined changes 
in the environment they face" (p. 163). The applicability 
of the theory to the real world, in thi.s view, is not uni-
versal but dependent on whether preferences and information 
can be taken as given . "He CMachlupJ provides examples of 
.situations in which such assumptions are unwarranted, and 
concedes that 'if the bulk of all cases were of thi.s kind, 
the usefulness of our theoretical system would be much 
reduced'" (Caldwell, p. 163). 
Rationality as a Psychological Process 
Lawrence Boland, in Ih~ [Q~~~~!iQrr~ Qf ~£QrrQ~i£ tl~!hQ~, 
has provided an in-depth exploration of the role of ration-
ality in the logical structure of the neoclassical economic 
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model. As seen in the last chapter, Boland maintains that 
the overriding objective of neoclassical economists is to 
provide an individualistic explanation of how market 
economies work. The explanation provided by the model has 
eliminated any determinate role for institutions by assuming 
that the only exogenous variables are the given psychologi-
cal states of individuals and natural constraints. The 
assumptions used in the model thus include the notion that 
rationality is a psychological process. 
The view that rationality is a psychological process, 
however, is chock-full of methodological difficulties. 
These difficulties involve the theory of knowledge and the 
problem of induction. 
The neoclassical model is often formulated with the 
specific assumption of perfect and complete knowledge on the 
part of decision-makers. It is easy to see how such an 
abstract world is characterized by widespread equilibrium. 
Any disturbance of equilibrium (consumer equilibrium or 
market equilibrium) would be met with instantaneous adjust-
ments at the margin which would result in a new equilibrium. 
It is also obvious that any application of the model to the 
real world -- which is characterized by extensive and 
prolonged disequilibrium-- must relax the assumption of 
perfect knowledge. Once this assumption is relaxed, the 
idea of rational decision-making cannot be separated from 
implications about the accumulation of knowledge. Rational-
ity must, in this case, be tied to a theory of learning. 
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The extension of neoclassical economics that has ex-
plicitly dealt with incomplete knowledge on the part of 
decision-makers without compromising the basic conclusions 
of the model is, of course, the theory of rational expecta-
tions. Disequilibria are explained away in this theory by 
the assumption that decisionmakers rationally minimize 
expectational errors. That is, decision-makers incur addi-
tional costs to obtain additional information so long as the 
marginal benefits (based on increased probability that 
acquired "knowledge" is true) are greater than marginal 
costs. The idea is that the more information one gathers 
within the relevant information set, the greater is the 
probability of forming correct expectations. As Boland 
points out, this is a restatement of the old inductivist 
learning theory: "Briefly stated, this old theory said that 
individuals learn by collecting (objectively provable) facts 
and when they have enough of them they are able to induce 
the true theory which would explain the phenomena encom-
passed by those facts" (p. 69). 
The methodological problem, especially for a profession 
that is overtly concerned with logical justification, is 
that Hume demonstrated some 200 years ago that there is no 
logic of induction (Blaug, 1980, pp. 11-12). In Boland's 
words, "What is really surprising about rational expecta-
tions models is that they employ a 500 year-old theory of 
knowledge and at the same time ignore the 200 year-old 
refutation of that theory" (p. 67l! 
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A Radical (Hermeneutical) Perspective 
on Rationality 
The debates among economic methodologists about the 
rational economic man of consumer theory have tended to 
revolve around the issues of whether or not the rationality 
postulate is <or should be) realistic. Economic methodolo-
gists have not demonstrated any significant concern about 
the £Q~£~E! of rationality itself. In fact, one could 
legitimately claim that western civilization (at least since 
the Enlightenment) has identified rationality With the logi-
cal, analytical, calculative thought processes employed in 
science and in technical philosophical argumentation. 
Irrationality~ on the other hand, has been used to refer to 
the absence of technical rationality. 
The exclusive identification of human reason with 
technical rationality has, however, come under scrutiny by 
phenomenologically- and hermeneutically-oriented 
philosophers such as Calvin Schrag. 
Reason is no longer, and probably never has 
been, an unproblematic vocation of man. 'What 
does it mean to be rational?' is a question that 
needs to be reopened time and again; and it is a 
question that becomes particularly urgent when 
methodological and technological rationality seem 
to be the only candidates on the slate <Schrag, 
1980, p. 108). 
~£i~~£~~. Schrag explores the inadequacies of the concept of 
technical rationality for the social sciences, and he 
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fleshes out an expanded (hermeneutical) notion of reason and 
rationality based on the seminal works of Heidegger and 
Gadamer. A review of Schrag's expanded notion of human 
reason should provide an excellent vantage point for a 
hermeneutical appraisal of the "rational man" concept embod-
ied in the consumer theory of neoclassical economics. 
In his expanded notion of reason, Schrag is fundamen-
tally concerned with the formation of human meaning and its 
role in life activities. He is concerned that the human 
sciences tend to employ a technical concept of reason that 
excludes too much of significance in human life. He is 
concerned that the perpetuation of such a truncated portrait 
of "Man" endangers our ability to cope with the contemporary 
problems facing humanity. 
The concept of reason with which Schrag is in vehement 
disagreement is that of the Enlightenment. 
In the classical Enlightenment concept of reason, 
which already defined the direction of the current 
technical view of reason, tradition itself was 
placed outside the domain of the rational. The 
Enlightenment ideal of reason came into its own 
through an alleged liberation from all tradition 
and authority. Contextless and objectivistic, 
reason was to recognize no authority but itself. 
In its philosophical expression, the Enlightenment 
concept of reason sought its foundations in an 
isolated epistemological subject; in its socio-
political expression, it made its appearance in a 
declaration of the individual rights of a radical-
ly individualized rational man, liberated from the 
sanctions of all governmental and ecclesiastical 
institutions. Cut off from tradition, the 
Enlightenment model of reason, and its further 
narrowing in contemporary philosophical posit-
ivism, assumed the stance of a detached 
objectivity (Schrag, 1980, pp. 113-14). 
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This technical concept of reason excludes the role of 
tradition, the "irrational", and mytho-poetic symbols and 
language in human life activities. All of these, in 
Schrag's View, play very significant roles in the generation 
and transmission of meaning. He thus sets for himself the 
task of deriving an expanded notion of reason which incorpo-
rates these essential elements. 
Schrag builds on the hermeneutical view that interpre-
tation is an ongoing basic aspect of human existence. 
Interpretation plays a major role in all conscious delibera-
tive thought processes, as well as in the more primordial 
preconscious, precategorial web of life activities. The 
concepts of technical reason have meaning and significance 
only in conjunction with the elaborate matrix of meaning 
that is carried forward in everyday language, thought and 
praxis. 
The matrix of human meaning, which is always in flux, 
is carried forward by tradition, according to Schrag. 
The historical as a feature of the experi-
enced life-world registers its significations by 
delivering a world of predecessors. Tradition 
insinuates itself into the text of everyday life 
through a matrix of social memories. The weight 
of tradition, which the Enlightenment concept of 
reason sought to suppress, leaves its inscriptions 
on the language, the thought, and the praxis of 
everyday life. The motives and actions of contem-
poraries are surrounded with the fringes of a 
historical past which continue to impinge on the 
present (Schrag, 1980, p. 116). 
Common memories, however, are not the only source of 
tradition that is carried forward. Schrag points out that 
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much that has been forgotten continues to be carried forward 
in the tradition that shapes our perspective on the present. 
"Forgotten events direct deliberations on socio-political 
planning, forgotten langauage exerts its influence in the 
linguistic operations of everyday communication, and a 
forgotten sense of being infects the project of human self-
understanding" (Schrag, 1980, p. 116). In fact, as Schrag 
claims, even the suppressed may contribute to the structure 
of meaning that ongoingly informs life activities. 
Schrag attempts to make clear, however, that he is not 
advocating a displacement of technical reason. Scientific 
and philosophical developments contribute very significantly 
to the continually changing tradition. But, so have mythic 
events. "The signs and symbols of mytho-poetic language 
conspire in a genesis and giving of meanings as they develop 
in the fabric of everyday sociohistorical existence" 
(Schrag, 1980, p. 122). Schrag maintains that the matrix 
of meaning which colors our perceptions of everyday life 
have been influenced by the social, political, psychologi-
cal, moral, artistic, and religious significations of myths. 
Schrag mentions the works of certain people in philosophy, 
anthropology, sociology, psychology, political theory, and 
theology which share the recognition ... 
that mythic consciousness is a constitutive fea-
ture of the story of man in all stages of his 
socio-historical development. They no longer see 
myth as a prescientific distortion of the thought 
of primitive man. The mythopoetic is viewed as an 
ingredient within the thought and praxis by which 
men in all ages live ( 1980, p. 119). 
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So, according to Schrag, "The tradition that .surrounds 
and contextualize.s everyday life unites scientific-
historical reports with mytho-symbolic interpretation" 
( H~80, p. 118) . The concept of reason developed by Schrag 
to encompass the range of human meaning creation and deploy-
ment is variously described by him as the performance of 
"insight", "vision", "commemoration", and "foresight". It 
is a performance that, according to hermeneutical theory, 
happens prior to the mental act of technical reason. II It is 
at work in the illumination of possibilities already enter-
tained and enacted within the tradition of thought and 
praxis, as well as in the illumination of possibilities 
projected against the horizon of the future 11 (Schrag, 1980, 
p. 105) . This expanded notion of reason has the virtue 
of illuminating the limits of technical reason. It also has 
a very significant positive function: 
... this expanded notion of reason allows the dis-
closure of a precategorial self-understanding 
within the drama of everyday life in which human 
agents, always in transit, endow their perceptions 
and actions with meaning as they respond to their 
past and anticipate their future. It makes possi-
ble the search for the significations of the 
irrational, the ideological, and self-deception, 
for they too shape the course of everyday life 
<Schrag, 1980, p. 126). 
World Capitalism and Cultural 
Production 
The hermeneutical concept of reason developed by Schrag 
is profoundly at odds with the rationality of neoclassical 
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economic man. Before turning to a critical analysis of its 
implications for price theory, however, it will be useful to 
take a cursory look at certain recent developments in cul-
tural anthropology which seem to support Schrag's contention 
that: "The tradition that surrounds and contextualizes 
everyday life unites scientific-historical reports with 
mytho-symbolic interpretation" (1980, p. 118). 
The last two decades have witnessed a growing crisis in 
the methodology of cultural anthropology: a crisis not 
unrelated to the crises in philosophy of science and founda-
tional philosophy in general. The more traditional approach 
to cultural anthropology implicitly assumed that primitive 
societies were essentially ahistorical, in that they were 
regulated by rituals and ceremonies based on age-old myth. 
The more traditional approach also implicitly assumed that 
the anthropologist could, via objective observation, uncover 
the fixed structure and meaning of primitive life. In 
short, the traditional approach to cultural anthropology was 
based on epistemological foundationalism and natural science 
methodology. 
In the last two decades, however, a wave of methodolog-
ical criticism has swept the field, sparked in part by a 
growing sense by many younger anthropologists that "culture" 
is disappearing. As Louis Sass puts it in an article entit-
led "Anthropology's Native Problems": 
Rituals, myths, and kinship systems no longer 
appear so stable and distinct, or so regulative of 
human life, as they did in an earlier era. In-
tense reevaluation of the field's traditional 
subject matter -- and also of its methods of 
observation and explanation -- has plunged 
cultural anthropology into a profound state of 
crisis ( p. 50) . 
A very significant outcome of the methodological re-
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evaluation was the development of a hermeneutically-informed 
alternative approach to cultural anthropology. The new 
approach, known as ''interpretive anthropology~, has been 
strongly influenced by the hermeneutical approach to liter-
ary criticism. Thus, in the words of anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz, a leader of the new approach, "society is 
less and less represented as an elaborate machine or a 
quasi-organism and more as a serious game, a sidewalk drama, 
or a behavioral text" (p. 23). Interpretive explanation, 
according to Geertz, "trains its attention on what institu-
tions, actions, images, utterances, events, customs, all the 
usual objects of social-scientific interest, mean to those 
whose institutions, actions, customs, and so on they are" 
(p. 22). 
The upshot of all this is that cultures, primitive or 
otherwise, cannot legitimately be viewed as static and 
ahistorical. Culture, in the interpretive view, is a con-
tinually unfolding improvisational drama. In accordance with 
this view, "many anthropologists have described the native 
as actually operating in accordance with abstract cultural 
laws --when in fact these laws are the intellectual con-
structions of the observer" (Sass, p. 54). As a result, 
"Ethnographies are being scrutinized like literary works 
as •allegories of subjectivity' that reveal as much about 
the interpreter and his cultural assumptions as about the 
society under investigation" CSass, p. 57). 
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This may all seem totally unrelated to the neoclassical 
economist's theory of consumer behavior. To the contrary, 
however, the ''interpretive turn" in cultural anthropology 
has resulted in an experimental trend that may have some 
significance for a hermeneutical critique of the theory of 
consumer behavior. 
As interpretive anthropologists began to explore the 
problems inherent in ahistorical ethnographical studies, 
they came to the realization that the major force of histor-
ical change impinging on third world societies was the 
spreading force of world economic markets. As stated by 
George Marcus and Michael Fischer in their hn!h£QEQ1Qgy ~~ 
Q~l!~r~l Qri!ig~§. "The contemporary third world, or any 
other part of the globe, had to be understood in the context 
of the history of a capitalist world economy developing 
since the sixteenth centurya (p. 80). Ethnographical 
studies thus inspired recognize that cultural meaning, sym-
bols and practices are constantly evolving in response to 
new situations in such a way that the influence of spreading 
world capitalism is not simply superimposed on traditional 
cultures, but is literally incorporated via the ongoing 
process of cultural production. 
Outstanding examples of such studies cited by Marcus 
and Fischer are Michael Taussig's I~~ ~~Yil ~n~ QQ~~Q~i1Y 
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E~!i~hi~~ in ~Q~!h 6~~rif~ c 1880) and June Nash's ~~ ~~! !h~ 
!:Un~~ ~n9: !h~ !:Lin~~ 1;:~! !,!~ < 1978). "Both deal with the 
impact of capitalism in shaping South American laboring 
classes, and both emphasize cultural analysis" <Marcus and 
Fischer, p. 88). 
These developments in cultural anthropology tend, in an 
indirect way, to support Schrag's expanded (hermeneutical) 
notion of reason. They indicate a potential approach for 
criticizing the theory of consumer behavior and the ration-
ality postulate. Specifically, hermeneutical theory 
contradicts the assumption that wants and preferences can be 
taken as given, and the cited developments in cultural 
anthropology tend to support hermeneutical theory in this 
sense. The developments referred to provide support for the 
notion that changes in the economic system may not only 
result in changes in wants and attitudes, but also in 
changes in the way the world is understood and thought 
about. 
Implications for the Applicability 
of Price Theory 
The relevance of the hermeneutical perspective for a 
critique of consumer theory is most obvious in the area of 
welfare economics theory. The driving notion behind the 
pure theory of welfare economics appears to be the possibil-
ity of deriving conclusions about the desirability of market 
outcomes. The satisfaction of the wants and preferences of 
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individual consumers are taken as the ultimate benchmark 
against which to gauge the performance of an economic sys-
tern. The pure theory of welfare economics attempts to prove 
that under certain extremely simplifying assumptions a per-
fectly competitive economic system will generate the highest 
possible level of satisfaction With a given amount of avail-
able resources. The relevance of the considerations raised 
in this chapter are most obvious in three respects: ( 1 l I f 
wants and preferences are unstable, then no definitive con-
clusion can be drawn concerning the level of satisfaction 
achievable over some time period; (2) If wants and prefer-
ences are not exogenous, but are somehow influenced by the 
market system itself, then any conclusions about the 
desirability of market outcomes are conditional upon some 
specifications about what kinds of wants and preferences 
should be generated; (3) And finally, if wants and preferen-
ces are derivative from the structure of human meaning 
itself, then one cannot draw any conclusions about the 
desireability of any set of outcomes without reference to 
cultural context. 
It is obvious that the hermeneutical perspective tends 
to undermine each of these crucial assumptions. If one 
accepts the hermeneutical perspective as descriptively 
accurate, then one cannot, Without extensive qualification 
and reservations accept the assumption of rational economic 
man With stable exogenously derived wants and preferences as 
realistic. 
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This line of criticism is, of course, old stuff to 
neoclassical economists. Yet many economists, while 
agreeing that welfare economic theory is built on very 
unrealistic assumptions, defend the perpetuation of the 
theory on the grounds that it is a good device for sharpen-
ing the skills involved in economic analysis. On the 
surface, this attitude appears to be politically neutral. 
All too often, however, the theory of welfare economics 
seems to be used in an oblique fashion to legitimate market 
outcomes. 
In any case, neoclassical welfare economics does not 
stop at theoretical classroom exercises. Some of the most 
powerful public policy concepts and tools come directly from 
welfare economic theory. Consider the concept of consumer 
surplus. This concept is perhaps the most fundamental and 
powerful concept used in applied welfare economics. It is 
the foundation for most economic analyses of antitrust 
issues, excise tax issues, and issues involving 
externalities. It is also the core of the powerful and 
widely-used cost/benefit analysis. Yet consumer surplus 
appears to be the most sensitive of all microeconomic con-
cepts to the sort of criticisms discussed in this chapter. 
Consumer surplus rises and falls with the demand curve 
which, in turn, is supposed to be a reflection of consumer 
wants and preferences. Thus, the legitimacy of using pre-
dieted changes in consumer surplus as a measure of change in 
social welfare rises and falls with the degree of realism 
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attached to the assumption of rational consumers with stable 
exogenously determined wants and preferences. 
A hermeneutical critique of consumer theory, then, 
indicates the following types of conclusions. Price theory 
should not be used as the sovereign authority regarding the 
virtues of market arrangements. Price theory does not dem-
onstrate that consumer sovereignty is a characteristic of 
market systems. Nor does price theory demonstrate that a 
market system results in an efficient use of resources -- at 
least, not when efficiency is defined as the derivation of 
maximum welfare (utility, satisfaction, or whatever) from a 
given amount of resources. And finally, regarding applied 
price theory, predicted changes in consumer surplus cannot 
conclusively be equated with changes in social welfare. 
These conclusions are not significantly different from 
the criticisms leveled against neoclassical economics from 
other perspectives. The significance of a hermeneutical 
critique is primarily due to the fact that it is rooted in 
an ontologically-oriented philosophy. If the ontological 
perspective of philosophical hermeneutics is accepted, there 
will be less likelihood of allowing the shortcomings of 
consumer behavior theory to be glossed over. 
All of this does not mean, of course, that there is no 
legitimate role for neoclassical price theory. The above 
criticisms do not disclaim a legitimate use of price theory 
for predicting price and quantity changes in specific mar-
kets as a result of specific changes in market conditions. 
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The criticisms discussed have to do with the association of 
welfare judgements with predicted price and quantity 
outcomes. 
The author suspects that there are many neoclassical 
economists -- especially those who eschew long-run, general 
equilibrium analysis -- who share (from a different perspec-
tive) these same criticisms. It is also suspected by the 
author that practitioners of cost/benefit analysis may be 
the most aware of the difficulties involved in associating 
consumer surplus with social welfare. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE NORMATIVE/POSITIVE DISTINCTION 
It is patently obvious that economics is thoroughly 
intertwined with public policy issues. The author sus-
pects, therefore, that non-economists would find it quite 
strange that there has been a lengthy and hotly-debated 
issue within the profession concerning whether economics is 
or is not a value-free social science dealing with "what 
is" and not with "what ought to be". The issue has been 
thoroughly aired, but the hermeneutical perspective holds 
promise for shedding new light on the controversy. In fact, 
it shall argued that the hermeneutical perspective justifies 
setting the issue aside altogether. But first, a brief 
review of the major strands of the argument is in order. 
The Is/Ought Dichotomy and the 
Possibility of Value-Free 
Science 
Mishan begins his lrr!~~~~£1i~rr 1~ ~~~~~!iY~ ~£~rr~~i£~ 
with a discussion of the distinction between "normative 
economics" and "welfare economics". He points out that the 
two terms are often used synonymously. "The designation 
normative economics, however, is the less ambiguous, inas-
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much as it implies 'ought' propositions ... whereas welfare 
economics can, in principle, also be a descriptive study ... " 
(Mishan, 1981, p. 3l. There tends to be a basic agreement 
among neoclassical economists that positive economics deals 
with "what is" while normative economics deals with "what 
ought to be". There has, however, been an extensive debate 
as to whether Paretian welfare economics belongs to positive 
economics or normative economics. In this section the 
broader issues involving the normative/positive distinction 
shall be reviewed. reserving the debate about the status of 
welfare economics for the next section. 
The foundation of the normative/positive distinction 
was laid down by David Hume over 200 years ago. Hume's 
foundational contribution has been succinctly summarized by 
Mark Blaug as follows: 
It was David Hume in his I~~~1i~~ Qrr tl~m~rr 
N~!~t~ who long ago laid down the proposition that 
'one cannot deduce ought from is,' that purely 
factual, descriptive statements by themselves can 
only entail or imply other factual, descriptive 
statements and never norms, ethical pronounce-
ments, or prescriptions to do something. This 
proposition has been aptly labeled 'Hume's guillo-
tine,' implying as it does a watertight logical 
distinction between the realm of facts and the 
realm of values ( 1980. p. 130). 
Most of the positive/normative debate in economics has 
implicitly accepted "Hume's guillotine". The prevalent view 
has been that a positive, value-free, economics is both 
possible and desireable. The major issue, in this view, 
concerns the economist's role with respect to values. The 
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extreme view is that economists, as economists, do not 
concern themselves with values. The moderate view is more 
in line with Max Weber's view on the legitimacy of value 
discussion in the social sciences. This view, as summarized 
by Blaug~ is that discussions of value "could take the form 
of ( ll examining the internal consistency of the value 
premises from which divergent normative judgments are 
derived; (2) deducing the implications of those value prem-
ises in the light of the practical circumstances to which 
they are applied; and (3l tracing the factual consequences 
of alternative ways of realizing normative judgments ... " 
(1980, p. 135). 
Tracing the factual consequences of alternatives is the 
key link, in the apparently predominant view, between pos-
itive and normative economics. In "The Methodology of 
Positive Economics," Friedman asserts that the task of posi-
tive economics "is to provide a system of generalizations 
that can be used to make correct predictions about the 
consequences of any change in circumstances" (p. 4l. 
Positive economics, in his view, is thus independent of 
normative economics. Normative economics, on the Other 
hand, depends in a very fundamental way on positive econom-
iCS. This is so, says Friedman, because, "Any policy 
conclusion necessarily rests on a prediction about the 
consequences of doing one thing rather than another, a 
prediction that must be based -- implicitly or explicitly 
on positive economics" (p. 5l. 
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Friedman also downplays the significance of differences 
in basic values. "I venture the judgment ... that currently 
in the Western world, and especially in the United States, 
differences about economic policy among disinterested citi-
zens derive predominantly from different predictions about 
the economic consequences of taking action -- differences 
that in principle can be eliminated by the progress of 
positive economics -- rather than from fundamental differen-
ces in basic values, differences about which men can 
ultimately only fight" (Friedman, p. 5). This viewpoint 
appears to be widely shared by neoclassical economists. 
One of the major criticisms of neoclassical economics, 
however, has been the very assumption that such a thing as 
value-free economics is even possible. Most of the criti-
cisms of this assumption are covered by Heilbroner in a 
1973 article entitled "Economics as a •value-free' Science". 
He points out, "There is an obvious political bias observa-
ble in the choice of research tasks arrogated to itself by 
the profession ... " (Heil broner, 1983, p. 33). This is, 
however, a relatively minor consideration. Hi.s main point 
has to do with profound differences between the social 
sciences and the natural sciences. 
Heilbroner contends that the vital element in social 
inquiry is the ascription of meaning to observed social 
data. This is an unavoidable element in social inquiry. 
Social scientists cannot achieve the objectivity of natural 
scientists because " ... the objects observed by the social 
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scientist all possess an attribute that is lacking in the 
objects of the natural universe. This is the attribute of 
consciousness-- of cognition, of 'calculation', of 
volition" (Heilbroner, 1983, p. 30). 
necessitates behavioral assumptions. 
This, he maintains, 
"Without assumptions 
about behavior, no conclusions whatsoever can be drawn from 
any set of social facts" <Heilbroner, 1983, p. 31). Behav-
ioral assumptions, he contends, intrinsically contain 
value-components. He points to the assumption of maximizing 
behavior by economists as a fundamental behavioral 
assumption which "generally accords with the prevailing 
orientation of most economists that 'more is better'" 
<Heilbroner, 1983, p. 32). Maximization thus becomes, 
according to Heilbroner, "a prescription for conduct" 
CHeilbroner, 1983, p. 32). 
In any case, however, the social scientist is psycho-
logically entwined with the objects under investigation in a 
radically different way than the natural scientist. The 
legitimacy of the natural universe is never in question. 
For social inquiry, however, " ... the discovery of unexpec-
ted results in the social universe almost invariably 
threatens or confirms the legitimacy of the social system of 
which the social investigator is unavoidably a part" 
(Heilbroner, 1983, p. 34). 
Recent developments in philosophy of science tend to 
support Heilbroner's contention regarding the impossibility 
of value-free economics. Those same developments, however, 
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make Heilbroner's notion that the natural sciences can 
achieve value-free objectivity seem a bit naive. As Mark 
Blaug points out, the work of Kuhn and Lakatos has led to 
the conclusion that "value impregnation is now a universal 
feature of all theoretical propositions and hence not a 
special problem of the social sciences" ( 1980, p. 137J. He 
rejects the implication that philosophical, social and 
political undertones are unique characteristics of hypoth-
eses in the social sciences. Regarding Heilbroner's 
contention that social scientists' assessment of data is 
colored by their inherent interests in the system under 
investigation, Blaug points out that basically the same 
thing can be said of natural scientists. For instance, 
" ... when natural scientists express views on such policy 
issues as biological warfare, the use of hydrogen bombs, 
nuclear energy, sterilization, vivisection, etcetera, they 
are just as likely as anyone else to mix facts and values 
and to misrepresent the actual state of the evidence" 
<Blaug, 1980, pp. 153-4). 
Blaug does concede, however, that there are special 
problems in economics with bias in the assessment of evi-
dence. He attributes these special problems to the fact 
that economics has a special branch of study welfare 
economics -- which deals in seemingly normative propositions 
while appearing to be a positive science. Thus, according 
to Blaug, the special problems of objectivity in economics 
"stem principally from the fact that the theorems of welfare 
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economics are forever spilling over from normative economics 
into the appraisal of evidence in positive economics" ( 1980, 
p. 154) . 
Paretian Welfare Economics: 
Positive or Normative 
Welfare economics was built on the foundational notion 
of a "Pareto optimum," a situation in which there is no 
change that could make anyone better off without making 
someone else worse off. This is the notion on which welfare 
economists base their case that, under certain conditions, 
perfect competition will yield the highest possible level of 
satisfaction of wants. 
It is generally recognized by economists, however, that 
the idea of "Pareto optimality" 
... rests on three fundamental postulates: ( 1) only 
self-chosen preferences count as individual pref-
erences or yardsticks of individual welfare (in 
popular parlance: an individual is the best judge 
of his welfare); (2) social welfare comprises the 
welfare of every individual member of society 
(except children and lunatics) and nothing else 
but the individual members of society; and 
(3) only unanimous reallocations of resources 
count as improvements in social welfare (Blaug, 
1980, p. 144 ) . 
These three postulates allow welfare economists to demon-
strate that a perfectly competitive equilibrium is a Pareto 
optimum situation with respect to the allocation of re-
sources. Samuelson, according to Blaug, dubbed this 
correspondence the "invisible hand theorem" (Blaug, 1980, 
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pp. 144-145). 
The basis for applying the notion of Pareto optimality 
to non-equilibrium situations was provided by John Hicks and 
Nicholas Kaldor in the 1930s. They developed the idea of a 
compensation test for a potential Pareto improvement (PPIJ. 
Roughly stated, a PPI exists when any contemplated change 
would produce large enough gains for one group (the winners) 
to allow them to compensate the losers and still be better 
off than before the change. This notion was the basis for 
the "new welfare economics". 
The issue to be dealt with here concerns whether or 
not the new welfare economics (which has had a very signifi-
cant impact on the analysis of many public policy issues) is 
a part of positive economics or normative economics. Re-
garding Pareto's optimality principle, Blaug notes that 
Pareto himself considered it to be "a proposition of pure 
economics, which was completely independent of any ethical 
value judgments" (1980, p. 142). Mishan notes that Kaldor 
considered the compensation test to be "an objective test 
of economic efficiency; prescriptions based on it were 
deemed to have a scientific status detached from any value 
judgments" (1981, p. 3031. 
In 1959, G. C. Archibald presented a rigorous argument 
for the inclusion of welfare economics within the scope of 
positive economics. 
follows: 
His argument is summarized by Blaug as 
Paretian welfare economics investigates the effie-
iency of alternative arrangements for satisfying 
given wants in the light of the choices that 
individuals themselves make in their own inter-
ests; thus, no evaluation of these wants is 
required for the Paretian theorems. An individ-
ual's preference map is identical with his welfare 
map, and to say that his welfare is higher in 
state B than in state A is simply to say that he 
would choose B rather than A were he free and able 
to do so. Paretian welfare economics simply asks: 
under what arrangements will this individual's 
choice be expanded from A to B without a contrac-
tion in someone else's choices, or alternatively 
expressed, under what arrangements will a PPI 
materialize? Value judgments only come into the 
picture when the crucial step to prescription is 
taken. Provided we do not prescribe, our argu-
ments do not rest at any point on approval or 
disapproval and are hence subject to empirical 
refutation like all other propositions in positive 
economics ( 1980, pp. 143-144). 
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Blaug suggests that Archibald's argument is logically 
valid but unrealistic noting that "it requires simply super-
human detachment not to slip in the 'simple' assumption 
that the elimination of a PPI is desirable ... " ( 1980, p. 
146). Blaug also claims that Archibald's position promotes 
a paradoxical use of language. "Welfare economics is, after 
all, that branch of economics concerned with the ethical 
criteria by which we decide that one economic state of the 
world is more desirable than another, and to speak of posi-
tive welfare economics is literally to revel in paradoxical 
language" CBlaug, 1980, p. 146). 
Possibly the most thorough and technical criticism of 
the notion that welfare economics belongs to positive as 
opposed to normative economics has come from the right-wing 
of the economics profession in a book-length argument. The 
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by Charles K. Rowley and Alan T. Peacock. Their argument is 
concerned with the domination by Paretian welfare economics 
in public policy analysis. 
Rowley and Peacock mount a tirade against the pretense 
of ethical neutrality which, in their view, has allowed 
Paretian welfare economics to establish a near dictatorship 
in the public policy arena . 
... [WJe charge those who deal in Paretian welfare 
economics with being implicated, in greater or 
lesser degree, knowingly or in ignorance, in a 
professional misdemeanour which forms the basis 
for the established dictatorship. In its most 
serious form, the misdemeanour amounts to a policy 
of presenting a value-based dogma as value-free, 
immutable and incontestable in the hope that those 
who endorse its internal logic will not inquire 
too closely as to its fundamental assumptions --
this the oldest technique of the religious 
fanatic. Less seriously, but more commonly, the 
Paretian principles are endorsed and defended as a 
set of ethically neutral propositions, tolerant of 
all ethical systems and the product of 'consensus 
among reasonable men,' phrases that are designed 
to capture the favour of the unwary scholar, but 
which, in our view, are misleading Within the 
welfare economics context CRowley and Peacock, 
p. 1 ) . 
The value assumptions of Paretian Welfare Economics are 
carefully delineated by Rowley and Peacock. The theory is 
radically individualistic. It is concerned with the welfare 
of all individual members of society. "Commodities are 
relevant to social welfare only in so far as they influence 
the welfare of individual members of society" CRowley and 
Peacock, p. 8). We\fare judgments are not granted legiti-
macy unless they spring from the individuals concerned. "No 
individual may impose his/her own preferences upon any other 
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individual, no matter how well founded those preferences may 
appear in terms of prevailing ethical standards" <Rowley and 
Peacock, p. 8). No legitimacy whatsoever is granted to 
interpersonal welfare comparisons. Thus, "If any change in 
the allocation of resources increases the welfare of at 
least one individual without reducing the welfare of any 
other individual, then this change is treated as improving 
social welfare" (Rowley and Peacock, p. 9). All in all, 
then, in contrast to its image of value-neutrality, Paretian 
welfare economics is shown to rely fundamentally on an 
elaborate set of value assumptions. 
It is not that Rowley and Peacock are opposed to value 
advocacy. Quite the contrary, they make no bones about the 
fact that they are pushing a value system -- the value 
system of classical liberalism -- which they openly admit 
is "a missionary philosophy" <Rowley and Peacock, p. 97). 
They summarize their mission in the following terms: "We are 
concerned ... to assist in the development of a society that 
encourages individuals to want to exercise free will, which 
assists them in their efforts so to do, and which confronts 
them with the responsibility for their decisions" (Rowley 
and Peacock, p. 80). 
Their complaint about Paretian welfare economics is 
that it rests on a different set of values, which they claim 
has led to a wide-spread condoning of collective interven-
tion in the name of cost-effectiveness and individual 
preferences, while disregarding the pattern of political 
institutions. "Liberalism", they point out, "is not con-
cerned ... with the primacy of individual preferences, but 
rather With the maintenance and extension of individual 
freedoms, defined as the absence of coercion of certain 
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individuals by others" (Rowley and Peacock, p. 2). Further-
more, in regard to their mission, Rowley and Peacock note, 
"It is inevitable that in many important respects the polit-
ical and social arrangements in modern societies will be 
incompatible with liberalism, implying that to achieve a 
liberal society requires a change in the existing order of 
individual preferences" (p. 97). 
It should be obvious that Marxists would likewise main-
tain that to achieve a socialist society requires a change 
in the existing order of individual preferences. In short, 
in the way the normative/positive dichotomy is usually 
delineated, welfare economics is obviously based on a value 
judgment in terms of the welfare index to be considered. 
As Blaug puts it, it is "difficult to resist the conclusion 
that welfare economics is avowedly and unashamedly norma-
tive, a point of view which may be said to be the dominant 
view" (1980, p. 143). 
A Hermeneutical Perspective on the 
Origin of Fact and Value 
All sides of the debate on the role of values in eco-
nomics have tended to accept the notion of a fundamental 
dichotomy between fact and value. Blaug notes that Gunnar 
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Myrdal has suggested that the economist should state his or 
her values openly and clearly at the beginning of any 
economic analysis ( 1980, pp. 139-140). Heilbroner, similar-
ly, wants economists to record "with all the honesty and 
fidelity of which he is capable, not only his data and his 
processes of reasoning, but his initial commitments, hopes, 
and disappointments" <1983, p. 36l. Heilbroner's objective 
is "to make a virtue of necessity, exposing for all the 
world to see the indispensable and fructifying value-grounds 
from which it begins its inquiries so that these inquiries 
may be fully exposed to -- and not falsely shielded from --
the public examination that is the true strength of science" 
( 1983, pp. 36-37). 
Mishan argues for the legitimacy of normative Paretian 
welfare economics from a different perspective. He points 
out that there may be a number of broad ethical notions that 
have widespread assent. If such notions are so basic and 
obvious that they are not written into the constitution, 
They can be said to form part of a virtual 
constitution. And if, among these ethical 
propositions that comprise a virtual constitu-
tion, there are several on which a welfare 
economics can be raised then ... its guiding rules 
can truthfully claim to rest on a widely accepted 
ethical base (Mishan, 1976, p. 385l. 
Mishan maintains that both a Pareto improvement and a dis-
tributional improvement appear to qualify for inclusion in a 
virtual constitution. 
A Pareto improvement takes place if some economic 
rearrangement makes one or more people better off 
without making anyone worse off. A distribution-
al improvement takes place if there is near-
unanimity that the distribution resulting from 
the economic rearrangement is an improvement 
CMishan, 1876, p. 386). 
Mishan thus claims legitimacy for the values inherent in 
cost-benefit analysis and other optimizing techniques of 
welfare economics. 
Finally, Blaug points out that values play a very 
crucial role in inquiry. The important consideration, he 
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maintains is that the role of values be kept within accept-
able bounds. 
The mutual interplay of facts and values is pre-
cisely the fuel that fires scientific work, no 
less in the social than in the physical sciences. 
Scientific progress comes only when we strive to 
maximize the role of facts and minimize the role 
of values ( 1980, p. 156). 
It is no coincidence that all of these viewpoints sound 
so similar. As Calvin Schrag points out, our notion of 
value is shaped in conjunction with our notion of fact. 
Positivist as well as antipositivist social scientists have 
tended to accept the positivist-empiricist conception of 
fact. He summarizes this conceptual framework as follows: 
The conceptual framework which occasioned the 
abstracted empiricism of positivism was one in 
which facts were viewed as discrete, atomistic, 
and nonintentional. In this conceptual framework, 
the physico-neurological model of perception 
became paradigmatic; and perception was understood 
as the reception of discrete, isolated, and con-
tingent physical properties. Consequently it was 
necessary for positivism to construct a theory of 
meaning and a theory of language which would be 
able to accommodate these facts by ordering them 
within the propositional forms of a truth-
functional logic. This uncritical use of 
truth-functional logic in the service of an ab-
stracted empiricism further contributed to the 
picturing of facts as discrete, isolated, contin-
gent, and non intentional (Schrag, 1980, p. 86). 
The positivist-empiricist view, according to Schrag, 
has been abstracted from our preconceptual, preanalytical 
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world of originary experience. The "facts" generated in our 
preconceptual experience -- "world-facts" in Schrag's 
terms -- are profoundly different from the facts in the 
positivist-empiricist conceptual framework. World-facts 
never arise in isolation; they are configurative. They 
arise in relation to a background -- natural facts in rela-
tion to a natural background and .social facts in relation to 
a social background. World-facts also are never independent 
of an "experiencer". The events giving rise to world-facts 
are experienced -- given shape -- in accordance with the 
personal history of the experiencer; the meaning of world-
facts i.s given .shape by the experiencer. Finally, world-
facts are never independent of the intentionality of the 
experiencer. The intentionality of the experiencer, to-
gether with the "fact" experienced and the background 
against which the "fact" is experienced, imbues facts with 
meaning at the point of origin. 
This hermeneutical viewpoint regarding facts contrasts 
radically with the positivist-empiricist viewpoint. 
On the abstracted level, facts are split off from 
meanings; but in the sphere of world-facts, 
meaning and fact mix and mingle. Every world-fact 
of perception is already a comprehension of the 
world in some manner. The world-facts that become 
manifest in man's use of tools and utensils appear 
within a field of practical concerns. The world-
facts of socio-political action are facts which 
already endow the action with meaning. Here the 
sphere of action is at the same time the sphere of 
sense. Clearly the meaning or sense at issue is 
not that of an abstract verification theory of 
meaning which necessarily follows from an abstract 
localization of fact, but rather a precategorial 
and preobjective deployment of meaning within the 
synthetic totality of experiencer, figure, and 
background (Schrag, 1980, p. 90). 
As mentioned above, the way facts are conceived sets 
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the stage for the way values are conceived. The bifurcation 
of fact and value can accordingly be seen as derivative of 
the widespread acceptance of the positiVist-empiricist con-
ception of fact. If facts are considered to be independent 
and pre-existing things or states of affairs, then it fol-
lows that values "remain extrinsic to the order of things 
and actions and enter into relation with things and human 
actions only via the instrumentation of human desires, voli-
tions, and appetitions" (Schrag, 1980, p. 93). Values are 
thus accidental predicates that might or might not be 
attached to a given thing or state of affairs by any given 
human being. Within this conceptual framework it makes 
perfect sense that science should attempt to eliminate, or 
at least minimize, the role of values. On the other hand, 
if the positivist-empiricist conceptual framework is wrong, 
then the role of values must be reconsidered. 
In the hermeneutical perspective, values are not added 
after the fact, but originate simultaneously with facts. As 
Schrag points out, the intentionality associated with the 
origin of facts necessarily involves valuation. 
The originary setting or milieu of human thought, 
language, and action is at the same time a horizon 
of world-values. Patterns of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction, approval and disapproval, the 
obliging and the nonobliging are inseparable from 
the being and behavior of man and the life of an 
historical culture. These patterns of valuation 
are situated in the lived-through experiences of 
self and society (Schrag, 1980, p. 94J. 
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According to the hermeneutical perspective, as represented 
by Schrag, Heilbroner is correct when he says that values 
are inevitably introduced at the point where meaning is 
ascribed to social facts, but he is wrong about where that 
point is located. Meaning is introduced at the point of 
origin of world-facts in the precategorial matrix of life 
experience. As Schrag points out, "The meaning-formation 
that is at work in the configurative presence of world-facts 
is at the same time a process of value-formationu (1980, 
p. 92) . 
This process of precategorial value-formation is not, 
however, a process that is unique to the individual. Facts 
and values generated via everyday life experience become 
embedded in ordinary language. According to Schrag, 
... the genesis of meaning in the precategorial 
life-world, with its multiple horizons of percep-
tual profiles and perspectives of action, is set 
forth by language. But this language is itself 
precategorial and preobjective. It is the lan-
guage of everyday discourse in the workday world 
of human concerns (1980, p. 90J. 
The relationship between ordinary language and the 
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facts and values generated by our l1fe experiences is not a 
one-way street. The language we are born into and grow up 
in plays a powerful role in determining the horizon against 
which facts and values are allowed to take shape. At the 
same time, however, as new circumstances give rise to new 
facts and values, adjustments are made in ordinary language 
to accommodate these new facts and values. 
Furthermore, neither science nor scientists themselves 
originate without connection to the ordinary world of human 
concerns and the influence of the ordinary language by which 
those concerns are shared and dealt with. Schrag, in agree-
ment with Michael Polanyi, explains that a logic of tacit 
knowing which precedes the formalized logic of explanation 
is operative in scientific endeavor (1980, p. 89). The 
tacit knowledge referred to is the knowledge that is gener-
ated by the precategorial life-world and transmitted via 
ordinary language. From the hermeneutical perspective then, 
the world-values generated by the precategorial life-world 
are also operative in the project of science. 
free science is impossible. 
Beyond the Positiave/Normative 
Distinction 
Hence, value-
The fact/value dichotomy can be seen from a hermeneuti-
cal perspective as an artificial dichotomy that has arisen 
out of scientific methodology considerations. The methodo-
logical viewpoint that fostered the dichotomy rested, in 
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turn, on the notion that it is possible to ground knowledge 
on an epistemological foundation that is logically necessary 
and certain. Positivistic scientific methodology sought 
prescriptions that would demarcate scientific knowledge 
claims from all other sorts of knowledge claims in such a 
way that scientific knowledge claims were the only ones 
resting on a logically certain epistemological foundation. 
The value-freedom issue can be seen as a manifestation of 
the attempt to demarcate science from other sorts of human 
endeavor. Science was thought to be concerned with "what 
is" and not with "what ought to be". 
The conclusion that the fact/value dichotomy is an 
artificial construct (as discussed in the previous sectionl 
toge~her with the rejection of the notion that an epistemo-
logical foundation is necessary (as argued in Chapter IIIl, 
generates an initial impression that the fact/value dichoto-
my can be set aside as a methodological issue. Before that 
can be done, however, the fact/value issue must be consid-
ered from another angle. In the previous section, Schrag's 
argument that on the "originative level of precategorial 
meaning-formation ... fact and value are equiprimordial" 
( 1980, p. 92) was reviewed. It could still be argued, 
however, that at the level of conscious and deliberate 
methodological decision-making there is a very significant 
degree of difference between dealing with "what is" versus 
"what ought to be". This sort of argument must be addressed 
from a hermeneutical perspective before leaving the fact/ 
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value issue. 
The hermeneutical perspective on this line of argument 
can be summarized quite briefly. In his search for the 
origin of the human sciences, Schrag observes that: 
The psychologist, sociologist, anthropologist, 
[economist,] and political scientist ... constitute 
a perspective on the life-world in such a manner 
that the investigatable data are human agents who 
endow their own gestures, speech, and actions with 
signification. What is at issue for the human 
scientist is human actions, motives, purposes, and 
concerns, which directly and indirectly inform the 
self-understanding of the agents and actors under 
investigation ( 1880, p. 69). 
Unlike the objects under investigation by the natural scien-
ces, the human agents and actors under investigation by the 
human sciences may, in turn, incorporate the findings of the 
human sciences into their future plans and actions. 
Indeed, this is the purpose of the human sciences. As 
Gadamer observes: 
[The human sciencesJ ... are •moral sciences'. 
Their object is man and what he knows of himself. 
But he knows himself as an acting being, and this 
kind of knowledge that he has of himself does not 
seek to establish what exists. An active being, 
rather, is concerned with what is not always the 
same as it is, but can also be different. In it 
he can discover the point at which he has to act. 
The purpose of his knowledge is to govern his 
action (1885, p. 280l. 
Clearly then, from a hermeneutical perspective, there is no 
fact/value issue nor a positive/normative dichotomy. The 
economist "as economist" can engage in value advocacy as 
well as "value-free" description and prediction. 
So, where does that leave us methodologically? The 
answer is: it leaves us with rhetoric -- rhetoric in the 
positive connotation of the word. In Gadamer's words: 
Rhetoric from oldest tradition has been the only 
advocate of a claim to truth that defends the 
probable ..• and that which is convincing to the 
ordinary reason, against the claim of science to 
accept as true only what can be demonstrated and 
tested! Convincing and persuading, without being 
able to prove -- these are obviously as much the 
aim and measure of understanding and interpreta-
tion as they are the aim and measure of the art of 
oration and persuasion. And this whole wide realm 
of convincing "persuasion" and generally reigning 
views has not been gradually narrowed by the 
progress of science, however great it has been; 
rather, this realm extends to take in every new 
product of scientific endeavor, claiming it for 
itself and bringing it Within its scope. 
The ubiquity of rhetoric, indeed, is unlim-
ited. Only through it is science a sociological 
factor of life, for all the representations of 
science that are directed beyond the mere narrow 
circle of specialists ... owe their effectiveness to 
the rhetorical element they contain (1976, p.24l. 
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As discussed in Chapter II, this view regarding rhet-
oric and economics has been analyzed by economist Donald 
McCloskey who claims that economic discourse is unavoidably 
a rhetorical discourse. His view of rhetoric <which he has 
borrowed from Wayne Booth) is totally consistent with 
Gadamer's. It is worth quoting again: 
Rhetoric is 'the art of probing what men believe 
they ought to believe, rather than proving what is 
true according to abstract methods'; it is 'the 
art of discovering good reasons, finding what 
really warrants assent, because any reasonable 
person ought to be persuaded'; it is careful 
weighing of more-or-less good reasons to arrive at 
more-or-less probable or plausible conclusions --
none too secure but better than would be arrived 
at by chance or unthinking impulse' ... <McCloskey, 
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p. 482). 
As noted in Chapter II, McCloskey views the examination 
of the rhetoric of economics as a move toward greater ratio-
nality in economic discourse. "The invitation to rhetoric 
... is an invitation to leave the irrationality of an arti-
ficially narrow range of arguments and to move to the 
rationality of arguing like human beings'' (McCloskey, 
p. 509). 
Does this mean, then, that "anything goes?" Not neces-
sarily. It means that anything may be attempted, in the 
sense that there is no dogmatic apriori exclusionary criter-
ion. But where evaluation of economic inquiry is involved, 
as in faculty evaluation or editorial evaluation, it does 
not follow that the elimination of dogmatic apriori criteria 
eliminates the legitimacy of negative appraisal. What it 
does mean is that it is incumbent upon appraisers to support 
their appraisal with reasoned argument. 
Specifically, with respect to values in inquiry, there 
is no apriori basis, from a hermeneutical perspective, for 
excluding values from economic inquiry. Prevailing social 
and cultural values obviously play a major role in shaping 
the economic world being investigated, and inquiry concern-
ing those values and their impact would surely enhance, 
rather than detract from, the usefulness of economic in-
quiry. This is probably not a very controversial claim. 
The author would extend the same sort of claim, however, to 
value advocacy. 
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The persuasive essay is generally believed to fall 
within the academic domain of language and literature. 
Within that domain some essays are judged to be more schol-
arly than others, and reasoned arguments for and against 
such judgments are openly aired. Scholarly essays may 
legitimately deal with values concerning economic and polit-
ical issues, or with novels, films, drama, etc. which deal 
with such issues. Arthur Miller's ~~~ih Qf A ~~l~~~~rr is an 
excellent example of a probing examination of the values 
inherent in American business society. 
The question to be put to economists, then, is: Should 
economists, as economists, be precluded from scholarly dis-
cussion of values concerning economic arrangements, leaving 
that important area to non-economists? The answer from a 
hermeneutical prespective is a resounding "No!" Economics 
as a discipline will be much more valuable to society if 
economists themselves are encouraged to engage in scholarly 
exchange regarding the virtues of various economic arrange-
ments. Philosopher Abraham Kaplan has argued that, 
"allowing a role to values is not what makes for bias; what 
makes for bias, rather, is allowing them only a role that 
insulates them from the test of experience ... " <p. 396). In 
a similar vein, it could be added that the conduct of eco-
nomic inquiry under the guise of value-free social science 
has the effect of insulating the values of the inquirer from 
the test of exposure to scholarly scrutiny. This is surely 
not desireable. Just as McCloskey argues that economics 
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would be improved if economists became more conscious of 
their use of rhetoric through open examination, it could be 
argued that economics would also be improved if economists 
became more conscious of the role of values in their inquiry 
by bringing values into the open for scholarly examination. 
CHAPTER IX 
ANOTHER LOOK AT FRIEDMAN'S ESSAY: 
EXPLANATION VERSUS PREDICTION 
IN ECONOMICS 
Milton Friedman's "The Methodology of Positive 
Economics" ( 1953) has been hailed by Mark Blaug as "the 
centerpiece of postwar economic methodology, the one essay 
on methodological questions that virtually every modern 
economist has read at some stage in his or her career ... " 
(Blaug, 1980 p. 103). This alone would be sufficient to 
mandate a review of the essay in a book-length appraisal of 
neoclassical economic methodology. There is, however, 
another justification for writing a chapter dealing with 
Friedman's essay, namely that his primary issue--
explanation versus prediction in economics -- has not yet 
been dealt with. He contends that economists need not be 
concerned with whether the assumptions of economic models 
are realistic, because the overwhelming purpose of economics 
is prediction, not explanation. 
The Role of Assumptions 
in Economic Theory 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Friedman down-
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plays the importance of normative economics. In his view, 
the major differences of opinion on economic policy in 
Western society can be largely boiled down to different 
predictions about the outcomes of various policies. Predic-
tion is what positive economics is all about: "The ultimate 
goal of a positive science is the development of a 'theory' 
or 'hypothesis' that yields valid and meaningful (i.e., not 
truistic) predi6tions about phenomena not yet observed" 
(Friedman, p. 71. 
Friedman is exercised by the persistence of criticism 
of neoclassical economic theory on the grounds that it 
employs unrealistic assumptions. The notion that the real-
ism of assumptions can be used to test the validity of a 
theory "only confuses the issue, promotes misunderstanding 
about the significance of empirical evidence for economic 
theory, produces a misdirection of much intellectual effort 
devoted to the development of positive economics, and im-
pedes the attainment of consensus on tentative hypotheses in 
positive economics" (Friedman, p. 14). In fact, Friedman 
suggests that there are strong reasons for expecting the 
most useful theories to employ "unrealistic" assumptions. 
"A hypothesis is important if it 'explains' much by little, 
that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements 
from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances sur-
rounding the phenomena to be expla~ned and permits valid 
predictions on the basis of them alone" <Friedman, p. 14l. 
Friedman elaborates several examples to illustrate his 
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point. One of these concerns the density of leaves on 
various sides of a tree: "I suggest the hypothesis that the 
leaves are positioned as if each leaf deliberately sought to 
maximize the amount of sunlight it receives, given the 
position of its neighbors, as if it knew the physical laws 
determining the amount of sunlight that would be received in 
various positions and could move rapidly or instantaneously 
from any one position to any other desired and unoccupied 
position" (Friedman, p. 19). He suggests that this hypothe-
sis would likely yield accurate predictions. If it does 
yield accurate predictions, then we are not justified in 
rejecting it on the basis that "leaves do not 'deliberate' 
or consciously 'seek', have not been to school and learned 
the relevant laws of science or the mathematics required to 
calculate the 'optimum' position, and cannot move from posi-
tion to position ... 11 (Friedman, p. 20). 
From examples such as this, Friedman maintains, "It is 
only a short step ... to the economic hypothesis that under a 
wide range of circumstances individual firms behave ~~ if 
they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected 
returns <generally if misleadingly called 'profits' l and had 
full knowledge of the data needed to succeed in this 
attempt ... " Cp. 21). Just as the unrealism of the assump-
tions about leaves does not invalidate the hypothesis, 
neither is the theory of the firm invalidated by the fact 
that businessmen don't solve the equations used in that 
theory. 
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Friedman does not, however, claim that no basis exists 
for judging the assumptions used in theories. He points out 
that any given theory can be generated with more than one 
set of assumptions. The relevant considerations for judging 
alternative sets of assumptions, he maintains, include such 
things as their contributions to clarity, economy, preci-
sion, and so forth. But in no case is the theory itself 
tested by the realism of the assumptions. <Friedman, 
pp. 40-41) 
Explanation versus Prediction 
Friedman's essay generated a flood of (mostly critical) 
articles. According to Caldwell, "Never before has one short 
article on methodology been able to generate so much contro-
versy" (p. 173). 
Friedman meant. 
Much of the controversy concerned what 
Was he talking about behavioral assump-
tions, assumptions regarding initial conditions, assumptions 
regarding boundary conditions, or all of these? The issue 
of realism could be argued differently depending on which 
assumptions he was talking about. What did he mean by 
realism? Was he talking about the testability of assump-
tions, the believability of assumptions, the truth status of 
assumptions, or did he mean realism in the sense that all 
relevant background variables are taken into account? All 
of these issues were taken up from various angles, as well 
as the question of whether or not Friedman was a positivist. 
Caldwell points out that even though most of the criticism 
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has been negative, "the methodological prescriptions ad-
vanced in his essay have become widely accepted among many 
working economists. And this has happened without Friedman 
ever having directly responded to his critics" (p. 173l! 
The methodological prescriptions advanced by Friedman 
have apparently been less widely accepted by economists 
dealing with methodological issues. As the methodological 
dust has settled, the major issues of the essay are seen 
more clearly as revolving around the question of whether or 
not Friedman is an instrumentalist and the implications of 
instrumentalism regarding the purpose of science. 
Instrumentalists, strictly speaking, are not concerned 
with the truth or falsity of theories. They consider thee-
ries to be instruments that are useful for dealing with 
particular problems. "Just as a hammer is an adequate 
instrument for certain tasks, and not for others, theories 
are evaluated for their adequacy, which is usually measured 
by predictive power" <Caldwell, p. 178). As Caldwell points 
out, much of the confusion surrounding Friedman's essay 
dissolves if Friedman is read as an instrumentalist. 
Instrumentalism in philosophical argumentation is often 
contrasted with realism: "realists claim that theories and 
theoretical terms should make real references, instrumen-
talists deny it" (Caldwell, p. 178l. Caldwell maintains 
that Friedman is not concerned with the existence or non-
existence of entities or other aspects of the philosophical 
debate over instrumentalism versus realism. Caldwell thus 
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labels Friedman a "methodological instrumentalist" (p. 179l. 
Reading Friedman as an instrumentalist may dissolve 
much of the confusion about his essay, but it certainly does 
not render it less susceptible to criticism. For one thing, 
as Caldwell points out, "the acceptance of instrumentalism 
rules out disconfirmation in science: a theory that is 
neither true nor false can be found inadequate, but not 
disconfirmed" (p. 182). Neither realists nor falsification-
ists are willing to accept the notion that scientific 
theories can be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed. 
A criticism of Friedman's instrumentalism that is even 
broader, however, is that it rules out any role for explana-
tion in science. The idea that science is not concerned 
with explanation seems to offend almost everyone. Caldwell 
even claims that, since the 1940s, philosophers of science 
have unanimously rejected the notion that prediction is the 
only goal of science. "Even such positivist philosophers as 
Carl Hempel have claimed that explanation, not prediction, 
is the goal of science ... " (Caldwell, p. 179). 
The crux of the argument against prediction as the 
exclusive goal of science is that it nullifies the role of 
causal explanation. If comparison of predictions with ex-
perience is the only legitimate way to test a theory's 
legitimacy, as Friedman maintains, then it does not matter 
if a causal mechanism is specified or not. According to 
this perspective, a theory that specifies no causal mechan-
ism but predicts well has a higher degree of validity than a 
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theory that predicts less well but provides an elaborate 
causal explanation. The root problem with this perspective 
is that it legitimizes spurious correlation. In Caldwell '.s 
words, "the instrumentalist preoccupation with predictive 
accuracy forces scientists to prefer statistical correlation 
over causal explanation if the former provides better pre-
dictions" Cp. 181). As Blaug puts it, this makes it 
"impossible to distinguish between genuine and spurious 
correlations ... " (1980, p. 110). 
Explanation versus Descriptivism 
Paul Samuelson's response to Friedman's essay was one 
of the most visible and controversial. Samuelson disagreed 
in no uncertain terms with Friedman's contention that un-
realistic assumptions do not matter. Friedman, Samuelson 
maintains, " ... is fundamentally wrong in thinking that 
unrealism in the sense of factual inaccuracy even to a 
tolerable degree of approximation is anything but a demerit 
for a theory or hypothesis" (Quoted in Blaug, 1980, p. 111). 
In making his case, however, Samuelson muddied the 
methodological waters further by conflating explanation with 
descriptivism. He claimed that: 
... a description (equational or otherwise) that 
works to describe well a wide range of observable 
reality is all the 'explanation' we can ever get 
(or need desire) here on earth .... An explanation, 
as used legitimately in science, is a better kind 
of description and not something that ultimately 
goes beyond description <Quoted in Blaug, 1980, 
p. 113). 
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Equating description and explanation allowed Samuelson to 
demonstrate that false assumptions necessarily imply that 
the theory is false. Caldwell describes Samuelson's refuta-
tion of Friedman as follows: 
... Samuelson undertakes an exercise in symbolic 
manipulation in which he asserts that theories are 
merely equivalent restatements of assumptions and 
conclusions, that is, A= B = C, where A is de-
fined as •assumptions', Bas •a theory', and Cas 
'consequences or predictions'. By this view, if 
either the assumptions or the theory itself are 
unrealistic, then the deduced consequences about 
reality are bound to be false ... (p. 193). 
This position led to an encounter between Samuelson and 
Machlup. Machlup pointed out that Samuelson's view was 
tantamount to a rejection of any explanatory role for 
theory: "If the consequences were to imply the 'theory' 
just as the theory implies the consequences, that theory 
would be nothing but another form of the impirical evidence 
(named 'consequence') and could never 'explain' the observed 
empirical facts" (Quoted in Caldwell, p. 193). Samuelson 
responded that Machlup's deduction was, indeed, correct. 
Scientists never 'explain' any behavior, by theory 
or any other hook. Every description that is 
superseded by a 'deeper explanation' turns out 
upon careful examination to have been replaced by 
still another description, albeit possibly a more 
useful description that covers and illuminates a 
wider area. (Quoted in Caldwell, pp. 193-194) 
Few economists, it seems, were in agreement with 
Samuelson. According to Blaug, Samuelson's descriptivism 
"left most of the combatants with the feeling that 
Friedman's methodology might be objectionable but 
Samuelson's new methodology was worse" (1980, p. 111l. 
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The author suspects that the view of explanation and 
prediction that would be most widely accepted by neoclassi-
cal economists is that expressed in the so-called "covering 
law model of explanation" as developed by the philosophers 
of science, Carl Hempel and Peter Oppenheim. According to 
the covering law model, a scientific explanation for an 
event is provided when we find a universal law which, to-
gether with a specified set of initial conditions, allows 
the statement of the event to be logically deduced. This is 
what we are doing when we offer a causal explanation. As 
Blaug put it, "to cite a particular cause as an explanation 
of an event is simply to subsume the event in question under 
some universal law or set of laws ... " ( 1980, p. 3). 
The author also suspects that the covering law model of 
explanation would be widely acceptable to most neoclassical 
economists because it allows for both explanation and pre-
diction as goals of economic science. Since the covering 
law model is based on the logical structure of scientific 
explanation, it is possible to view prediction as working 
through the same logical steps as explanation, simply going 
the other way. "In the case of prediction ... we start with a 
universal law plus a set of initial conditions, and from 
them we deduce a statement about an unknown event; the 
prediction is typically used to see whether the universal 
law is in fact upheld" CBlaug, 1980, pp. 3-4). 
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The Nature and Functions of Explanation 
Caldwell points out that Hempel's view of scientific 
explanation has been widely challenged in the philosophy of 
science. Alternative formulations, he maintains, have not 
been descriptivist. On the contrary, they have "gone in the 
other direction by giving an even broader scope to explana-
tion in science than did Hempel and other logical 
empiricists" (Caldwell, pp. 194-195). 
The eminent philosopher of social science, Abraham 
Kaplan, has made one of the most significant contributions 
in the move to broaden the scope of explanation. In his 
influential book, Ih~ QQrr4~~1 Qf lrrq~itY~ tl~1hQ4QlQgy fQt 
~~h~YiQt~l ~~i~rr~~. Kaplan devotes an entire 43 page chapter 
to the matter of "explanation". What makes his work especi-
ally relevant for the present chapter is the affinity 
between his ideas about explanation and the role of under-
standing in philosophical hermeneutics. 
Kaplan broadens the scope of scientific explanation in 
the behavioral sciences by claiming legitimacy for the pat-
tern model of explanation as well as the deductive model (of 
which the covering law model is a subset). The pattern 
model is a holistic approach. "According to the pattern 
model ... something is explained when it is so related to a 
set of other elements that together they constitute a uni-
fied system" (Kaplan, p. 333l. 
simple illustration: 
Kaplan gives the following 
There is a figure consisting of a long vertical 
straight line with a short one branching upwards 
from it near the top, and a short curved line 
joining it on the same side near the bottom; the 
figure is meaningless until it is explained as 
representing a soldier with fixed bayonet, accom-
panied by his dog, disappearing around the corner 
of a building (the curved line is the dog's tail). 
We understand the figure by being brought to see 
the whole picture, of which what is to be ex-
plained is only a part <p. 333). 
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Kaplan points out that gestalt psychology has generated 
much of the literature on cognitive patterns which has been 
influential in the development of the pattern model of 
explanation. This literature has placed much emphasis on 
relationships, unity, wholeness, and integration. The ex-
planatory role of relationships is especially fundamental. 
For example, 
We explain a surmise that a certain letter in the 
cryptogram is an M: because the letters following 
are ESSAGE, so that together they spell a word, 
and this word in turn combines meaningfully with 
its successor RECEIVED. We explain a sequence 
whose successive members are 2, 4, 8, and 16 by 
observing that these numbers are increasing powers 
of 2 (Kaplan, p. 334). 
In examples like these we experience a "click of relation", 
the sense of understanding. "The perception that everything 
is just where it should be to complete the pattern is what 
gives us the intellectual satisfaction, the sense of clos-
ure, all the more satisfying because it was preceded by the 
tensions of perplexity" <Kaplan, p. 335). 
No explanation ever provides complete closure, however. 
It is more appropriately thought of as a tentative "cogni-
tive map" that is always open for adjustment. 
Every explanatory pattern is a fragmentary map of 
a limited territory; we aim to fill in details, 
and to fit it together with other fragments. As 
we pursue these aims, moving always into new ter-
ritories, we subject the map to continuous test. 
A sound explanation is one that grows on us as our 
knowledge grows (Kaplan, p. 336). 
In all of this, the fundamental link is between 
explanation and understanding -- "explanations provide 
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understanding" <Kaplan, p. 350J. This is as true for deduc-
tive models as for pattern models. In Kaplan's terms, the 
deductive and the pattern models are "two accounts of the 
reasons which provide understanding, and thereby explana-
tion" (p. 332). It should also be noted that deductive and 
pattern models are not mutually exclusive. "The pattern 
model of explanation can be applied to systems of deductive 
relations as well as to patterns constituted by other sorts 
of relations" <Kaplan, p. 336). On the other hand, Kaplan 
elaborates, " ... we can subsume pattern explanations under 
the deductive model. Fitting something into a pattern has 
explanatory force in so far as thereby we are enabled to 
show how what is being explained can be deduced from more 
general considerations" (p. 338). 
Returning to the issue of prediction versus explana-
tion, Kaplan maintains that prediction without explanation 
is possible and that explanation without prediction is also 
possible. As an example of the former, he notes that "the 
periods of certain pulsating stars are very well known even 
though we do not have any firm explanations of their beha-
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vior" (Kaplan, p. 349). Good explanations, on the other 
hand, may have considerable explanatory force, without 
making prediction possible. In terms of necessary and suf-
ficient conditions, this is easily seen. 
Our knowledge, especially in behavioral science, 
is often limited to what is necessary for a cer-
tain kind of event to occur but does not comprise 
what is sufficient to produce it. In that case, 
what we can explain on the basis of that knowl-
edge is not strictly deducible from it, and surely 
not predictable <Kaplan, p. 347). 
Kaplan does not deny that prediction is a goal of 
science in general, or social inquiry in particular. Nor 
does he deny that predictive capability is a good reason for 
accepting an explanation: "if we can predict successfully on 
the basis of a certain explanation we have good reason, and 
perhaps the best sort of reason, for accepting the explana-
tion" (Kaplan, p. 350). Kaplan is very much opposed, 
however, to the idea that predictive capability is the only 
criteria for scientific work: 
... recognition of the difference between explana-
tion and prediction may help relieve the pressure 
on theorizers to meet the immediate test of 
prediction or stand condemned of unscientific 
speculation. It is surely not too much to say 
that some good work has been done in behavioral 
science, and that not all of it has been marked by 
the power to predict. To arrive at some under-
standing of what is going on is hard enough, 
without having also to meet the demand that we 
anticipate what will happen next <Kaplan, p. 351l. 
Kaplan laments the fact that "for some time behavioral 
science has been too much concerned with weeding out 'pseudo 
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explanations' and not enough concerned with making the most 
for inquiry of what any explanation is capable of" (p. 358). 
That the range of capability extends considerably beyond 
enabling predictions can be seen by a brief review of the 
technological, instrumental and heuristic functions that 
Kaplan associates with explanations. 
The technological function of explanations refers to 
their adaptive usefulness: " ... they are used for a better 
adaptation to the environment, a more effective adjustment 
of available means to desired ends" (Kaplan, p. 356). It 
is in this technological function that the predictive capa-
bility is important. The importance of controlling and/or 
preparing to deal with events is obvious. And disastrous 
economic events such as the Great Depression make it appar-
ent why economists have placed such overwhelming emphasis on 
prediction. 
Another aspect of the technological function of expla-
nations is that they help us to act by providing a basic 
orientation toward events. "In so far as explanation pro-
vides understanding we can better orient ourselves, choose 
more wisely among the courses of action open to us" (Kaplan, 
p. 356). In economics, then, understanding is provided by 
economic explanation, and economic policy is chosen or sup-
ported in accordance with such understanding. 
Another function of explanation has to do with the 
communicative effect. This function, which Kaplan calls the 
instrumental function, is described as follows: 
We can produce results ... not just by applying 
knowledge but even by merely communicating it. An 
effect can be produced by helping others see an 
explanation .... We call this the instrumental 
function of explanation .... When someone has been 
brought to see an explanation he will in general 
behave otherwise than he would without an explana-
tion, or with a different one. A particular 
explanation, therefore, may be adduced in a cer-
tain context because it is expected to have such 
an effect. This expectation is of obvious impor-
tance in the practice of politics, psychotherapy, 
salesmanship, education, counseling, administra-
tion, and even religion (pp. 356-357). 
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This communicative effect of explanation is obviously what 
disturbs many critics such as Galbraith that the neoclassi-
cal economic explanation is the predominant one that is 
taught to several hundred thousand students each year. 
Finally, Kaplan points out that one of the roles of 
explanation is to guide inquiry. He refers to this as the 
heuristic function. New problematic situations arise in 
light of the explanation that the scientist already has. 
And this explanation tends to provide a guide for inquiry 
into the new situation. This viewpoint is reminiscent of 
Kuhn's claim that research problems pursued tend to be those 
which are seen as holding the most promise for extending the 
explanatory power of the accepted theoretical framework. 
A Hermeneutical Perspective 
So, Kaplan obviously would find Friedman's viewpoint 
that prediction is the exclusive goal of science -- to be 
fundamentally wrong. A hermeneutical perspective would 
align with Kaplan's perspective. In fact, Kaplan's views on 
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explanation are so in-line with the hermeneutical viewpoint 
that the latter could essentially be seen as a rewrite of 
the former. 
According to Gadamer, the object of the human sciences 
"is man and what he knows of hi mse 1 f. .. [and the J purpose of 
his knowledge is to govern his action" (1985, p. 280). 
This is essentially the instrumental function of explana-
tions that Kaplan discussed. 
According to Gadamer, we act in accordance with our 
understanding; and our understanding is constantly undergo-
ing adjustment as we encounter new situations that do not 
conform to our expectations. To paraphrase Kaplan, we act 
in accordance with our understanding; and understanding [in 
social inquiry] is provided by explanations. Furthermore, 
according to Kaplan: 
Every explanatory pattern is a fragmentary map of 
a limited territory; we aim to fill in details, 
and to fit it together with other fragments. As 
we pursue these aims, moving always into new 
territories, we subject the map to continuous 
test. A sound explanation is one that grows 
on us as our knowledge grows (p. 336). 
Substitute Kaplan's "cognitive map" for Gadamer's "horizon", 
and it becomes apparent that the "growing of a sound expla-
nation" in Kaplan's terminology is very nearly the same as 
the "fusion of horizons" in Gadamer's terminology. 
There is no need to pursue this analysis of similarity 
further. However, one more point needs to be made in regard 
to Friedman's essay. If one takes Kaplan's perspective Cor 
a hermeneutical perspective) on the explanatory role of 
theories, then one must obviously disagree with Friedman 
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about his ''irrelevance of assumptions" thesis. In terms of 
the pattern model, the "economic picture'' generated by a 
model built on false assumptions has to be, to some extent, 
a false picture. In this sense, then, the critics of neo-
classical economic theory are quite justified in attacking 
the theory on the grounds of unrealistic assumptions. 
CHAPTER X 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The recent turmoil in philosophy of science and the 
resulting uncertainty regarding the foundations for econom-
ic methodology have given rise to a call for methodological 
pluralism. Bruce Caldwell and Lawrence Boland have been 
particularly outspoken concerning the desirability of a 
pluralist perspective. Caldwell has suggested that from a 
pluralist perspective it is incumbent upon the appraiser to 
explicitly state the point of view being used to evaluate 
the strengths and weaknesses of the programme in question. 
The methodological appraisal of neoclassical economics de-
veloped in the preceding chapters has been carried out in 
the spirit of Caldwell's suggestions. 
The point of view used to guide this appraisal was 
philosophical hermeneutics as developed by Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. Gadamer's hermeneutics was developed out of the 
phenomenological tradition in western philosophy; a tradi-
tion which 13 considerably different from the epistemologi-
cal tradition which spawned philosophy of science. While 
neoclassical economics has been thoroughly appraised from a 
philosophy of science perspective, it has not been system-
atically appraised from a hermeneutical perspective. An 
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appraisal from the hermeneutical perspective was deemed 
appropriate because, as William Outhwaite has noted, " ... it 
is clear that his [Gadamer'sJ radicalisation of the hermen-
eutic approach has had and is having a powerful influence in 
Anglo-Saxon social theory" Cp. 371. 
Gadamer's hermeneutics is essentially a theory of human 
understanding which stresses the role of preconceptual ex-
perience. According to hermeneutical theory, human beings 
can never achieve a presuppositionless foundation for know-
ledge <as is the goal of epistemological philosophy!. Human 
beings, according to Gadamer, have already interpreted the 
world in many ways prior to conscious reflection. We always 
have a perspective Can understanding) that has been shaped, 
in part, by culture, tradition, and personal circumstances. 
Our understanding, however, is never fixed; it is constantly 
undergoing adjustment as we are faced with new situations. 
When we are faced with a situation that doesn't conform to 
our expectations, questions are raised, the resolution of 
which results in an adjustment of our understanding. 
The implications of Gadamer's hermeneutical theory for 
methodological appraisal stem from his ideas about the way 
questions are generated by new situations. Since he main-
tains that the purpose of the human sciences is to provide 
assistance in guiding human action, the appropriate ques~ 
tions to be pursued are those generated by the contemporary 
problematic situations facing humankind. Gadamer claims 
that a failure to be open (in the sense of willingness to 
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suspend one's existing perspective) to new situations may 
result in a failure to understand the questions being gen-
erated by the situation. 
Summary of Major Findings 
Most of the aspects of neoclassical economic methodol-
ogy that were dealt with in this appraisal were aspects that 
have been previously appraised from various perspectives 
(Marxist, institutionalist, and others). The most unique 
aspect of the present (hermeneutical) appraisal concerned 
the effectiveness of the neoclassical economic approach to 
inquiry with respect to issues raised by the contemporary 
problematic situation (Chapter Vl. The appraisal in this 
chapter relied primarily on Gadamer's model of conversation 
to explore the source of questions addressed by neoclassi-
cal economists and their apparent openness (or lack there-
of) to issues raised by the contemporary human situation. 
According to Gadamer, any explanation is implicitly or 
explicitly an answer to some question. In Chapter V, the 
case was developed that the neoclassical economic model is a 
very sophisticated set of answers to questions that were 
relevant during Adam Smith's time, some 200 years ago. It 
was argued, in Chapter V, that neoclassical economics has 
all the appearances of being a normal science in the Kuhnian 
sense -- the neoclassical economist seems to be engaged in 
trying to force the economic world into the preformed box of 
neoclassical economic theory. If this is indeed the case, 
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then the effectiveness of neoclassical economics in dealing 
With issues raised by the contemporary situation is called 
into question. 
The most pressing issues facing humanity today, accord-
ing to Gadamer, have to do with a loss of control over the 
forces of science and technology. Our civilization, he 
maintains, is founded on modern science. It is a civiliza-
tion characterized by the extensive domination made possible 
by scientific technology. The problem, he maintains, is 
that our capacity for technical reason has dangerously out-
paced our capacity for social reason. 
A cursory exploration was made in Chapter V of the way 
neoclassical economists have approached the issue of tech-
nology and other related issues. The conclusion was reached 
that the inquiry concerning these issues was basically an 
attempt to extend the explanatory power of the neoclassical 
economic paradigm. This, of course, is a characteristic of 
Kuhnian-type normal science. This conclusion, in and of 
itself, however, does not necessarily mean that the neo-
classical approach was inadequate for dealing with these 
types of issues. In one article reviewed in Chapter V, how-
ever -- "How Fast Should We Graze the Global Commons?'' by 
William Nordhaus -- a major inadequacy was alluded to. 
After suggesting a model to determine a carbon dioxide 
shadow price which could be applied in the form of a global 
carbon tax, Nordhaus noted that this sort of approach to 
global environmental problems must overcome monumental real-
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istic problems in agreeing on global policy. In Gadamer's 
terms, the problem Nordhaus alluded to is, at least in part, 
a manifestation of what Gadamer refers to as the lack of an 
adequate level of social reason. 
Gadamer's notion of social reason can be thought of as 
"insight into the suitability of any means to commonly 
willed ends ... " CGadamer, 1882, p. 77). According to him, 
our identity is inseparably rooted in a common reality and 
anything that atomizes common experiences is destructive of 
our sense of common reality and our capability for social 
reason. 
Gadamer's notion of social reason provided a unique 
approach to the appraisal of methodological individualism. 
Chapter VI explored questions concerning the effectiveness 
of methodological individualism for fostering a capability 
for social reason. Neoclassical economics and its methodo-
logical cornerstone of individualism were shown to be rooted 
in philosophical liberalism which fosters the expansion of 
the private political world and the contraction of the pub-
lic political world, while an expansion of the public sphere 
was argued to be essential to an expansion of social reason. 
In Chapter VI, the neoclassical economics conception of 
"public goods" was characterized as a weak conception grow-
ing out of the commitment to methodological individualism. 
A stronger (hermeneutical) conception of public goods and 
public interests was discussed. Common value, public goods 
and public 1nterest, in the stronger conception, do not have 
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some independent existence prior to and separate from social 
interactions. They are ~~~~1~~; they grow out of a sense of 
commonality, mutuality, and participative citizenship, 
which, in turn, is dependent on and nurtured by political 
conversation. While the neoclassical conception of public 
goods is certainly useful for technical economic analysis of 
many issues, it is an inadequate explanatory conception. 
Neoclassical economic theory provides an explanation of 
the economic system that is ineffective for the development 
of a sense of commonality, mutuality and participative citi-
zenship. Neoclassical economics perpetuates the notion that 
the market system automatically works to transform private 
interests into social harmony. In the cases of market 
failure, conceptual tools such as cost/benefit analysis can 
be applied. What the perspective of the neoclassical econo-
mist does, in other words, is to propagate the idea that 
"public ends" deserving of collective action can be deter-
mined by the appropriate analysis of marketplace decisions 
about private goods. It minimizes the need for community 
participation regarding collective action. From a hermeneu-
tical perspective, however, such participation plays a 
crucial role in the development of a citizenry capable of 
social reason. 
Other aspects of the appraisal -- the theory of 
consumer behavior and the rationality postulate in Chapter 
VII, the normative/positive distinction in Chapter VIII, and 
explanation versus prediction in Chapter IX -- did not yield 
218 
conclusions that were notably different from those reached 
by previous appraisals done from other perspectives. The 
appraisal from a hermeneutical perspective is significant in 
these cases, not only because it bears out the conclusions 
drawn from other perspectives, but also because it grounds 
the conclusions in a single, well-developed philosophical 
perspective. 
In Chapter VII the underlying assumptions of the theory 
of consumer behavior -- that consumers are rational in 
their pursuit of exogenously determined wants and preferen-
ces -- were found to be unrealistic from a hermeneutical 
perspective. This is, of course, an old criticism that has 
been levied against neoclassical economics by Marxists, 
institutionalists and others. The uniqueness of the herme-
neutical criticism is that it traces the origins of human 
wants and preferences to the preconscious and preanalytical 
web of life activities. This web is always in flux. And, 
it is profoundly influenced by the workings of the economic 
system itself. Furthermore, the concepts of technical rea-
son were also shown to be rooted in the matrix of human 
meaning that is formed at the preconscious and preanalytical 
level of life activities. The concepts of technical reason 
have meaning and significance only in conjunction with the 
elaborate matrix of meaning that is carried forward in 
everyday language, thought and praxis. From a hermeneutic-
al perspective, then, no conclusions can be drawn regarding 
the desirability of any set of outcomes without reference 
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to cultural context. 
The analysis in Chapter VIII concluded that the notion 
of a positive/normative dichotomy, or even a fact/value 
dichotomy, is illusory from a hermeneutical perspective. 
This conclusion is in line with the views of Marxists and 
institutionalists, and many others (including Mishan, Blaug, 
Heilbroner, Peacock and Rowley) that economics as a value-
free social science is not possible. These others, however, 
still seem to accept the idea of a fact/value dichotomy, 
with major points of contention over precisely where and in 
what form values should be allowed to enter the inquiry. An 
acceptance of the idea of a fact/value dichotomy is, in the 
author's opinion, the source of much of the confusion about 
the issue of values in inquiry. The uniqueness that the 
hermeneutical perspective brings to this issue is the claim 
that there is no distinct realm of either facts or values. 
Philosopher Calvin Schrag's excavation of the roots of fact 
and value (discussed in Chapter VII!) showed that valuation 
as well as fact originates in the precategorial and preana-
lytical matrix of human activities and concerns. Valuation 
is not something that is originally interjected into inquiry 
at some discrete point in the process; it is ineradicably 
part of the horizon within which inquiry is initiated. Just 
as McCloskey argues that economics would be improved if 
economists became more conscious of their use of rhetoric 
through open examination, the author suggests that economics 
would also be improved if economists became more conscious 
of the role of values in their inquiry by bringing values 
into the open for scholarly examination. 
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Finally, the analysis in Chapter IX found that, con-
trary to the claims of Milton Friedman, prediction could not 
be claimed as the exclusive, or even the primary, goal of 
economics when considered from a hermeneutical perspective. 
The purpose of the human sciences, from a hermeneutical per-
spective, is to generate understanding to assist in guiding 
human action. Understanding Cin social inquiry) is provided 
by explanations. In the author's opinion, the importance of 
stressing the role of explanation in economic inquiry is 
heightened by the fact that Friedman's famous essay on eco-
nomic methodology has been so influential. In his essay 
Friedman argues essentially that the unrealism of assump-
tions is not a relevant criticism, because the exclusive 
goal of positive economics is prediction. This argument can 
thus serve to insulate neoclassical economics from otherwise 
powerful criticism (of the sort discussed in Chapter VIIl. 
If explanation is a major goal of economics, then the real-
ism of assumptions can be very important. 
Microeconomics in a Broader Perspective 
This appraisal has culminated in some strong negative 
judgments about neoclassical economic methodology. These 
negative judgments do not, however, represent a wholesale 
denial of legitimacy to neoclassical economics. The findings 
of this appraisal simply deny legitimacy to neoclassical 
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economics as !h~ explanation of economic society: the view 
of microeconomics that is so grand and sweeping that it 
subsumes, in Martin Shubik's words "a goodly part of general 
behavioral science and philosophy as a subset of economics" 
CShubik, p. 407). 
There are, of course, numerous important and legitimate 
applications for traditional neoclassical microeconomics. 
For explanatory purposes, however, the author contends that 
a different approach would be more appropriate -- an 
approach that allows the virtues of holistic (hermeneutical) 
explanation as well as rigorous microeconomic analysis. The 
new microeconomics that Shubik anticipates in his wonder-
fully rambunctious article, "A Curmudgeon's Guide to 
Microeconomics", would seem appropriate: 
Since the defeat of the institutionalists, 
there have been many new developments in economics 
that I believe are going to result in the joining 
together of detailed institutional studies, ad-
vanced mathematical economic theory and political 
economy. I expect that a new microeconomics is 
about to emerge. It can be described (in a rather 
ponderous manner) as mathematical-institutional-
political economy Cp. 407). 
The author agrees with Shubik in his recognition of the need 
for microeconomics courses to provide a map for a variety of 
issues involving choice at the micro level. "Why and how 
microeconomic theorizing is relevant to the future lawyer, 
legislator, economist, manager, operations researcher, 
banker, bureaucrat, or citizen, are important questions" 
(Shubik, p. 409). The provision of such a map that 
stresses realism and relevance would be quite compatible 
with the hermeneutical perspective. 
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In conclusion, the hermeneutical perspective is one 
which calls for an "opening up" of economic inquiry incor-
porating approaches possibly less rigorous and elegant than 
the traditional formal model of neoclassical economics, but 
potentially more useful and relevant for understanding the 
scope and complexity of economic reality. Heilbroner has 
suggested, "What is needed is a new paradigm that will 
permit a major enlargement of economics -- not one that 
discards the relationships that economics can often usefully 
reveal, but one that absorbs them into a much larger and 
more complex system of social cause and effect" (1970, 
p. XV) • Hermeneutics is a philosophical perspective which 
would encourage such a development. 
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